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REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 2009

September Term, 1999

JEFFREY R. LAPIDES v. KIRSTEN TRABBIC _______________________________ _ Kenney, Adkins, Karwacki, Robert L. (Retired, Specially Assigned) JJ.

Opinion by Adkins, J.

Filed: September 7, 2000

In this case, a father with joint custody of his teenage daughter sought tort damages from his ex-wife's companion.

Jeffrey R. Lapides, appellant, sued Kirsten Trabbic, appellee, the domestic partner of his former wife, for interfering with his parental rights and harming his relationship with his

daughter.

In reviewing the dismissal of appellant's complaint,

we must consider whether Maryland recognizes a tort cause of action by a parent against a third party who allegedly persuaded a child to transfer her affection from that parent.

FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS Appellant and Kathy Gabriel ("Kathy") were separated in

April 1994, and subsequently divorced in June 1996.

Before they

separated, three children were born to the marriage: Jessica, born May 23, 1981; David, born June 23, 1984; and Benjamin, born June 20, 1986. Appellant and Kathy's Separation and Property

Settlement Agreement ("Agreement") was incorporated into their divorce decree. Under this Agreement, appellant and Kathy

shared joint custody of their three children. provided that Jessica was "to choose the

The Agreement where she

location

resides on any given day."

Appellee currently resides with, and

is the intimate domestic partner of Kathy.

On appellee

March

1,

1999,

appellant

filed

a

complaint interference

against with

alleging:

(1)

"Intentional

parent/child relations;" (2) "Negligence;" (3) "Enticement;" and (4) "Fraud."1 Appellant alleged, inter alia, that appellee's

actions "included refusing and denying him the opportunity to speak with Jessica on the telephone; interfering with his

telephone calls to Jessica; making deliberate plans to interrupt his time spent with Jessica; instructing Jessica to not speak to him; directing Jessica to disregard his authority; and advising Jessica that he was not the parent responsible for disciplining her." Appellant prayed compensatory damages in the amount of punitive damages in the amount of four million

$500,000 and dollars.

Appellee filed an answer to the complaint denying the After a

stated allegations and a subsequent motion to dismiss.

September 27, 1999 hearing, the court dismissed the complaint without leave to amend. Additional discussion. facts Appellant timely noted this appeal. will be added as necessary to our

DISCUSSION Appellant claims that the trial court erred in dismissing
1

Appellant also claimed "intentional infliction of emotional distress," but is not challenging the dismissal of that claim on appeal. 2

his complaint. have not

Specifically, he argues that Maryland courts a claim by a custodial In parent addition, on for he the

foreclosed with

interference contends

parent/child owed

relations. him a duty

that

appellee

"based

responsibility each person has to exercise due care to avoid unreasonable risk of harm to others," and that she breached this duty by engaging in acts that contributed to the "estrangement [of] his relationship with his daughter." Appellant's final

claim is that he was fraudulently induced to "back off" his claim for sole custody of his children due to his reliance on appellee's answers regarding the nature of her relationship with Kathy during a deposition taken in appellant's divorce case.

I. Standard Of Review In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, a trial court must assume the truth of all well-pleaded relevant and material facts in the complaint, as well as all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom. See Odyniec v. Schneider, 322 Md. 520, 525 (1991). To this end,

the facts comprising the cause of action must be pleaded with sufficient specificity. See Continental Masonry Co. v. Verdel Further, although the

Constr. Co., 279 Md. 476, 481 (1977).

3

words of a pleading will be given reasonable construction, when a pleading is doubtful and ambiguous, it will be construed most strongly against the pleader in determining its sufficiency. Dismissal is

See Hixon v. Buchberger, 306 Md. 72, 75 (1986).

proper only if the alleged facts and permissible inferences, so viewed, would, if proven, nonetheless fail to afford relief to the plaintiff. 519, 531 (1995). See Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 340 Md. On appeal from the granting of a motion to

dismiss, this Court must determine whether the trial court was legally pleading. correct, examining solely the sufficiency of the

See Bobo v. State, 346 Md. 706, 709 (1997).

II. Intentional Interference With Parent/Child Relations And Enticement Appellant contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his claims of intentional interference with parent/child

relations and enticement. appellee committed

He posits that his allegations that acts aimed at destroying his

intentional

relationship with Jessica were the equivalent of stating a claim that appellee induced that on Jessica "Maryland Hixon v. to remain apart such from torts" and him. and the We

Appellant bases his

asserts

recognizes Buchberger,

argument

supra,

Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement") (1977)

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