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HEADNOTE Linda Ann Senez v. Ann Collins, et al., No. 111, September Term, 2007 ADVERSE POSSESSION; ACTUAL POSSESSION; CONTINUITY OF POSSESSION; RE-ENTRY ON THE LAND; HOSTILITY. The court erred in its resolution of appellant's adverse possession claim. The maintenance and improvement of the disputed land area by appellant and her predecessors, which included yard work, construction of a bulkhead, and installation of a boat ramp, constituted actual use and possession. Appellees' recreational use of the boat ramp did not constitute re-entry sufficient to re-take possession; such use does not have the characteristics of maintenance, upkeep, and improvement of land that constitutes possession. The court erred in equating cooperative relations between landowners as evidencing a failure to establish the element of hostility; the element of hostility pertains to the land.

REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 111 SEPTEMBE R TERM, 2007

LINDA ANN SENEZ v. ANN COL LINS , et al.

Kraus er, C.J., Hollander, Moylan , Charle s E., Jr., (retired, specially assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Hollander, J.

Filed: October 3, 2008

This appeal arise s from a d ispute as to th e ownership of a 291-square-foot sliver of land situated along the boundary of two adjoining waterfront properties in the Middle River area of Baltimore County. The disputed area also includes a portion of a concrete boat ramp that straddle s the co mmo n boun dary. Lin da An n Sene z, appellant, is the owner of 341 Worton Road (the "Senez Property"); Ann and Steve Collins, appellees, own 339 Worton Road (the "Collins Property"). Both properties front on Norman Creek, a tributary of the Chesa peake Bay, and each c ontains a single family ho me. In Septemb er 2004, ap pellees filed a quiet title action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, and also alleged c laims, inter alia , of trespass and nuisance. Appellant filed a counterclaim based on adverse possession. Following a bench trial in 2006, the cou rt ruled in favor of appellees as to most of their claims, including adverse possession. On appeal, appellant presents one issue: "Whether the circuit court erroneously denied the appellant's adverse possession claim despite the evidence of twenty-thre e years of hos tile possession and the ab sence of a ny clear and u nequivoc al acts by the appellees to challenge her exclusive, hostile possession." For the reasons that follow, w e answe r in the affirm ative and sh all therefore v acate the judg ment a nd rem and fo r furthe r proce edings . FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Appellant purchased the Senez Property on November 22, 2000, and began to live there immediately. Her predecess ors in title, Arthur L. and Joan E . Myers ("the Myers"), had previously acquired the property on April 6, 1981, and lived there continuously for

approximately nineteen years and seven months. Appellees purchased the Collins Property on August 14, 2000, from the estate of George Cook, who had ow ned the property with his wife, Madeline Co ok ("the Cook s").1 The Cooks had acquired the property on August 7, 1973. In October 2000, appellees tore down the existing house on the property and commenced construction of a new home. As a result, they did not begin living on the property until late July 2001. Thus, although appellees purc hase d the Collins P rope rty before appellan t acq uired the Sen ez Prope rty, appellant was already living on her property before appellees moved into theirs. At the time the parties purchased their respective properties, the properties were separated by a concrete retaining wall (the "Wall"), which did not prec isely track the pro perty line. The Wall, approximately 115 feet long, extended almost the entire length of the boundary between the properties, beginning some 75 feet from Worton Road and terminating at the point where the Wall met a concrete sea wall, or bulkhead, which separated the Collins Property from Norman Creek. A survey of the Senez Property, which was conducted for appellant by Bryan R. Dietz, and which was later admitted at trial as a joint exhibit (the "Dietz Survey"), showed that approximately 35 feet before meeting th e sea wall, th e Wall diverged from the boundary line. Between that point an d the sea w all, according to the Dietz Survey, the W all sat entirely on the Collins side of the property line. As a result, a narrow strip of the Collins Property was located on the Senez side of the Wall. That narrow strip

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We assume that Ms. Cook predeceased her husband. 2

betwe en the W all and th e boun dary line is the area of land in dispu te. The disputed area contains part of a concrete boat ramp that extends past the sea wall, providing access from the Senez Property to Norman Creek. The boat ramp is ent irely on the Senez sid e of the W all. But, because the Wall does not follow the boundary, a portion of the boat ramp falls on the Collins side of the property line. In the disputed area, the elevation of the ground on the Senez side of the Wall is a few feet higher than the elevation on the Collins side. As noted, the Wall was a retaining wall; it maintained the properties at their differing elevations. On September 29, 2004, appellees filed suit against appellant, seeking mon etary damages and injunctive relief, on the grounds of trespass , continuing trespass, priva te nuisance, quie t title, and inva sion of privacy. 2 In relevant part, appellees contended that they owned "one half of a boat ramp which straddles the parties' properties," and that appellant had "[i]nstalled a wood fence between the properties, which fence not only encroaches on the Collins Pro perty but at the so uth end of the Collins Proper ty, also blocks access by [appe llees] to th at part of the Co llins Pro perty wh ich inclu des the shared boat ram p." In her Answer, appellant contended that she "presently owns the entirety of the boat

The Complaint also contained a seventh "count," which was merely a prayer for injunctive relief. Appellee s' nuisance and invas ion of priva cy counts w ere groun ded in allegations that, as the neighbors' relationship deteriorated, appellant placed hostile signage and video cameras on the Senez Property facing the Collins Property. In rulings that appellees do not contest, the court awarded judgment in appellant's favor on these counts. We need not discuss these allegations f urther, as they are not germa ne to the issues on appeal. 3

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ramp by adverse possession." She also denied "the allegation that any portion of the fence encroaches upon the Collins Property insofar as she presently ow ns the prop erty in question by adverse possession." Then, on November 8, 2004, appellant filed a "Counterclaim for Title by Adv erse Po ssession and B ill to Qu iet Title." 3 She allege d that "the S enez Pro perty is . . . marked at its b oundary w ith the Collins Property by a one-foot wide block wall and a wooden privacy fence," and that she "and her predecessors in title for more than the prescriptive period of twenty (20) years have maintained the lawn, erected and/or maintained fencing and/or the aforedescrib ed block wall and/or have otherwise exercised actual peaceab le possession" of the disputed area. Further, appellant contended that her

predecessors' possession , as well as her own, had been "actual, open, notorious, exclusive and hostile, and that said possession has been continuous and un interrup ted," thus satisfying the requ iremen ts for ad verse p ossessio n. The matter was heard by the circuit court, sitting without a jury, in December 2006.4

The Counterclaim was initially filed against appellees and their mortgage lender, National City M ortgage C omp any. Subsequently, appellant voluntarily dismissed National City as a c ounter -defen dant. Days before trial, appellees filed an Amended Complaint, which added claims of adverse possession against app ellant, relating to a separate portion of land closer to the properties' western boundary at Worton Road, where the Wall again crossed the property line as surveyed, in this in stance cros sing onto th e Senez Pro perty and leaving a sliver of the Senez Property on the Collins side of the Wa ll. Appellant responded the next day with a Motion to Strike Amended Complaint as untimely. At the outset of trial, the court heard argument on the motion. It subsequently denied the motion to strike, concluding that it was "easier to resolve this issue." The court later denied appellees' adverse possession claim. Appellees have not challenged that ruling. 4
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All of the p arties testified at trial. 5 At trial, the court received into evidence as a joint exhibit the de bene esse deposition testimony of Arthur M yers, the prior owner of the p roperty acquire d by appellan t. In his deposition, Mr. Myers stated that he purchased the property w ith his wife in 19 80, but did not secure a boun dary surv ey at that tim e. Mr. M yers recalled that th e Wall (or a predecessor to it) was a lready in p lace w hen he purcha sed the proper ty now o wned by appel lant. He did not know w ho originally constructed the Wall, however. Mr. Myers did not realize that the Wall did not track the property line, and he assumed that the Wall was situated on his neighbors' side of the boundary. According to Mr. Myers, in the late 1980's a portion of the original Wall fell down; the Cooks had the Wall rebuilt in the same footprint, at their own expen se, with a better f ounda tion and "wee p holes " to allow drainag e. Throughout the time the Myers owned what is now the Senez Property, both when the original Wall existed and after the construction of the replacement Wall, the M yers maintained the property up to the Wall, doing yard maintenance and the like. Acc ording to Mr. M yers, the C ooks n ever ob jected to his main tenanc e of the proper ty up to the Wall. Mr. Myers recounted that he constructed the boat ram p wh ile he lived at the prop erty. 6
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Some of the testimony related to issues that are not contested on appeal. Therefore, we shall omit reference to that testimony. Moreover, because the testimony of Steve Collins was lar gely dup licative o f that of Ann C ollins, w e shall o mit refe rence to most o f it. It is not clear whe n the ramp was built. Throughout Mr. Myers's deposition, he often misstated the year of an event. For instance, he initially responded that he bought the Senez Property in 2000, then corrected himself to 1980. Moreover, he testified that he constructed (contin ued...) 5
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Although Mr. M yers did not obtain a boundary survey at that time, he claimed that he never received any complaints that the boat ramp encroa ched on the Co oks' property. Mr. Myers never e xpand ed the ra mp, an d had n o need to perfo rm sign ificant m aintena nce on it. In addition, Mr. Myers constructed a wooden sea wall, or bulkhead, across the eastern side of his pro perty, fronting on Norman Creek. At the same time, he constructed a wooden bulkhead on the Cooks' side of the boat ramp, extending to the concrete sea wall along the east side of what is now th e Collin s Prope rty. He explained that, due to erosion from the creek, " we w ere losin g prop erty." 7 Mr. M yers testified: The only discussion I had with George [Cook] was when I was gonna build the bulkhead the water had started eroding around his bulkhead and I say, "Well, I'll tie it into your bulkhead so the water can 't get dow n there." Y ou see, it was underm ining his bulkhead, so that's why, if you see that there's some curve in this when I brought it back to meet his bulkhead. Mr. Myers allowed many neighbors to use the boat ramp, "with perm ission." In particular, he recalled that he allowed various neighbors to use the ramp d uring a perio d in which "the local [public] ramp closed, and until it w as open ed aga in, I allowed them to come down and put their boats in." According to Mr. Myers, this use was infrequent, and "anyone [who] would launch their vessel from [his] ramp did so after first securing [Mr. Myers's] permis sion." Mr. Myers was emphatic that the ramp "was not open to the public [such] that
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(...continued) the ram p in 200 0, but als o stated that peo ple use d the ram p durin g the '8 0s and '90s. This woode n bulkhea d is shown on the Dietz Survey as "wooden sea wall." In effect, the wooden bulkhead extends the Wall past the concrete sea wall; it is wholly on the Collins side of the pro perty line. 6
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they could wander down [the] property." With regard to the Cook s, however, M r. Myers asserted that there was n o formal "understanding." In his words, "I'm a neighbor and I of fered it." Mr. Myers also assisted the Cooks with launching boats from the ramp. When asked wh ether he recalled seeing anyone from the C ook fam ily ever cross the Wa ll and use the boat ramp , Mr. Myers said: "I wouldn't have thought anything of it if they did." M r. Myers indica ted that, "to his recollec tion," af ter appe llees pu rchase d the C ollins Pr operty "th ey never used" t he ram p. Shortly before Mr. Myers sold his property to appellant in 2000, he obtained a survey of the property, to en sure that a fence he intended to construct on the southern boundary of his proper ty (i.e., the opposite side from the C ollins Prope rty) correctly follow ed the prop erty line. The surveyor inform ed Mr. M yers that, on the northern side of his property, there was "about a foot difference" between the Wall and the actual property line, such that the W all was "a foot back from the property line onto 33 9," i.e., the Collin s Property. M r. Myers said that his primary interest was the correct placement of the fence on the southern side of the prop erty, rather than the northern property line, but he placed the survey in the materials shown to prospective buyers of his property. He commented that "anybody who was buying it could look at that survey and figure it for themselves what they wanted to do with it." Ann Collins testified that she and her husband purchased the Collins P roperty in August 2000. The Myers w ere their next-door neighb ors until appellant purchased the Senez Property and moved in aroun d Thank sgiving of 2000. A ppellees did not mov e in

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imm edia tely, however, because they were replacing the existing house on their property w ith a new one. Nevertheless, Ms. Collins said that she visited the property often, particularly to do gardening. She claimed that, before the existing house was demolished in October 2000, she was there "almost every day. And then, on the weekends Steve and I would go down and spend two nights there. We got a blow-up mattress." Ms. Collins ma intained that s he freque ntly used the boat ramp. The following colloquy is relev ant: [APPELLEES' COUNSEL ]: How many times did you use the boat ramp between, well, between let's say, the time you moved in and the time your house was completed? [MS. COLL INS]: Well, whe n Mr. Myers was there it was much easier, we just jumped over the wall. We used it as a launch for our swimming. We had a canoe or, at least, som e people brought a canoe out of the water all the time, my children, my friends, Shirley, we went swimming there. [APPELLEES' COUNSEL ]: When you say you jumped over the wall, you mea n the retai ning wall you b eliev e is on your pro perty? [MS. COL LINS]: Yes. [APPELLEES' COUN SEL]: Okay. At that time was there--you were talking about Mr.--when Mr. Myers was there? [MS. COL LINS]: Yes. [APPELLEES' CO UNSEL]: At that time there was no fence? [MS. COLLINS]: No, no. [APPELLEES' COUNSEL]: Did Mr. Myers give you permission to use the boat ramp?

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[MS. COLLINS]: There was never any question about permission. [APPELLEES' CO UNSEL]: So you didn't ask permission? [MS. C OLLIN S]: Abso lutely not. [8] [APPELLEES' COUNSEL]: You told [the judge] earlier you-- you and Mr. Myers got a long very w ell? [MS. COL LINS]: Yes. [AP PEL LEE S' COU NSE L]: Y ou used the boat ramp freq uently? [MS. COLLINS]: Yes, because the house wasn't built, we didn't have any furnitu re. We would go ove r there a nd sit. According to Ms. Collins, before appellant moved into the Senez P roperty in November 2000, appellant hired a contractor to erect a wo oden fen ce that ran alo ng the W all, sitting just on the Senez side of the Wall. Ms. Collins recalled that before appellant constructed the fence, th e two disc ussed its loca tion. Ms. C ollins said: When we were do wn there planting she called me towards the fence or towards the wall and said, can my fence follow the wall instead of the property line? And I said, hum, I can't answer that because my husband and I own the property jointly, we 'll have to talk a bout it. Nevertheless, Ms. Collins maintained that the fence was "absolutely" constructed without appellees' permission. At trial, Ms. Collins was asked: "After the fence was constructed and you became aware of it, did you have any conversations with Ms. Senez about the fence?" Collins responded: "Yes, we did." She continued: "[Appellant] said we

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As noted, Myers indicated that he had no knowledge that appellees used the boat

ramp. 9

did not say no." Mr. Collins corroborated his wife's testimony as to this point. He denied that they gave Ms. Senez permission to build the fence. Mr. Collins recalled: "We were [asked for permission to build the fence] and, unfortunately, we did not respond quick enough for her. Um, w hen w e return ed to the proper ty the fenc e was in place." 9 Ms. Collins admitted that both be fore and after the fence was erected, she maintained the Collins P rope rty only up to the Wall; the Myers, and later appellant, maintained the property on the other side of the Wall. Despite the concerns about the fence, Ms. Collins testified that until April 2004, appellees and appellant had a cordial relationship, which included possessing keys to each other's homes. They would also socialize together and take care of each o ther's pe ts, as nee ded. Moreover, Ms. Collins claimed tha t appellees an d their children continued to use the ramp after appellant moved into the Senez Property; they laun ched their canoe from the ramp "several dozen" tim es. At som e point after a ppellant initially con structed the fence, how ever, she extended it along the W all towards the water, with wire fencing, purportedly to keep her dogs in her yard.10 After the fence was extended , it was no lon ger possible for appelle es to cross b etwee n the tw o prop erties at th e end o f the W all to gain access to the ram p. According to Ms. Collins, appellant's property suffered storm damage as a result of

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This w as the ex tent of M r. Collin s's testim ony as to th e const ruction of the f ence. No testimony established exactly when this took place. 10

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Hurricane Isabelle in 2003. As a result, appellant had to replace a railroad-tie retain ing wall on her property that ran parallel to the Wall and supported a terraced yard adjacent to the house on the Senez Property. Appellant rebuilt the railroad-tie wall highe r than its origina l, and constructed a fence or railing atop it, which blocked appellees' view down Norman Creek from their property. 11 Ms. Collins also testified that appellant regraded the area between the replaced terrace wa ll and the W all, such that m ore water w ould run o ff onto appelle es' prop erty. Ms. Collins adm itted that she and her husband began to inquire with various permitting authorities as to whether appellant had acquired the ne cessary permits to erect the replacem ent terrace w all. At that poin t, in April or May of 2004, the relationship between the neighbors began to sour. At some point (Ms. Collins did not specify a date), appellant constructed a wooden gate across the boat ramp, supposedly to keep her dogs from entering the water. At another point, according to Ms. Collins, appellant "slurried concrete in the water" to mak e the bo at ramp longer and w ider. For reasons that Ms. Collins did not explain, at some point appellees used concrete to block the weep h oles in the W all. This ultima tely caused a p ortion of the Wall to fall down in 2006 .

When Senez reb uilt the railroad-tie wall, she did not use railroad ties for construction. We sha ll refer to this w all and the fe nce or railing atop it as the "terrace w all" and "terrace fence," to avoid confusion with the Wall and the privacy fence that appellant constructed along it. 11

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Although appellant's perspective was significantly different, appellant ag reed with appellees about m any matte rs. She testified that, at first, she and appellees "became friends ." She "invited them to [her] house to have drinks, occasionally, out on the deck. Watched fireworks together down on the lower level of the property. Exchanged keys to the house so in the ev ent [sh e] got h ome la te they cou ld let [he r] dog o ut," and vice ve rsa. According to appellant, she hired a contractor to erect the fence along the Wall prior to final settleme nt on the S enez Pro perty with the M yers. At the time she decide d to construct the fence, she had not yet met appellees. She explained that after she hired the contractor, "the contractor talked about possibly putting [the] fence . . . up on top of the [W]a ll," rather than alongside it, so as to "eliminate that small space between the fence and the [W]all." She claimed that she "mentioned" this possibility to appellees, who did not respond affirmatively or negatively, and there was "no further c onversa tion." Accor ding ly, she "just decided to put the fence . . . right next to the wall." Appellant recounted that "Mrs. Collins occasionally asked for permission to come to the boat ramp to feed the ducks or geese with her granddaughter," and appellant granted permission. Acco rding to appella nt, appellees never requested to launch a boat from the ramp, nor objected wh en she repaired the ramp. She testified that she extended the ramp further into N orman C reek, but did not widen it. According to appellant, in late April of 2004, appellees complained that her construction of the terrace wall and terrace fence blocked their view of the water. She

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recalled that she met with appellees on May 9, 2004, a date which she remembered because it was her father's birthday, "and that's when Mr. Collins told [her] that half the boat ramp was his." Appellant stated: "I was a little surprised because I had assumed my property line had gone to the wa ll. . . ." According to appellant, she offered to purchase the sliver of land, but said that the parties first w ould have to ob tain a boun dary survey to esta blish the pro perty line. She recalled that M r. Collins made her a co unter-offer: "[H]e told me if I take the boathouse down, if I give him permission to take the boathouse down and pay for it, he would gift me the piece of p roperty." According to appellant, Mr. Collins had told her on previous occasions that he considered her boathouse an "eyesore." Appellant declined Mr. Collins's offer, and at that point their relationship deteriorated. She stated: "After that, it became quite heated, with Baltimore County coming out to the prop erty, pulling permits, putting a stop order." She recounted that on approximately a dozen occasions she met with various county, state, and federal permitting agencies as a result of complaints lodged against her by appellees. On cross-examination, appellant was asked whether she asked appellees' permission to install the initial fence she erected along the Wall. She responded: No, I did no t ask pe rmissio n. I discussed with them, putting the fence on top of the wall to minimize and reduce four inch space [sic] between the wall and the fence, and it was only in a passing thought as to what to do. I never heard back from th em. I really didn't pursue it. I thought it was just as easy for me to put in -- in t he grou nd and probab ly cheape r. At the close of the hearing, the court made an oral ruling, granting judgment in favor

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of appellees on their trespass, possession, and quiet title claims, but awarding no damages. The court also denied appellant's adverse possession claim. On December 20, 2006, the court entered its "Fina l Judgm ent," w hich it fo llowed , sua sponte , on December 21, with an "Amended Final Judg ment" to correct the inadvertent omission of a provision it had dictated in open co urt. 12 Appellant filed a "Motion to Alter/Am end Judg ment, or in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial" on January 2, 2006, seeking reconsideration of the court's ruling on the issue of adverse possession, and seeking further clarification of the court's order relating to ownership of the boat ramp. Sh e contended that the term s of the court's order had

inadverten tly created an "easement by implication" with respect to the boat ramp. Appellees oppos ed the m otion. In response, the court issued its "Second Amended Final Judgment" on February 23, 2007, in which it clarified the language of its order relative to the boat ramp, but otherwise denied the motion. In this ruling, as to appellee's possession of property and quiet title claims, the court said: 4. Judgment on Count IV (possession of prope rty) is hereby entere d in favor of [appellees] and against [appellant] in that [appellant] is hereby ORDERED, absent an a greemen t by the parties to the contrary, to remove any gate or fence blocking access by the parties for the enjoyment and use of the boat ramp presently located on the east side of 339 and 341 Worton Road at Norman Creek. [Appellees] own approximately fifteen (15%) percent of the

The Amended Final Judgment permitted the parties to come to an agreemen t that would obviate the nec essity of re movin g the ga te acros s the bo at ramp . 14

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boat ramp on the side close st to their property; [appellant] owns the remaining eighty-five (85 %) perce nt. 5. Judgment on Count V (quiet title) is entered in favor of [appellees] and agains t [appe llant] in th at the 29 1 squa re foot a rea . . . shall remain the property of [appe llees]. . . . [F]urther, [appellant] shall remove the fence pres ently e xisting on [ap pelle es'] p rope rty. Further, the court said: "Judgment on the Counter Claim (for title by adverse possession) is hereby entered in favor of [appellees]." As to appellees' trespass claims, the court awarded judgmen t in appellees' favor, with out dama ges. But, the court entered judgment in favor of appellant as to appellees' claims of nuisance a nd in vasion of privacy, as well as their claim to title by adverse possession over an area of land other than the disputed area on appeal. Th e court also denied appellees' request for a permanent injunction. The court accompanied the Second Amended Final Judgment with a written "Motions Ruling" concerning appellant's motion to alter or amend. The court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: Under Maryland law, to obtain title to property, the person claiming adverse possession must prove actual, open, notorious and visible, exclusive, hostile and continuous possession of the claimed property for at least 20 years. Bratton v. Hitchens, 43 Md . App. 348 (1979); Blickensta ff v. Bromley , 243 Md. 164 (19 66). * * * In 1981, when the Myers took title to 341, a concrete wall existed along the property line of 341 and 339. The wall fell sometime in the 1980s and was rebuilt by Cook (o wner of 339) in the o riginal wall's f oot print. Th e wall sat partly on 339, and partly on 341 , crossing the bounda ry line at one po int. Myers installed a boat ramp which sat on both properties. In addition, Myers had a bulkhead installed across the waterfront of 341 to the boat ram p. Myers maintained the property on the 341 side of the wall, including the boat ramp.

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Myers granted permission to neighbors to use the property between Myers' house and the wall, including the boat ramp, to access the waterfront to launch boats, in part, because a local boat ramp had closed. The Cooks, including their son-in-law used the b oat ramp. A s a result, the Court does not infer that Mr. and Mrs. Myers' possession of 341 and use of the property in dispute was adverse to the Cooks. When [appellees] purchased 339, they too used the boat ramp, as did [appellant] when she purchased 341. At the time [appellant] purchased her property, [appellee] had already used the b oat ramp to launch ca noes and to feed ducks. Thus, by using their prop erty, [ appellee s] were in poss essio n of their prop erty. Initia lly, the parties were friendly. It is unfortunate for both sides that their friendship has not continued. The Court found [appellees'] testimony that they had never ask ed permis sion to use the boat ramp c redible. The Court did not find credible [appellant's] testimony that [appellees] asked her for permission. Nor does the Court accept the suggestion that [appellees] were required to file suit to assert their ownership of the property in dispute. [Appe llant] added a gate to the boat ramp to prevent her dogs from going into the water on the ramp. [Appellees], who also have dogs, did not object to the addition of the gate. The Court did not view the gate as evidence suff icien t to deprive th e [ap pelle es] o f the ir pro perty. From the time she acquired 341 in November 2000, [appellant] maintained the boat ramp and the property on her side of the wall. Most of the boat ramp is on [appe llant's] prope rty; maintaining th e boat ram p is clearly in her best interest. Neglecting to maintain one side of it, the small portion which is on [appellees'] property, could result in collapse or other failure of the ramp. [Appellant's] maintenance of the small sliver of area in front of the wall as well as the ramp were no t, in the Court's view, sufficient evidence of control to de prive [ap pelle es] o f the ir pro perty. In his d eposition testimo ny, Arthur Mye rs tes tified tha t he a lways cooperated with his neighbors, the Cooks. While it is true that he mowed the grass in the area now in dispute, he did not appear to view his actions as an assertion of con trol or do minion over th e area. At best, Myers' actions toward the property in dispute indicate use or "ac tual possess ion" of the property in question but nothing more. W hen he de cided to sell 341, Myers commissioned a survey of the property. The survey show s the prope rty line and area in 16

dispute. Myers inclu ded the su rvey with the d ocumen ts he provid ed to all prospective buyers including [appellant]. Contrary to the testimony of [appellant], Myers said th at he show ed a copy of the survey to [a ppellant] when he w as selling 341 to her. [13] * * * Myers' testimony is clear that he and the Cooks were friendly throughout the years they were neighbors. There is no evidence in the record that there was any adversity or hostility betwee n them. A lthough n o ill-will is required, there must be some proof. Myers believed when the wall was built, and then rebuilt, that it was on his property. Th ere is no evid ence that his use of the area was "exclusive." The neighbors were friendly, and cooperative. [Appe llant] argu es that when Myers' ownership is added to her ownership, she has met the 20 year req uirement. M yers owned his property for 19 years and 7 months. But during the last few months of his ownership, [appellees] acquired 339 Worton and used the boat ramp. Myers did not testify he gave them permission; and, [appellees] testified they never asked. The pages from Myers' desposition transcript cited by [appellant] for the proposition that Myers "granted permission" to [appellees] do not make that statement. [ Appellees'] use of the area in dispute destroys the claimed 20 years period required for [ appellant] to establish her adverse possession claim. The Court was not persuaded that the fact that [appellees] did not move into their residence at 339 full-time until the year after purchase helps [appellant's] claim. The testimony was uncontradicted that [appellees] made frequent visits to 339 Worton for recreation, boating and supervision of the demolition and construction. Further, there was persuasive testimony that [appellee] Ann Collins used the boat ramp before and after residing at 339 Worton. Use of the boat ramp without seeking permission by [appellee] was the equivalent of asserting an ownership interest or dominion over the prop erty. In sum, the Court was not persuaded that [appellant] met her burden of proof by a prepon derance o f the evide nce to estab lish adverse possession of the area in dispute. (Emp hasis added.)

Mr. Myers's deposition does not contain a specific assertion that he showed the survey to appellant in particular. Rather, he indicated tha t he put the su rvey in the ma terials he sho wed p urchas ers gen erally. 17

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DISCUSSION The issue here is whether the court erred in concluding that appellant did not acquire title to the disputed area by adverse possession.14 This Court recently discussed the doctrine of adverse possession in Yourik v. Mallonee, 174 Md. A pp. 415, 422 (200 7): "Adverse possession is a method whereby a person who was not the owner of property obtains a valid title to that property by the passag e of tim e." Md. Civ. Pattern Jury Instr. 2:1 (MPJI-Civ.). "A number of policy justifications for the doc trine of adv erse po ssession have b een ad vance d." Herbert T. Tiff any & B asil Jone s, Tiffany Re al Proper ty , Neighbor

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