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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 77

September Term, 1996 ___________________________________

NATASHA RENKO v. TERESA KAYLOR McLEAN ___________________________________

Bell, C.J. Eldridge Rodowsky Chasanow Karwacki Raker Wilner JJ. ___________________________________ Opinion by Karwacki, J. ___________________________________

Filed:

July 30, 1997

In Warren v. Warren, 336 Md. 618, 650 A.2d 252 (1994), and Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 505 A.2d 826 (1986), this Court declined to create an exception to the parent-child immunity doctrine in motor tort cases based upon the existence of compulsory automobile liability insurance coverage. reexamine those decisions. We are asked in this case to

Having done so, we shall reaffirm the

vitality of the parent child-immunity doctrine in this State and affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.

I. The facts of this case are brief and undisputed. 8, 1992, Natasha Renko suffered serious injuries On December when her

biological mother, Teresa Kaylor McLean, negligently drove the car both women were occupying into the rear of another vehicle. time, Natasha Renko was seventeen years old. On January 18, 1994, and following her eighteenth birthday, Renko filed a Complaint and Election of Jury Trial in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County seeking damages in the amount of $100,000 for injuries she allegedly sustained in the December 8, 1992 automobile accident. The Complaint named Teresa McLean and At the

her husband, Robert McLean,1 as defendants,2 here appellees.

1 2

Robert McLean is Natasha Renko's stepfather.

The Complaint charged Teresa McLean with direct negligence as the operator of the motor vehicle in which Natasha Renko sustained her injuries. Robert McLean was named as a defendant under a theory of vicarious liability for engaging Teresa McLean as an agent or servant.

Both Teresa and Robert McLean filed Motion[s] to Dismiss. Robert McLean subsequently filed an independent Motion for Summary Judgment. In a hearing on the motions, Renko beseeched the court

to recognize an exception to the parent-child immunity doctrine and allow emancipated children to file actions against their parents for injuries sustained in motor vehicle accidents occurring in minority between fifteen and eighteen years of age. The court

declined to do so and entered judgment in favor of the appellees. Renko appealed the judgment entered in favor of her mother to the Court of Special Appeals.3 We issued a writ of certiorari

before consideration by the intermediate appellate court of the issues presented in this appeal.

II. For nearly seventy years, the parent-child tort immunity doctrine has been, with few exceptions,4 a salient feature of Maryland law. (1930).5 See Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498

It remains so today.

Natasha Renko did not appeal the judgment entered in favor of her stepfather, Robert McLean. We have departed from this rule on only two occasions. First, when a child has suffered cruel or unusually malicious conduct at the hands of a parent, an action for monetary damages may be maintained. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951). Second, a child may sue a parent's business partner for negligence committed in the operation of the partnership. Hatzinicolas v. Protopapas, 314 Md. 340, 550 A.2d 947 (1988). The reasons for these departures are discussed more fully, in Part III a., infra.
5 4

3

The first formulation of the parent-child immunity doctrine was adopted

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Once an absolute bar to tort actions between parents and their minor children,6 the parent-child immunity doctrine grew out of an abiding belief that it served the compelling public interest in preserving, under normal circumstances, the internal harmony and integrity of the family unit and parental authority in the parentchild relationship. Warren v. Warren, 336 Md. 618, 622, 650 A.2d

252, 254; Smith v. Gross, 319 Md. 138, 145-46, 571 A.2d 1219, 1222 (1990); Frye, 305 Md. at 548, 505 A.2d at 829-30; Yost v. Yost, 172 Md. 128, 134, 190 A. 753, 756 (1937); Schneider, 160 Md. at 21-22, 152 A. at 499-500. In fact, the special relationship, with its

reciprocal duties and obligations, that the minor child shares with his or her parents forms a major component of the foundation upon which the parent-child immunity doctrine is built -- a relationship recognized both at common law7 and by the General Assembly.8 Other

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by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). Mississippi has since repudiated the doctrine in motor tort cases. See Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992). The immunity does not apply to tort actions between parents and their adult children arising beyond minority . Waltzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107, 12526, 128 A.2d 617, 627 (1957). See, e.g., Greenwood v. Greenwood, 28 Md. 369, 381 (1868)(father entitled to earnings of minor child); Lucas v. Maryland Drydock, 182 Md. 54, 58-60, 31 A.2d 637, 639 (1943)(parents possess right to discipline children for the benefit of their education); Mahnke, 197 Md. at 64, 77 A.2d at 924 (minor childrens' rights inferior to parental rights so that latter can effectively discharge their parental obligations); Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 510-11, 374 A.2d 900, 902 (1977)(duty of support entitles father to child's earnings and services); Singer v. Singer, 300 Md. 604, 611, 479 A.2d 1354, 1358 (1984)(parents have duty to support adult incapacitated child); 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, CH. 16, OF PARENT AND CHILD.
8 Indeed, Maryland Code (1984, 1991 Repl. Vol., 1996 Supp.),

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