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REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

No. 426

September Term, 2006

DAVE SHAWN JENNIFER v. STATE OF MARYLAND, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORREC TIONAL SERVICES, AND DIVISION OF CORRECTION

Krauser, Woodward, Wenn er, Willia m W. ( Ret., specially assigned) JJ.

Opinion by Krauser, J.

Filed: September 26, 2007

While working in the kitchen of the Central Laundry Facility of the Maryland Division of Correction, prison inmate Dave Shawn Jennifer was attacked and injured by fellow prisoner and co-worker, Stanley B. Taylor. Jennifer brought an action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against Taylor for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and against the State of Maryland1 for violations of Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, but his suit proved unavailing. Holding tha t Jennifer's exclusive remedy against the S tate lay with the Sundry Claims B oard, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the State and thereafter entered a default judgment against Taylor. On appeal, Jenn ifer claims that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment because his injury neither "arose out of his employment" nor was "accidental": two conditions that must be met, he insists, before Sundry Claims Board review can be obtained. B ecause w e find that Je nnifer's inju ry did indeed a rise out of h is employme nt, and because w e conclude that the B oard's jurisdiction is not limited to injuries that are "accidental," at least as that term is interpreted by Jennifer, 2 but includes injuries caused by the willful acts of third parties, we hold that Jennifer's exclusive remedy lies with the

In suing the State of Maryland, Jennifer specifically named the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services and the Division of Correction. Jennifer suggests that "accidental" should be defined narrowly so that it excludes injuries caused b y the willful acts o f third parties. B ut, as we sh all later discuss, this term has been defined in other statutory co ntexts, notab ly the Worke rs' Comp ensation A ct, to include such injuries.
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Sund ry Claims Board . Acco rdingly, w e shall af firm the judgm ent of th e circuit c ourt.

Background On Au gust 23, 20 02, Jennife r was w orking in the Central L aundry Fac ility with fellow inmate Stanley B. Taylor, where he received a wage for the work he performed.3 On that August day, Jennifer asked the dietary officer on duty in the kitchen for permission to have a hamburger. The officer agreed and directed Taylor to serve Jennifer the food he requested. But Taylor refused and, according to Jennifer's complaint, "[a] heated argument" erupted between Taylor and the officer. It ended when Taylor stated that "he would rather throw [the hamburger] on the floor than give it to [Jennifer]," and then pr oceed ed to do precise ly that. The office r then o rdered Taylor to leave th e kitche n. The next day, Taylor was again assigned to work in the kitchen. Although the two prisoners were placed in different areas of the kitchen and given separate duties, at some point Taylor "approached [Jennifer] from behind, holding a large spatula used to stir large pots" a nd struc k him in the hea d with i t. Taylor was, at that time, according to Jennifer's complaint, "under care by [the State] for mental health problems ... related to [his] violent disposition," but had, at that point, exha usted the m edication h e was tak ing for that c ondition. "D espite reque sts to

Jennifer was paid $.95 per day for his work, according to the affida vit of Pam ela Sorenson, facility administrator and custo dian of rec ords of the Central L aundry Fac ility of the Maryland Division of Correction. 3

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[prison officials] for additional medicine," none, the complaint averred, was provided.

Discussion Jennifer contends that the circuit court erred in holding that his sole remedy against the State lay with the Sundry Claims Board ("the Board") and, on that basis, entering summ ary judgm ent for t he State . Because this case was disposed of on a motion for summary judgment, our task would n ormally be to "` determine if there is a ge nuine disp ute of ma terial fact and , if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Goldstein v. Miles , 159 Md.App. 403, 422 (2004) (quoting Crews v. Hollenbach, 126 Md.App. 609, 624, 730 A.2d 7 42 (19 99), aff'd, 358 M d. 627, 751 A.2d 48 1 (2000)). B ut, since neithe r party alleges that there are any material facts in dispute, we confine our review of that motion to "whether summary judgment was correctly entered as a matter of law," Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. B errett, 395 Md. 439, 450-451 (2006) (citing Ross v. State Bd. of Elections, 387 M d. 649, 658 , (2005); Todd v. MTA, 373 M d. 149, 154 (2003); Beyer v. Morgan State U niv., 369 M d. 335, 359 (2002)), tha t is, "`whethe r the trial court w as legally correct '" in gra nting su mmar y judgm ent. Messing v. Bank of Am., N.A., 143 Md. App. 1, 10 (2002) (quoting Heat & Power Corp. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 320 Md. 584, 591 (1990)). We conclude that it was.

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The Sundry Claims Board Act4 ("SCBA") provides that the compensation authorized by that act is the "exclusive remedy against the State for a claim,"

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