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REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 2187 September Term, 2010

ALAN SANFORD REMSON v. KAREN KRAUSEN f/k/a KAREN REMSON

Woodward, Wright, Hotten, JJ.

Opinion by Hotten, J.

Filed: June 28, 2012

On September 25, 2008, appellee, Karen Krausen, f/k/a as Karen Remson, filed a complaint for limited divorce in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. During the proceedings, the parties signed a consent order enjoining appellant, Alan Sanford Remson, from contacting appellee. A contempt order was subsequently issued when appellant violated the consent order. Appellant thereafter submitted a motion to set aside the contempt order. During the pendency of that motion, appellant, through new counsel, submitted a motion to withdraw the motion to set aside. Subsequently, the motion to set aside was granted. The motion to withdraw was granted soon thereafter. Appellant, again through new counsel, vigorously attempted to demonstrate that the motion to withdraw was improperly granted. An in banc panel reviewed the issue and concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to withdraw. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend, or in the alternative, motion to strike the contempt order pursuant to Md. Rule 2-535(b).1 The in banc panel denied the motion and appellant noted an appeal.2

Md. Rule 2-535(b) states that "[o]n motion of any party filed at any time, the court may exercise revisory power and control over the judgment in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity."
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Appellant presents the following questions: Did the circuit court abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant's motion to vacate the order granting injunctive relief as facially invalid for procedural irregularity because it was not issued in compliance with Rule 15-501 et seq .? Should the Appellant's contempt finding be vacated if the injunctive order on which it is based is void? (continued...)

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For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the pending appeal. BACKGROUND On September 6, 2008, the District Court for Montgomery County issued a temporary protective order against appellant. A few weeks later, appellee filed a complaint for a limited divorce. Appellee then filed an emergency motion for injunctive relief, arguing that appellant engaged "in an escalating course of abusive and harassing conduct" that made her fearful. Additionally, appellee alleged that appellant threatened her "livelihood, peace of mind, and safety." Appellee, in particular, posited that appellant repeatedly called her despite requests to stop, he was verbally abusive during the phone calls, and he repeatedly sent her email and text messages despite numerous requests to stop. Appellant countered that the injunction was unnecessary because he had no intention of initiating future communication. Moreover, appellant averred that the allegations were untrue and exaggerated. On November 3, 2008, appellant submitted a "NO CONTACT AGREEMENT" ("Agreement") to the circuit court. The Agreement stated that appellant would not directly or indirectly contact appellee, and that he would refrain from communicating with mutual friends about her. Thereafter, the Agreement provided: This agreement will be strictly adhered to and if violated, and proof of a

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(...continued) 3. In the alternative, did the [c]ircuit [c]ourt err when it denied Appellant's motion to dissolve the injunction without holding a hearing and without making findings to support continuation of the injunction?

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violation is forthcoming such as phone records, computer email printouts or a statement from a mutual friend, the attached Order Granting Injunctive Relief shall be entered with the Court and [appellant] shall be liable for a portion of [appellee's] attorney['s] fees which correspond to a breach of this Agreement. On November 7, 2008, the parties signed a consent order granting injunctive relief. The order provided: Upon consideration of [appellee's] Motion for Injunctive Relief filed in the above-captioned matter and for good cause shown, it is thereupon this 7 day of November, 2008, by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, ORDERED, that [appellant], is hereby enjoined from contacting [appellee] in any way, either directly or indirectly, including but not limited to, telephoning, emailing, or texting [appellee]; and it is further; ORDERED, that should [appellant] fail to abide by this Order, he shall be liable to [appellee] for all attorney's fees and costs for the preparation of the Motion for Injunctive Relief and Order and all sanctions necessary to enforce this Order. About thirteen days later, appellee filed a motion for contempt, asserting that appellant had contacted her at work. Appellant countered that the allegation was untrue. Specifically, he posited that he was driving home from the doctor when the incident was alleged to have occurred.3 Appellant then noted that he had no intention of violating the injunction because he would lose his security clearance and employment opportunities. After considering the arguments, the circuit court found appellant to be in contempt and sentenced him to thirty days of incarceration. The sentence was suspended, predicated on future compliance and

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Appellant provided cell phone records to demonstrate that he did not call appellee. -3-

payment of $2500 in attorney's fees. On September 17, 2009, appellant submitted a motion to set aside the contempt order, noting that he had complied with the provisions of the injunction since June 23, 2009. Appellee opposed, positing that there was no reason to set aside the order. Not long after, appellant retained new counsel, who submitted a motion to withdraw the motion to set aside. Days later, the motion to set aside the contempt order was granted. The motion to withdraw was then granted, thereby vacating the motion to set aside, which in turn, resulted in the continued viability of the contempt order. On December 3, 2009, through new counsel, appellant submitted a motion to vacate the order granting the withdrawal. In that motion, appellant argued that the motion to withdraw was "inadvertently filed . . ." because he and previous counsel "did not effectively communicate . . . ." Appellant then requested that the circuit court exercise its revisory powers and reinstate the order that set aside the contempt order. Appellee opposed, positing that the court entered the order in error. The motion was denied and appellant subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend, reiterating the same arguments. Again, the circuit court denied the motion. Appellant thereafter requested an in banc panel review to determine whether the circuit court abused its discretion in granting the motion to withdraw. After the in banc panel concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion, appellant filed a "Motion To Reconsider, Alter Or Amend Order Dated July 9, 2010; Or, In The Alternative, Motion To Vacate Contempt Order Entered June 23, 2009 Pursuant To Rule

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2-535(b)." Appellant argued that the contempt order should be vacated because injunctive relief was not properly issued. Namely, appellant averred that it was impossible to determine whether the injunction was permanent or temporary; the reasons for granting the injunction were not properly placed on the record; the reasons for the relief were not stated in writing; there was no reference to harm; and no hearing was held. Appellant then posited that the contempt order should be vacated because there was an "irregularity" in the process of granting the injunction. Appellee opposed, arguing that the in banc panel lacked authority to vacate the contempt order. Appellee also posited that the validity of the injunction was not before the panel. Appellee, nevertheless, averred that the alleged errors must be disregarded because the parties consented to the injunctive relief. In an order dated October 14, 2010, the in banc panel denied appellant's motion without explanation. Appellant thereafter noted an appeal. DISCUSSION An in banc panel review has been endearingly referred to as "the poor person's appeal." Washabaugh v . Washabaugh , 285 Md. 393, 396 (1979) (citing Roth v. The House of Refuge , 31 Md. 329, 333 (1869)) (internal quotations omitted). This moniker stemmed from the sentiment that Article IV,

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