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Ocean City Police Department v. Dale C. Marshall, No. 1678, September Term, 2003

_________________________________________________________________ LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER'S BILL OF RIGHTS (LEOBR) -- Under the LEOBR, Article 27, section 728(b)(5)(i) (now Public Safety, section 3-104(d)(2)), a law enforcement officer under investigation shall be informed of the "nature of the investigation" prior to any interrogation. A notification to the officer that a complaint had been made concerning the officer's actions prior to and after the officer's capture of a suspected bank robber on January 8, 2002, was insufficient to inform the officer of the "nature" of the investigation.

REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 1678 September Term, 2003

OCEAN CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

v.

DALE C. MARSHALL

Eyler, James R., Barbera, Fischer, Robert F. (Ret., specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by Eyler, James R., J. Filed: July 19, 2004

This appeal arises out of disciplinary action taken by the Ocean City Police Department, appellant, against Sergeant Dale Marshall, appellee, an officer in the department. 2002, appellee apprehended a bank robber. On January 8,

Subsequently, he

received notice that he was under investigation with respect to "actions prior to and after the capture." Appellee appeared for

scheduled interrogations on two occasions and refused to answer any questions because appellant would not provide him with additional information with respect to the nature of the complaint. Consequently, appellant, through its chief,

sanctioned appellee for violating departmental rules on "Professional Courtesy" and "General Conduct/Courtesy," and suspended appellee from work for sixty-four hours without pay. Appellee sought review of the decision in the Circuit Court for Worcester County. The circuit court, interpreting the

provision in the Law Enforcement Officer's Bill of Rights (LEOBR), requiring that appellee be informed in writing of the "nature of the investigation" prior to interrogation, held that the notice provided by appellant was insufficient. Thus, the

court held that the resulting discipline occurred in violation of the LEOBR. We shall affirm the decision of the circuit court.

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Facts In 2002, appellee had been working for appellant full time for 29 years. In 1980, he was promoted to Sergeant. On January

8, 2002, appellee was instrumental in apprehending a bank robber on 47th Street and the beach, in Ocean City. On April 24, 2002,

appellee was asked to meet with Lt. Richard J. Currence (Lt. Currence), at which time he was given a "Notification to Accused of Complaint" (the Notification). The Notification was a printed The Notification

form, with handwriting, as set forth below. provided:

Be advised that a complaint has been lodged concerning a situation in which you were alleged to have been involved. The details of the complaint as they are known are as follows: On January 8, 2002 you were involved in captureing [sic] a suspected bank robber. This occurred at 47th and the BEACH, O.C. M.D. Your actions prior to and after the capture have come into question. You are further advised that other issues may arise concerning this complaint as the investigation progresses, at which time you will be informed as to their nature. * * * You have the right to be represented by an attorney or any other responsible representative of your choice. Should you desire representation, advise your attorney or other representative of your interview. [italics indicate handwriting]. Lieutenant Currence asked appellee to sign the Notification, and appellee refused, stating: haven't done anything wrong." "I am not signing anything. I

Appellee also stated that he was

represented by counsel, whom he identified as Damon Trazzi.

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Appellee referenced a worker's compensation claim previously filed by him and stated that he told his attorney "when we started" that the "Mayor and Council would try something." Apparently, Mr. Trazzi represented appellee with respect to the worker's compensation claim, and appellee believed that the investigation was somehow related to the filing of that claim. Lieutenant Currence wrote on the form that appellee refused to sign, and scheduled an interrogation date for May 22, 2002. Appellee indicated that he intended to call his attorney the following day. At the interrogation on May 22, 2002, appellee said he had been unable to contact his attorney, and the interrogation was rescheduled for May 29, 2002, so that appellee could obtain representation. Appellee was informed that the interrogation

would go forward on May 29th, with or without counsel. On May 26, 2002, appellee wrote a memo to Lt. Currence advising that he had spoken to Mr. Trazzi the day before. Appellee stated that Mr. Trazzi would not take the case because he did not know enough about the LEOBR, and Mr. Trazzi suggested he seek advice from another attorney. Appellee then gave Lt.

Currence the name of another attorney whom he planned to contact. On May 27th, appellee contacted Peter Wimbrow, III, an attorney, and scheduled a meeting with him on May 29th at 10:30 a.m. On May 29, the day of the interrogation, appellee sent a

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memo to Lt. Currence, stating that he could not make the interrogation because his attorney could not meet before that time. radio. Lieutenant Currence ordered appellee to appear, via police Appellee did so but refused to answer any questions

without his attorney present, even though Lt. Currence ordered him to answer. Appellee received a Reprimand and Disciplinary The report

Action Report as a result of the May 29th meeting.

recited a violation of departmental rules relating to courtesy and general conduct, for failing to answer questions, and suspended appellee without pay for sixty-four hours. After appellee met with Mr. Wimbrow, Mr. Wimbrow sent a letter, dated May 29, 2002, to Lt. Currence, advising him that appellee would appear for an interrogation if appellee were advised of the allegations against him. Lt. Currence responded

by letter, dated June 4, 2002, stating that charging documents had been prepared for failure to submit to the May 29 interrogation. The letter advised that another interrogation had

been scheduled for June 19, 2002, but declined to provide additional information. Appellee's counsel replied by letter

dated June 11th and requested that the interrogation be scheduled for the afternoon of June 19, as he had a court appearance scheduled for the morning or, in the alternative, rescheduled for any other morning of that week. was scheduled for the afternoon. The request was granted, and it

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On June 19, 2002, appellee appeared for the interrogation, with counsel, and once again refused to answer any questions. Subsequently, appellee received another Reprimand and Disciplinary Action Report. The report recited a violation of

the same departmental rules, for failing to answer questions on June 19, and reduced appellee's rank from sergeant to police officer, first class. Pursuant to appellee's request for a hearing, a three member hearing board was formed. 2002. The board held a hearing on August 9, Evidence was

Appellee was represented by counsel.

presented by stipulation of the parties.

Following the hearing,

the hearing board found that appellee had wrongfully refused to submit to interrogation on both days, May 29 and June 19, and upheld all charges, but recommended that appellee be disciplined by suspending him without pay for 8 days. Appellant, acting

through its chief, accepted the recommendation. On October 28, 2002, appellee filed a petition for judicial review in circuit court. After a hearing on August 18, 2003, the

circuit court issued a written opinion and order dated September 9, 2003, reversing appellant's decision. The circuit court held

that appellee had not been given sufficient information about the nature of the investigation, in violation of the LEOBR. Appellant noted this timely appeal.

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Questions Presented Appellant presents the following questions on appeal: I. Whether the trial court erred in finding that [appellee] was not "informed in writing of the nature of the investigation prior to . . . interrogation." II. Whether the trial court erred in finding that [appellee] had been disciplined "by reason as exercise of or demand for the rights granted him," in violation of the Law Enforcement Officer's Bill of Rights. Standard of Review The Court of Appeals recently addressed the standard of review, in a similar situation, in Coleman v. Anne Arundel County Police Dept.: No statute expressly establishes the scope of judicial review of an administrative proceeding initiated by a county police department pursuant to the LEOBR. See Montgomery County v. Stevens, 337 Md. 471, 482 (1995); Younkers v. Prince George's County, 333 Md. 14, 17 (1993)(noting that unlike the scope of review established under the State Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when a state police agency is involved, Md. Code (1984, 1993 Repl. Vol., 1993 Cum. Supp.), State Government Art.,

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