Preview:

REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 1997 September Term, 2002

L. CHRIS LAMPROS v. GELB & GELB, P.C.

Hollander, Sonner, Adkins, JJ.

Opinion by Adkins, J.

Filed: December 3, 2003

L. Chris Lampros, appellant, was sued in a circuit court outside his county of residence in an action for declaratory relief. He contends that the Circuit Court for Montgomery County

lacked jurisdiction to hear the dispute due to improper venue and asks that we vacate the declaratory judgment entered against him. We agree, and so order. FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS Lampros shared a law office in the District of Columbia for 35 years with, first, Joseph Gelb, and then, Gelb & Gelb ("Gelb"), appellee. This arrangement continued until August 31, 2000, when Both Lampros

Lampros ostensibly retired from the practice of law.

and Roger Gelb, Joseph's son, are licensed to practice law in the District of Columbia. Neither lawyer is licensed in Maryland. Gelb is a

Lampros is a resident of Anne Arundel County, Maryland.

corporation located in, and organized under, the laws of the District of Columbia. On September 1, 2000, Lampros was contacted by Howard Schultz, the grandfather of Marshall Lewis, a minor who had been killed in an automobile accident. The accident occurred on August 18, 2000, The Lewis family resides in the case to Gelb. On

in Montgomery County, Maryland. Montgomery County. Lampros

referred

September 5, 2000, Marshall Lewis' parents, Robert and Linda Lewis, retained Gelb to represent them on a contingent fee basis regarding their wrongful death claim. The parties contest the degree to

which Lampros remained involved in the case.

Liability was not contested in the wrongful death claim and litigation was avoided. primarily involved Gelb's services for the Lewis family of the amount of insurance

identification

coverage and negotiation of the settlement amount, which was somewhat complicated by the existence of three other claimants. In May 2001, a settlement was reached in which the Lewises were paid $852,589.58. When Lampros learned of the settlement, he

demanded $142,098.00, which represented one-half of the contingency fee. Gelb placed the disputed $142,098.00 in its trust account and filed an action for declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Lampros filed a Motion to Dismiss or Transfer Action for Improper Venue. Judge Thompson denied the motion. Gelb then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. While that motion was pending,

Lampros filed an answer and counterclaim asserting three counts: breach of contract, fraud/nondisclosure of material facts, and declaratory judgment. On May 15, 2002, Judge Woodward granted Gelb's Motion for Summary Judgment. Gelb then filed a Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim and/or for Summary Judgment on the Counterclaim. While Gelb's

Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment on the Counterclaim was pending, Lampros filed three new motions: a motion to stay the operation of the May 15 order, a renewed motion to dismiss for improper venue, and a motion to vacate the May 15 order.

2

Judge

Thompson

granted

Gelb's

motion

to

dismiss

the

counterclaim and denied Lampros' motion to vacate; Judge Woodward denied Lampros' motion to stay and his renewed motion to dismiss for improper venue. Lampros filed a timely appeal to this Court. DISCUSSION I. Improper Venue Lampros argues that venue for this action was improper in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. We agree.

With limited exception, a defendant has the right not to be sued except in the county of his residence. 250 Md. 516, 518 (1968). See Eastham v. Young,

"The right to have a case heard in the Howell v.

court of proper venue is a personal privilege[.]"

Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc., 190 Md. 704, 711 (1948). "The privilege of a defendant to be sued only in the county of his residence is a substantial right not to be denied except in strict compliance with the exceptions established by law." Mandel, 250 Md. 255, 260 (1968). Capron v.

In Allender v. Ghingher, 170 Md.

156 (1936), the Court of Appeals explained: And even though equity could be considered the proper forum, it does not follow that appellants are compelled to defend the suits beyond the county of their residence, thus depriving them of the right of trial at home where they live and are known, which in turn makes the proceedings more costly to them. . . . "The privilege conferred on a defendant of being sued in the county of his domicile is a valuable and substantial 3

right which is not to be denied upon a strained or doubtful construction of a statutory exception or except in strict compliance with the law on clear and convincing proof, and all doubts are to be resolved in its favor." Id. at 165-66 (citations omitted). The legislature has provided statutory direction governing proper venue for disputes brought before Maryland courts. The

general rule for venue is set forth in Md. Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol.) section 6-201 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article ("CJ"), which states, in pertinent part (a) Civil Actions.

Download Lampros v. Gelb.pdf

Maryland Law