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Mattie Moore, as Parent and Next Friend of Monica Graham, a Minor v. Jeanne Myers, et al. No. 2519, September Term, 2003 Negligence; Violation of a Statute or Ordinance: Where there is an applicable statutory scheme designed to protect a class of persons which includes the plaintiff, the defendant's duty ordinarily is proscribed by statute or ordinance and that the violation of the statute or ordinance is itself evidence of negligence. In that situation, all that a plaintiff must show is: (a) the violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect a specific class of persons which includes the plaintiff, and (b) that the violation proximately caused the injury complained of. Negligence; Violation of a Statute or Ordinance; Proximate Cause: Proximate cause, in the context of a statutory violation, is established by determining whether the plaintiff is within the class of persons sought to be protected by the statute, and the harm suffered is of a kind which the drafters intended the statute to prevent. And, where there is evidence that the violation of the statute proximately caused the plaintiff's injury, evidence of such violation is sufficient evidence to warrant the court in submitting the case to the jury on the question of the defendant's negligence. Negligence; Superseding Cause: The chain of causation may be broken by an intervening force (negligent or non-negligent) that may, in turn, become a superseding cause, in which case the original tortfeasor's liability will terminate. An intervening force is a superseding cause if the intervening force was not foreseeable at the time of the primary negligence. Negligence; Negligent Entrustment: The doctrine of negligent entrustment provides that one who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical harm resulting to them. Negligence; Negligent Entrustment: There is no reference to "motor vehicles" in the Maryland definition of negligent entrustment. That tort refers to the negligent entrustment of "chattel" not "motor vehicles". And dogs are chattel under Maryland law.

Negligence; Intentional Actions: While it is true that the absence of intent is essential to the legal conception of negligence, the presence of an intent to do an act does not preclude negligence. Indeed, as we have observed, there is no reason why an intentional act that produces unintended consequences cannot be a foundation for a negligence action.

REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 2519

September Term, 2003

MATTIE MOORE, as Parent and Next Friend of Monica Graham, a Minor, v. JEANNE MYERS, et al.

Adkins, Krauser, Thieme, Raymond G., Jr.,
(Retired, Specially Assigned)

JJ.

Opinion by Krauser, J.

Filed: February 25,2005

Twelve-year-old Monica Graham was struck by a car in Prince George's County while fleeing a neighbor's advancing pit bull. The dog was, at that time, both unleashed and unconfined, in violation of Prince George's County law.1 Seeking damages for her daughter's injuries, Monica's mother, appellant Mattie Moore, brought a negligence action on behalf of herself and her daughter, in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, against the driver of the car, Mia Flatricia Young; the owner of the dog, Michael Myers; his wife, Jeanne Griffin Myers; Jaton, appellant

and her fifteen year-old son, Jaton Griffin.2

alleged, played a pivotal role in this matter: He was with the dog at the time of the accident and had, according to appellant, prompted the dog's pursuit of Monica, setting in motion the

terrible events of that day. In her amended six-count complaint, appellant alleged, among other things, that the accident had resulted from the individual negligence of Ms. Young, Jaton, and Mr. and Mrs. Myers and from the Myerses' negligent entrustment of Mr. Myers's pit bull to Jaton. After granting successive motions for judgment, the first at the conclusion of appellant's case and the second at the conclusion of the defense, the court permitted the case to go to the jury on a single count, accusing the driver of the striking vehicle, Ms.

1

Prince George's County, Md., Code

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