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REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 1838 September Term, 2000

WILLIAM DALE RIDENOUR, JR.

v. STATE OF MARYLAND

Salmon, Eyler, Deborah S., Bloom, Theodore (Ret'd, Specially Assigned), JJ.

G.

Opinion by Eyler, Deborah S., J.

Filed: December 31, 2001

In the Circuit Court for Caroline County, William Dale Ridenour, Jr., the appellant, was charged with first degree burglary, several lesser included burglary offenses, and theft over $300. He pled guilty to first degree burglary pursuant to

a negotiated plea agreement; as part of that agreement, the State nolle prossed the remaining charges. On August 28, 2000,

the appellant was sentenced to a 15-year term, eight years of which were to be served and seven years of which were to be suspended in favor of five years' supervised probation. The appellant filed an application for leave to appeal, which was granted. He presents three questions for review. We

have adopted the State's reworded and combined restatement of those questions: I. Did the trial court properly sentence the appellant consistent with the terms of the plea agreement? Did the trial court impose sentence based on impermissible considerations?[1]

II.

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As worded by the appellant, the questions presented were: Whether the trial court erred, as a matter of law, when it breached the binding, written plea agreement that Appellant Ridenour and the State entered into whereby Appellant Ridenour would be sentenced within the sentencing guideline range, which was agreed to be two to eight years, and instead, the trial court sentenced Appellant Ridenour to 15 years, executing upon eight years and suspending seven years. Whether the trial court violated Maryland Rule 4243(c), by failing to inform Appellant Ridenour that (continued...)

1.

2.

For

the

following

reasons,

we

answer

"yes"

to

both

questions. Accordingly, we shall vacate the sentence imposed by the circuit court and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing, by a different judge. We shall recite the pertinent

facts in our discussion of the issues.

DISCUSSION
I. On June 7, 2000, the appellant and the State entered into a written "Plea Agreement" in which the appellant agreed to plead guilty to first degree burglary and the State agreed to nolle pros the remaining charges. Paragraph 9 of the Plea

Agreement provides, in pertinent part: The sentence disposition and/or other judicial action will be: The court will bind itself to a split sentence with initial time to serve not to exceed sentencing guideline range, with the balance of the

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(...continued) the trial court rejected the plea agreement and failing to afford im the opportunity to withdraw his plea and to go before a different judge. Whether the trial court erred when it considered, during sentencing, (A) Appellant Ridenour's exercise of his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination during the investigation, arrest, and detention phase, prior to his guilty plea, and (B) Appellant Ridenour's exercise of his First Amendment rights under the free exercise clause [sic] and the establishment clause [sic] of the United States Constitution. -2-

3.

sentence suspended in favor of supervised probation . . . . The guideline range was two to eight years. the appellant was sentenced by a circuit On August 28, 2000, court judge (now

retired) to a total of 15 years, eight of which were suspended in favor of five years' probation. The appellant contends that the Plea Agreement was a binding agreement, under Md. Rule 4-243(a)(6), which the court accepted, but the court then failed to impose a sentence in accordance with the terms of the Plea Agreement. Specifically, he argues

that, when read in light of Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.), Art. 27,

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