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HEADNOTE Janet L. Neal v. Prince George's County, Maryland, et al., No. 127, September Term 1997 ASSUMPTION OF RISK - VOLUNTARINESS - SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Court erred in granting summary judgment; appellant, a recipient of social service benefits, raised a jury question as to whether she voluntarily assumed the risk of falling on the icy sidewalk as she proceeded to the Department of Social Services for a scheduled appointment to obtain medical benefits for her child.

REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 127 SEPTEMBER TERM, 1997 ___________________________________

JANET L. NEAL v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND, et al. ___________________________________ Moylan, Hollander, Kenney, JJ. ___________________________________ Opinion by Hollander, J. ___________________________________ Filed: September 26, 1997

In this case, we must analyze the concept of voluntariness in deciding whether a recipient of social service benefits assumed the risk of falling when she walked on an icy sidewalk in order to keep a scheduled appointment with the Maryland Department of Social Services ("DSS"), rather than risk adverse consequences from

missing the appointment.

Janet L. Neal, appellant, brought a

negligence action against Prince George's County and Palmer Park Condominium Association, appellees, for injuries she sustained when she fell on January 24, 1994 on an ice-covered sidewalk leading to the DSS office in Landover. At the time, appellant had an

appointment with DSS to obtain medical assistance benefits for her young son; the accident occurred as appellant was approaching the only entrance to the DSS office. Appellees moved for summary judgment, claiming that appellant assumed the risk when she walked on the icy sidewalk. denied that her action was voluntary. Appellant

Following a hearing, the

Circuit Court for Prince George's County concluded that appellant assumed the risk of the occurrence, and granted appellees' motion. Thereafter, appellant timely noted her appeal. She presents a

single question for our review, which we have rephrased: Did the court err in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants when there was a dispute of material fact as to whether plaintiff voluntarily encountered a known risk?

We conclude that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment. In our view, it is for the jury to determine whether

appellant voluntarily assumed the risk of falling on the ice. Accordingly, we shall reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Factual Background Appellant had an appointment with DSS on January 24, 1994 at 9:45 a.m. at its office in Landover, for the purpose of obtaining medical assistance benefits for her son, Derek, who was then four years old. Appellant arrived at about 9:00 a.m., parked her car,

and observed that snow was on the ground and that the parking lot was icy. There was only one sidewalk leading to the entrance to Nevertheless, the

the DSS office, which was also covered with ice.

DSS office was open for business and so appellant, who was wearing boots, proceeded across the parking lot and up to the sidewalk, from which she entered the office without incident. After waiting approximately 20 minutes for her interview, appellant was informed that she needed identification to register Derek for medical assistance. Consequently, she was "told" to Neal exited the After taking about

return home to retrieve her identification. building and proceeded on the icy sidewalk.

ten or fifteen steps, she slipped on the ice but did not fall. Appellant then drove to her home, which was located a few minutes away, obtained the necessary identification, drove back to DSS, and

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parked in the identical parking space that she had previously used. As there was only one path available to appellant to reach the DSS entrance, she again traversed the icy path. Appellant took about

three or four steps and slipped at approximately the same location where she had slipped earlier. Unfortunately, this time appellant

fell and fractured her left tibia and fibula. At her deposition, appellant said of her decision to cross the ice another time: "I looked and I was scared to walk there, but I couldn't find another place to walk." She added:

I was cautious when I went back because I knew I had already slipped. So I was trying to watch where I was going. I was trying to find a place that I didn't have to go back the same way. And since I didn't, I just took my chances, went on across. And once I got right smack in the middle, I fell backwards, slid backwards. (Emphasis added.) Appellant also explained at her deposition that she thought her appointment was mandatory; while she did not "want to come [to DSS] that day," because of the weather, she thought she "had to be there." When asked whether she could have rescheduled the

appointment, she responded: I'm not sure. Because usually when you do that, if you have an appointment there and you don't keep it, they'll close your case or -- sometimes you got to wait like 30 days to get another appointment. Appellant also explained that she had no health insurance for her son, and needed medical assistance in order to obtain a

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physical examination and vaccinations for him that were required for school and child care. Appellant also believed that her public

assistance benefits would be terminated if she did not take her child to the doctor. Thereafter, appellees moved for summary judgment, asserting the affirmative defense of assumption of the risk. At the hearing,

the circuit court concluded: "I think that she took a chance, that she in her own words `took my chances.' I think that there was

assumption of the risk, and the motion for summary judgment is granted."

Standard of Review "In deciding a motion for summary judgment . . . the trial court must decide whether there is any genuine dispute as to material facts and, if not, whether either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Bagwell v. Peninsula Regional

Medical Ctr., 106 Md. App. 470, 488 (1995), cert. denied, 341 Md. 172 (1996); see Md. Rule 2-501; Davis v. DiPino, 337 Md. 642, 648 (1995); Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 737-38 (1993); Tennant v. Shoppers Food Warehouse, 115 Md. App. 381, 386 (1997). In our review of the trial court's decision granting a

motion for summary judgment, we must undertake the same analysis as the trial court. Cf. Martin v. ADM Partnership, 106 Md. App. 652,

657 (1995) (construing motions for judgment), cert. granted, 341 4

Md. 719 (1996).

This requires us to resolve all factual disputes

in Neal's favor, and to construe all inferences reasonably drawn from those facts in her favor as well. 387; Bagwell, 106 Md. App. at 488. Tennant, 115 Md. App. at

If the facts generate a jury Martin, 106 Md.

question, then summary judgment is not warranted. App. at 657.

In the absence of a dispute as to material fact, we

must also consider whether the trial court's decision was legally correct. Beatty, 330 Md. at 737; Tennant, 115 Md. App. at 386;

Bagwell, 106 Md. App. at 488. To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must present admissible evidence to show the existence of a dispute of material fact. Tennant, 115 Md. App. 386; Bagwell, 106 Md. App.

at 488; Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Porter Hayden, 97 Md. App. 442, 451 (1993), rev'd on other grounds, 339 Md. 150 (1995). formal denials or general allegations of disputed facts Mere are

insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment, however. Tennant, 115 Md. App. 386-387; Bagwell, 106 Md. App. at 488;

Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Richard F. Kline, Inc., 91 Md. App. 236, 243 (1992). Moreover, the evidence presented by the non-moving party

to defeat the motion must be sufficiently detailed and precise so as to enable the trial court to assess the materiality of the proffered facts. Beatty, 330 Md. at 738; Tennant, 115 Md. App. at Only a material fact, i.e., "a

387; Bagwell, 106 Md. App. at 489.

fact that will alter the outcome of the case depending upon how the 5

factfinder resolves the dispute over it,"

Bagwell, 106 Md. App. at See King v.

489, will be considered for purposes of the motion.

Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 111 (1985); Tennant, 115 Md. App. at 387. Discussion The elements of the affirmative defense of assumption of the risk are well settled. The defendant must show that: (1) the

plaintiff had knowledge of the risk of danger; (2) the plaintiff appreciated the nature of the risk of danger; and (3) the plaintiff voluntarily encountered the risk of danger. Liscombe v. Potomac

Edison Co., 303 Md. 619, 630 (1985); Martin, 106 Md. App. at 657; W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts

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