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HEADNOTE: Michael H. Minehan v. State of Maryland, No. 2043, September Term 2001.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - CONFESSION - MIRANDA WARNINGS - CUSTODY Accused was not in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), when police approached him at his workplace and asked him to drive with them to the police station for questioning about a crime for which he was the alleged victim. The accused assented to the drive and the questioning, was told throughout the interrogation that he was not under arrest, and left the station unencumbered, only to be arrested one week later. Because there was no custody, police did not need to give the accused Miranda warnings before taking his statement. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - CONFESSION - VOLUNTARINESS - Accused's statement was voluntary under U.S. and Maryland law as police did not use improper inducements or threats to extract the confession. The officers' remarks that "everything [would] change[] once [they] left the room" and that the accused was "putting [him]self in a precarious position" were said to encourage the accused to be forthright in the investigation of the crime for which he was the alleged victim, not for the crime for which his confession was sought. Moreover, although perhaps hostile in tone, the statements did not rise to the level of improper threats. EVIDENCE - PRESERVATION - MOTION IN LIMINE - To preserve an evidentiary objection after losing on a motion in limine, the accused must renew the objection at the moment the court actually admits the suspect evidence. When the accused acted according to the court's grant of a continuing objection following the motion in limine, this Court may overlook the non-preservation and review the merits of the claim.

REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 2043

September Term, 2001 ___________________________________

MICHAEL H. MINEHAN

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

___________________________________ Sonner, Eyler, Deborah S., Krauser, JJ. ___________________________________ Opinion by Sonner, J. ___________________________________

Filed: October 1, 2002

REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 2043

September Term, 2001 ___________________________________

MICHAEL H. MINEHAN

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

___________________________________ Sonner, Eyler, Deborah S., Krauser, JJ. ___________________________________ Opinion by Sonner, J. ___________________________________

Filed:

In April and May of 1999, the police investigated a rash of armed robberies of commercial establishments in Montgomery County. The result of the investigation was a twenty-count indictment, with various permutations of robbery, conspiracy, assault, and use of a handgun, charging Michael H. Minehan with participating in the robberies as the driver of the getaway car. The indictment resulted in three trials, two of which were jury trials and one of which was a bench trial. The first jury

convicted Minehan of robbery with a deadly weapon, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony, conspiracy to commit robbery with a deadly weapon, and robbery. All of those offenses stemmed from the robbery of a restaurant, Sole D'Italia, on May 12, 1999. Minehan

was acquitted of some of the other charges in the indictment by a second jury, as well as by the circuit court in the first jury trial. Then, the circuit court in the bench trial convicted him of three counts of robbery with a deadly weapon. prossed the remaining charges. The State nol

Consolidating all the guilty

verdicts, the circuit court sentenced Minehan to twelve years' incarceration. On appeal, Minehan asserts that we must reverse all of the convictions confession. because the trial court accepted an unlawful

He also argues the court improperly allowed evidence Next, Minehan the jury's

of his other crimes during the first jury trial. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

for

convictions of robbery with a deadly weapon and use of a handgun.

Finally, Minehan alleges that, during the first jury trial, the judge erroneously limited defense counsel's cross-examination of a key witness. We find no reversible error and affirm the judgments. I. The Confession The suppression hearing is our source for learning what happened before, during, and after Minehan's confession. Facon v.

State, 144 Md. App. 1, 19, 796, cert. granted, __ Md. __, 801 A.2d 1031 (2002). Moreover, we must view the evidence from that hearing in a light most favorable to the State because it prevailed in the trial court on the motion to suppress. Detective Gene Curtis of the Id. at 20. Montgomery County Police

Department developed Minehan as a suspect in the robberies in late May 1999. The biggest tip came from Marcos Columba, who was the At the same

man suspected of effectuating the actual holdups.

time, the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department was investigating a robbery at Johnson's Flower Shop, where Minehan worked. Minehan was the alleged victim of that crime. Indeed,

Police suspected

Columba's involvement in the florist robbery, and given Columba's admitted relationship with Minehan, they suspected Minehan knew a great deal more about that robbery than he had expressed.

Accordingly, the police devised a plan to question Minehan about the florist robbery as a gateway to a larger discussion of his involvement in the serial robberies. Minehan was one month shy of

twenty-three years of age and did not have a criminal record.

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As

the

first

step

in

the

plan,

police

discussed

their

suspicions with Minehan's superiors at the flower shop and learned his work schedule. They hoped to confront Minehan before he had an

opportunity to speak with other suspects and "think a whole lot" about the investigation. It also is clear that they wished to

interrogate him in a manner that would not be viewed as custodial and trigger Miranda rights. Accordingly, on June 3, 1999, at 8:30

in the morning, three police officers, including Detective Curtis, arrived at the florist,1 wearing civilian clothes. Detective

Curtis testified that he approached Minehan, along with another officer and Minehan's employer, and asked to speak with him at the police station about the florist robbery. Minehan assented

"willingly." The officers followed him around the shop as he completed his work and walked out with him. According to Detective Curtis, although Minehan's car was parked in the florist lot, he assented to the officers' suggestion that he drive with them to police headquarters in an unmarked police vehicle. Apparently, one of the officers patted him down

before he got into the car, which Detective Curtis described as "normal" police procedure. Notwithstanding defense counsel's

prodding at the suppression hearing, Detective Curtis could not remember exactly what the men discussed in the car, although "it

The alleged robbery occurred at Johnson's Flower Shop in Washington, D.C. However, when police later confronted Minehan on June 3, 1999, he was working at Johnson's Flower Shop in Kensington, Maryland.

1

3

was something about the D.C. case." At police headquarters, the officers escorted Minehan to a room established for interviewing victims and witnesses. They

intentionally did not use the room set aside for the interrogation of suspects. He sat at the head of a long table with the three The taped interview began at 9:19 a.m., was

officers facing him.

interrupted for twenty minutes for Minehan's cigarette break, and ended less than two hours later at 11:00 a.m. incriminating remarks about a quarter of the He began his way into the

interview. The officers deliberately did not advise Minehan of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Following the confession, the officers obtained Minehan's permission to collect evidence at his home. That effort, however,

was unsuccessful, so the officers proceeded to drive Minehan to his car at the florist parking lot. June 10, 1999. A. Was Minehan Subject to Custodial Interrogation? By dictate of Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, an accused's statement cannot be used against the accused at trial if it was the product of "custodial interrogation" and the police did not inform the accused of certain habitual warnings before taking a statement. "The constitutional distillate of Miranda is that selfHe was arrested one week later, on

incrimination flowing from a custodial interrogation is, ipso

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facto,

compelled

self-incrimination

because

of

the

inherent

coercion

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