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REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 1642 SEPTEMBER TERM, 2009

NICHOLAS SHARP v. BARRY K. DOWNEY, et al.

Hollander, Meredith, Zarnoch, JJ.1

Opinion by Hollander, J.

Filed: December 17, 2010 Judge Alexander Wright, Jr., did not participate in the Court's decision to report this opinion pursuant to Md. Rule 8-605.1.
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Nicholas Sharp, appellant, and Barry and Rhonda Downey, appellees, own adjacent tracts of land in Howard County. For almost eight years, the parties, as well as their predecessors in title and some of their neighbors, have been engaged in litigation as to various matters regarding the adjoining parcels. In 2007 and 2008, the Circuit Court for Howard County ordered the parties to submit their disputes to binding arbitration. Of relevance here, in an Arbitration Award (the "Award") dated December 22, 2008 (issued January 6, 2009), the arbitrator rejected appellant's claim that he is entitled to an easement over a portion of appellees' land in order to reach a public road. That decision left appellant's parcel "landlocked." Dissatisfied with the Award, appellant unsuccessfully asked the Circuit Court for Howard County to vacate it. This appeal followed, in which appellant presents one issue: "Whether the circuit court erred in refusing to vacate the arbitrator's decision and award[.]" For the reasons that follow, we shall reverse and remand. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 The properties at issue are two adjacent, irregularly shaped lots in Woodbine, along the South Branch of the Patapsco River at the northern border of Howard County. Appellant's property is located at 400 Morgan Station Road. We shall refer to it as "Lot 2"

The litigation has encompassed several disputes related to the two properties at issue here and other adjacent tracts. The arbitrator resolved three disputes between Sharp and the Downeys, only one of which is the subject of this appeal. We recite only the facts that are relevant to this appeal. 1

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or the "Sharp Lot." Appellees' property is located at 410 Morgan Station Road. We shall refer to it as "Lot 1" or the "Downey Lot." Originally, the two lots were a single tract of land owned by Jack Ryan, Inc., the corporate alter ego of John E. Ryan (collectively, "Ryan"). On February 20, 1996, Ryan divided the tract by deed, creating Lot 1 and Lot 2. By a separate deed of even date, Ryan conveyed Lot 1 (i.e., the Downey Lot) to Pamela Jekel, Inc.,3 and retained ownership of Lot 2 (i.e., the Sharp Lot). Notably, the Downey Lot adjoins Morgan Station Road, while the Sharp Lot is (in the words of the arbitrator) "landlocked." 4 On the same date as the conveyance of Lot 1, Ryan and Jekel executed two instruments relating to two separate easements concerning Lot 1 and Lot 2. One instrument, entitled "Declaration for Ingress and Egress Easement (Driveway) and Maintenance Agreement," established an easement "over the existing jeep trail located on Lot 1" (i.e., the Downey Lot). We shall refer to this agreement as the "Original Jeep Trail Agreement." The

Pamela Jekel, Inc., is the corporate alter ego of Pamela Jekel Ryan. Unless otherwise noted, we shall refer collectively to the corporation and the individual as "Jekel." Ms. Jekel is married to John Ryan. However, the two apparently were not married when Ryan conveyed the Downey Lot to Jekel. The record does not explicitly disclose whether Lot 2 has access to any public road other than Morgan Station Road, which is relevant to the issue of whether there is an implied easement by necessity. See, e.g., Condry v. Laurie , 184 Md. 317, 322 (1945) ("[T]he court will not recognize a way of necessity if another road to the public highway can be made without unreasonable expense, even though the other road may be much less convenient."). But, because "factual findings by an arbitrator are virtually immune from challenge," Mandl v. Bailey , 159 Md. App. 64, 92 (2004), we accept the arbitrator's finding that, in the absence of access to Morgan Station Road, Lot 2 is "landlocked." 2
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other easement instrument, entitled "Declaration for Easement and Maintenance Agreement," is referred to by the parties as the "Riverfront Easement." All four instruments were recorded in the land records of Howard County on February 27, 1996. According to the Original Jeep Trail Agreement, "[t]he Easement shall be for the sole purpose of ingress and egress for foot and vehicular traffic and for no other purpose." It noted that the jeep trail "is not described in a metes and bounds description," but stated that the jeep trail was "shown on an unrecorded plat titled, `Health Department Percolation Certification Plan, Project No. 423'" (the "Health Department Plan"). 5 The Original Jeep Trail Agreement also provided: "The beginning of the Easement at Morgan Station Road is at the driveway which is used in common with 430 Morgan Station Road and [the easement] ends at the northeast boundary of Lot 2." Further, it stated that the easement was "perpetual" and "binding on the parties [and their] successors and assigns." It also provided that, "[i]n the event of disagreement between the owners of Lots 1 and 2 as to the use, repairs, maintenance of the Easement, or any other issue, the dispute shall be resolved in accordance with the American Arbitration Association rules and procedures . . . ." The Riverfront Easement granted to Jekel (and her successors in title) an easement over a narrow strip of riverfront property that was part of Lot 2, and which separated Lot 1 from the Patapsco River. In relevant part, it stated that "Ryan will not in anyway interfere

The parties' submissions and the Award made clear that two versions of the Health Department Plan were offered into evidence at the arbitration. However, only a single version of the Health Department Plan has been reproduced in the record extract. 3

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with Jekel's use of the easement such as moving animals to the river or any other purpose." The primary significance of the Riverfront Easement to the issues on appeal is that, as we shall explain, the arbitrator ultimately found that the jeep trail referenced in the Original Jeep Trail Agreement cut into, and then out of, the Riverfront Easement area as the jeep trail made its way between Lot 2 and Morgan Station Road.6 A little over a year after the conveyance of Lot 1, Ryan and Jekel executed and recorded another easement agreement (the "Second Jeep Trail Agreement"), which, like the Original Jeep Trail Agreement, was titled "Declaration for Ingress and Egress Easement (Driveway) and Maintenance Agreement." It provided: "An easement is established over the existing jeep trails located on Lot 1." Moreover, the Second Jeep Trail Agreement expressly stated that it "replaces absolutely and in its entirety" the Original Jeep Trail Agreement. Nevertheless, it largely tracked the language of the Original Jeep Trail Agreement, including the statements that the easement was "perpetual" and was for the purpose of "ingress and egress," and the requirement that any disputes be resolved by arbitration. However, unlike the Original Jeep Trail Agreement, it did not explicitly describe the jeep trails as connecting to Morgan Station Road or to the Sharp Lot. The Second Jeep Trail Agreement again identified the jeep trails by reference to the Health Department Plan, but also by reference to a "new road approved by the State of Maryland Department of the

The Riverfront Easement was the subject of much dispute among the parties, but none of the issues that directly pertain to the Riverfront Easement has been raised on appeal. 4

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Environment Water Management Administration, April 25, 1996, permit 94-NT-10721994468197" (the "MDE Permit").7 In 1997, Jekel conveyed Lot 1 (the Downey Lot) to Larry and Wendy Raskin. In turn, by a deed dated December 15, 2000, the Raskins conveyed Lot 1 to appellees. On December 13, 2002, in the Circuit Court for Howard County, appellees filed a three-count "Complaint for Declaratory Judgment," naming as defendants Jack Ryan, Inc., as well as John E. Ryan and Pamela Jekel Ryan individually, and seeking resolution of several disputes regarding the adjoining properties. Pertinent to this appeal,8 the second count of the Complaint alleged that Ryan had constructed a driveway on Lot 1 "located outside the easement area," as described in the Second Jeep Trail Agreement. Therefore, appellees sought a judicial declaration that Ryan was "under an obligation to relocate the driveway serving the [Sharp Lot] to conform" to the Second Jeep Trail Agreement. In the course of the litigation, appellees filed five amended complaints. On September 4, 2003, during the litigation, appellant purchased Lot 2 (the Sharp Lot) from Ryan. As a A copy of the MDE Permit is included in the record extract. The permit itself is a one-page document that granted Ryan permission "[t]o construct a driveway, approximately 690-foot long, through the 100-year floodplain of the South Branch of the Patapsco River to provide primary access to homesites located west of Morgan Station Road. The final driveway elevation will be equal to the existing elevation of the unimproved access." The MDE Permit did not specifically articulate the location of the "driveway." The record extract also contains a "Joint Permit Application," which Ryan apparently submitted to obtain the MDE Permit. It includes a drawing showing the "proposed access driveway." We need not recount the entire tortured history of the litigation, as it is not relevant to the issues on appeal. Washington v. State , 180 Md. App. 458, 461 n.2 (2008); Singfield v. State , 172 Md. App. 168, 170 (2006), cert. denied , 398 Md. 316 (2007). 5
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result, appellees added Sharp as a defendant to their suit.

Appellant filed a counter

complaint, as did other defendants (including Ryan, as well as the Breslins, a couple who owned another neighboring parcel and had been named as defendants by the Downeys with respect to claims not at issue here).9 Before Sharp purchased Lot 2 and entered the lawsuit, Ryan filed a "Motion to Dismiss Count II and to Compel Arbitration." Ryan cited the language of the Second Jeep Trail Agreement calling for resolution by arbitration of disagreements relative to "any . . . issue" concerning the easement, and asked the court to dismiss the second count and to "order [appellees] to initiate the arbitration process." Noting that appellees "indicated that they do not oppose the Motion," the court granted Ryan's motion on May 15, 2003. In the summer of 2003, Ryan and the Downeys began a binding arbitration proceeding to resolve the claims at issue in the Downeys' original "Count II." After Sharp purchased Lot 2 from Ryan, he joined in that arbitration proceeding. Subsequently, in July 2007, Ryan and Jekel and their associated entities were dismissed from the lawsuit by a joint stipulation that resolved all claims by and against them. By "Order" entered on September 11, 2007, the circuit court required Sharp and the Downeys to arbitrate in the pending arbitration proceeding their disputes relative to the "Second Jeep

Notably, one count of Ryan's counter complaint sought $25,000 in damages from the Downeys due to a "continued pattern of harassing action" that Ryan alleged had caused a prospective buyer of Lot 2 (apparently Sharp) to "indicate[] that, because of the . . . Downeys' harassing actions . . . the buyer would only go forward with the contract if the price were reduced" by $25,000. 6

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Trail Agreement." On January 16, 2008, pursuant to an agreement by Sharp and the Downeys, the court entered an Order dismissing the remaining claims between them, and ordering Sharp and the Downeys to submit those claims (which are wholly separate from the issues on appeal) to the arbitrator. Later that month, the Downeys and the Breslins reached a settlement agreement resolving their disputes (which also are not relevant to this appeal). Accordingly, pursuant to joint motions of the parties, the circuit court entered orders dismissing all remaining claims relative to all remaining parties. On March 26, 2008, the circuit court entered an order directing the clerk to close the case. The arbitration proceeding at issue here began in January 2008.10 The arbitrator heard testimony, received documentary exhibits, and conducted two site visits to the properties. Notably, the proceedings before the arbitrator were not transcribed. On January 6, 2009, the arbitrator issued his Award, in which he recounted the history of the land transactions relative to the two lots. The arbitrator also explained that before Ryan divided his property into the Sharp Lot and the Downey Lot, he had begun "to improve the jeep trail without the necessary government permits regulating flood plain tidal and nontidal waterways." The arbitrator continued: On July 9, 1994, Ryan was ordered to stop such activity. Ryan then filed a Joint Permit application with an attached plat that showed the Jeep Trail.

Although Ryan and the Downeys initially began the arbitration in the summer of 2003, the proceedings were delayed by settlement negotiations and subsequent collateral litigation in the circuit court proceeding, which caused the parties to hold the arbitration in abeyance for several years. 7

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Thereafter, a Letter of Authorization (After-the-Fact) was issued effective May 22, 1995. A dispute arose between Verba O. Day [another neighbor] and Ryan over Ryan's use of Day's right-of-way to access Morgan Station Road. To avoid the conflict, Ryan filed a petition to modify the permit to bypass Day's right-of-way . . . . (Internal citations omitted.) The arbitrator also observed that the Health Department Plan, referenced in both the Original and the Second Jeep Trail Agreement, indicated the "Ex[isting] Jeep Trail" with a "darker broken black line." In his decision regarding the issues pertinent to this appeal, the arbitrator placed great reliance on the Health Department Plan's depiction of the jeep trail. The arbitrator said: There are three issues concerning the Jeep Trails Easement, namely, whether the easement extended to Morgan Station Road, whether the easement extended to Lot 2, and whether the driveway as it now exists is the easement created by the [Second Jeep Trail Agreement]. A careful examination of the Health Department [Plan] discloses that the easement does not extend to Morgan Station Road but connected to the Verba O. Day right of way to access Morgan Station Road. When Day disputed Ryan's use of her right of way, Ryan filed for a modified permit to bypass the Day right-of-way. The permit was granted effective April 25, 1996. The plat filed with the modified permit application showed the "proposed access driveway" parallel and to the north of the Day right-of-way. The "proposed access driveway" to Morgan Station Road was not built at the location shown [on] the plat attached to Ryan's [MDE] Permit, but . . . connected to the driveway of the Howard County Bus Turnaround. There was no permit to reflect this, nor was there any amendment to the [Second Jeep Trail Agreement] to reflect this. Consequently, the easement created by the [Second Jeep Trail Agreement] does not extend to Morgan State [sic] Road. The second issue, whether the Jeep Trails Easement extends to Lot 2, also invites the close examination of the Health Department Plan. [The Downeys' version of the Health Department Plan] shows the Jeep Trail Easement going in a northwesterly direction, i.e. traveling away from Morgan 8

Station Road over Lot 1, through Lot 2, then owned by Ryan, through the . . . Riverfront Easement, then curving toward the south and re-entering Lot 1, but stopping short of Lot 2. [Sharp's version of the Health Department Plan] shows the path of the same Jeep Trail, but instead of stopping short of Lot 2 [the trail] extends into Lot 2. The Downeys argue that the existing Jeep Trail did not extend to Lot 2 . . . , but fell short of Lot 2 . . . . Of course, the primary purpose of the Health Department [Plan] was to determine the location of the proposed wells and septic systems. The Jeep Trail was not determined by a metes and bounds description and, for the most part, simply followed the contour lines on the Health Department Plan. The Health Department Plan is dated November 11, 1991. The first recorded evidence of the Jeep Trail easement occurred on February 20, 1996 when Ryan created Lot 1 and Lot 2, conveyed Lot 1 to Jeckel [sic], . . . and created with Jekel "the existing Jeep Trail" Easement [ i.e., the Original Jeep Trail Agreement]. The pertinent language of the [Original Jeep Trail Agreement] reads: "1. An easement is established over the existing Jeep Trail located on Lot 1, but which is not described in a metes and bounds description for the mutual use of both lots. The beginning of the Easement at Morgan Station Road is at the driveway which is used in common with 430 Morgan Station Road and ends at the northeast boundary of Lot 2," and as "shown on an unrecorded plat, Health Department Percolation Certification Plan, Project No. 423, dated November 11, 1991." The [Original Jeep Trail Agreement] also stated that the easement "ends at the northeast boundary of Lot 2 . . . ." The easement stops at the division line of Lot 1 and 2 and does not enter Lot 2. On February 27, 1997, Jeckel [sic] and Ryan executed the [Second Jeep Trail Agreement] that replaced absolutely and in its entirety the [Original Jeep Trail Agreement]. This instrument established an easement "over the existing jeep trails located on Lot 1["] as ["]shown on the Howard County Health Department Certification Plan" and the "new road" approved by Maryland Water Management permit 94-NT-1072/199468197. Since the prior easement 9

was entirely replaced, this [Second Jeep Trail Agreement] is the sole controlling extant easement and limits the easement to the "existing jeep trails located on Lot 1" of which none give access to Lot 2, the Riverfront Easement, nor to Morgan Station Road. The remaining issue is whether the existing driveway is located within the Jeep Trails Easement. As stated before, the Jeep Trails Easement does not extend to Morgan Station Road, nor was it built in accordance with the permit 94-NT-1072/199468197 as modified, nor does the easement extend into Lot 2. The above, together with . . . other evidence shows substantial parts of the driveway were not built within the easement designations. (Internal citations omitted.) The arbitrator also rejected a claim by Sharp that, if he did not have an express easement, he nevertheless was entitled to an implied easement. The arbitrator reasoned: Sharp contends that since he is landlocked, he has an implied easement by necessity. When Ryan created Lot 1 and 2, he immediately sold Lot 1 to Jeckel [sic], [and] created with Jeckel [sic] the Riverfront Easement, then the [Original Jeep Trail Agreement]. All of the above instruments were executed on the same day and recorded among the Land Records of Howard County. . . . The [Original Jeep Trail Agreement] gave an easement through Lot 1 to Ryan, but it did not extend into Lot 2, the Riverfront Easement, or Morgan Station Road. Obviously, Jeckel [sic] did not want any intrusion into her Riverfront Easement.[11] Ordinarily, subsequent instruments should not be considered. Here, however, the [Original Jeep Trail Agreement] was substituted by the [Second Jeep Trail Agreement] by the same parties and concerned the same property and . . . also was recorded. This easement did not extend into Lot 2 to cross into the Riverfront Easement nor to Morgan Station Road. This is the operative easement and, once again, it is apparent that Jeckel [sic] did not want her easement rights disturbed. Ryan, now Sharp, does not have an implied easement by necessity. (Internal citations omitted.)

In another portion of the Award, the arbitrator made findings, which appellant does not contest, that "[t]he Downeys may maintain and use the Riverfront Easement Area for any purpose for the use and benefit of Lot 1 and Sharp may not interfere with the Downey's [sic] use of the Riverfront Easement in any way." 10

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With respect to the instant dispute, the arbitrator made the following "Decision and Findings": 5. The "Jeep Trails" over which Sharp has an easement are only those depicted on the Health Department Percolation Certification Plan dated November 11, 1991, and as permitted by the Maryland Department of Natural Resources Permit No. 94-NT-1072/199468197 (as modified). 6. The "Jeep Trails" do not provide Sharp access to Morgan Station Road[.] 7. The portions of the paved driveway are not located within the Jeep Trails defined by the [Second Jeep Trail Agreement], and/or extend beyond the 690 feet permitted by the [MDE] Permit, and may be removed by the Downeys. (Internal citations omitted.) By letter dated January 13, 2009, the arbitrator advised the parties that the final sentence of the Award's discussion of easement by necessity "should read, `Ryan, now Sharp, does not have an implied easement by necessity, he does not need one.'" (Emphasis added to show addition.) On January 20, 2009, Sharp filed with the arbitrator a "Motion to Reconsider, Modify or Correct Arbitration Award," in which he asked the arbitrator to reconsider his three "Findings," numbered 5, 6, and 7, relating to the Second Jeep Trail Agreement. Sharp did not challenge five other findings of the arbitrator, which related to issues that are not the subject of this appeal. In the meantime, on January 15, 2009, appellees reopened the circuit court case by filing a "Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award." Appellant responded with an answer to appellees' petition, as well as a "Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award." In these papers, 11

appellant advised the court that he had filed his Motion to Reconsider with the arbitrator on January 20, 2009. According to appellant, appellees' petition to confirm the Award was "premature," because "Section 3-222 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides a period of twenty (20) days to file a motion to modify or vacate the award with the arbitrator." Therefore, Sharp contended that "[n]either [appellant's] Petition nor the Petition to Confirm Award should be heard until the arbitrator completes his task by ruling on the Motion to Reconsider," and indicated that he was filing his Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award "in an excess of caution." Appellant asked the court to stay action on the competing petitions until the arbitrator ruled on his Motion to Reconsider. Although the court did not issue a formal stay, it took no immediate action on the two petitions. On March 30, 2009, the arbitrator denied appellant's Motion to Reconsider. In his "Ruling & Order on Motion of Respondent," the arbitrator stated: There were three issues relative to the "existing Jeep Trails on Lot 1," namely, whether the easement extended to Morgan Station Road, whether it extended to Lot 2, and whether the driveway as it now exists is the easement created by the [Second Jeep Trail Agreement]. As to the first issue, the easement did not extend to Morgan Station Road. The easement was not built in accordance with the plat attached to the [MDE] Permit . . . . Instead, it was built to connect to the Howard County school bus turnaround. There was no permit to do this. The (after the fact) authorization required "grading and fill associated with improvements to a school bus turnaround." It was not an authorization to connect to the school bus turnaround, but merely to improve the school bus turnaround. As stated in the Arbitration Award, the [Second Jeep Trail Agreement] is the controlling easement. It gave no access to Lot 2, the Riverfront Easement, nor Morgan Station Road. In short, Lot 2 has no access to Morgan 12

Station Road since Lot 2 does not have access either to the Riverfront Easement or Lot 1 from Lot 2, and therefore cannot cross Lot 1 to gain access to Morgan Station Road. The Downey's [sic] own Lot 1 in fee simple unencumbered by the [Second Jeep Trail Agreement] and unencumbered by the replaced [Original Jeep Trail Agreement]. Since the owner of Lot 2, presently Sharp, cannot traverse or cross Lot 1, Sharp has no access to Morgan Station Road. Lot 2 is landlocked. Relative to the remaining issue, the location of the driveway on Lot 1, such is no longer the concern of the owner of Lot 2, presently Sharp. (Internal citations omitted.) On April 7, 2009, appellees filed a "Memorandum in Further Support of Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award" in the circuit court. On April 28, 2009, appellant filed a "Further Petition and Memorandum to Vacate Arbitration Award." In brief, appellant contended that the Arbitration Award was "irrational" and displayed a "manifest disregard of the law." In Sharp's view, the arbitrator illogically "failed to actually locate the `new road' referred to in the Jeep Trails Easement when the location was shown on exhibits referred to in the Award." Further, appellant argued that, "if the easement was not locatable by the Declaration of Easement, it must be presumed to be in the location the parties constructed their driveway." Additionally, Sharp maintained that the Downeys "took title to Lot 1 subject to the known and clearly visible easement for the existing driveway clearly visible to them on the ground." Finally, Sharp disputed the arbitrator's statement that an implied easement was "not needed," arguing: "The finding of no implied easement, because it was `not needed', leaves Lot 2 landlocked, clearly an 13

arbitrary, irrational decision in manifest disregard of the law. Such clearly was not the intention of Jekel and Ryan when they expressly created the two easement documents for ingress and egress." On September 28, 2009, the court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order, confirming the Award. It recognized that "Maryland law favors the resolution of legal disputes through binding arbitration as evidenced by the codification of the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act . . . ." The court also explained that "the Act severely limits the Court's authority to vacate an arbitration award," and that, "[t]o prevent a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for the decision of the arbitrator, a court `shall not vacate the award or refuse to confirm the award on the ground that a court of law or equity could not or would not grant the same relief.'" (Quoting statute; circuit court's emphasis). Nevertheless, the circuit court recognized case law for the proposition that "arbitrators `exceed[] their powers' when they reach a completely irrational result," O-S Corp. v. Samuel A. Kroll, Inc., 29 Md. App. 406, 409 (1975), cert. denied , 277 Md. 740 (1976), and that an arbitrator's award may be vacated where it displays "`manifest disregard of the law,'" which is "`something beyond and different from a mere error in the law or failure on the part of the arbitrator[] to understand or apply the law.'" Board of Educ. of Prince George's County v. Prince George's County Educators' Ass'n, Inc., 309 Md. 85, 102 (1987) (citation omitted). The circuit court concluded that the arbitrator "completely, and rationally, adjudicated all issues presented in the arbitration proceedings." The court explained:

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The arbitrator reasoned based on careful analysis of the[] land records and weighing of testimony and evidence that the existing Jeep Trails Easement did not extend to Morgan Station Road and did not provide [Sharp] access to Morgan Station Road. The evidence before the arbitrator included the fact that the existing driveway was not built in accordance with the Modified Permit or the joint application's proposed driveway. Furthermore, the arbitrator was not obligated to consider the proposed access driveway contained in the joint application because, contrary to [Sharp's] assertion, the proposals were not incorporated into the Jeep Trails Easement or the Modified Permit. . . . As such, it was reasonable for the arbitrator to locate the Jeep Trails Easement . . . based upon the accepted controlling documents to find that the easement did not provide [Sharp] access to Morgan Station Road. The court also rejected appellant's assertion that the easement should be "presumed" to be located where Ryan had physically placed his driveway, stating: [T]he parties' predecessors-in-interest granted a way with a fixed location found in the Modified Permit. While an easement was intended, the [Downeys] should not be burdened by the unapproved existing driveway because the parties' predecessors-in-interest elected not to comply with the recorded Jeep Trails Easement and follow the Modified Permit for the access road. In denying Sharp's claim that the Downeys should be burdened by the easement because it was readily apparent "on the ground," the court observed that "whether an unrecorded easement is apparent to a purchaser is a fact determination." In the court's view, the arbitrator's conclusion that no easement supported the existing driveway was "reasonable . . . based upon the record . . . which includes evidence that [Sharp] purchased his property with knowledge that [the Downeys] had a pending declaratory judgment action

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against the predecessor-in-title, Jack Ryan, regarding the land." The court declined to "substitute" its judgment for "the judgment of the arbitrator." Finally, the court rejected Sharp's claim "that an implied easement is necessary to keep his land from being landlocked and that such a finding is supported by Maryland law." The court stated: "An owner may freely cut off access to his land." For that proposition, it cited Shpak v. Oletsky , 280 Md. 355, 371 (1977). The court explained that, in the arbitrator's view, "[t]he parties' predecessors-in-interest created an easement involving the Jeep Trails, but . . . did not extend it into [appellant's] property (Lot 2), the Riverfront Easement, or Morgan Station Road, leaving [appellant] landlocked." Finding no error in the arbitrator's determination, the circuit court reasoned: The necessity to access [Sharp's] property and Morgan Station Road did not exist at the time of severance of title as evidenced by the boundaries of the easement agreements, preventing a finding of an implied easement by necessity. This lack of necessity is also reflected in [appellant's] purchase of the property at a reduced rate based upon knowledge that [appellees] were challenging the existence of encumbrances to the land. It is reasonable to conclude that [Sharp] purchased the land with the understanding that any easements may not be valid or upheld. Accordingly, the court entered its "Order" granting the Downeys' Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award and denying Sharp's competing Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award. This appeal followed.

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DISCUSSION As the circuit court correctly recognized, this case is governed by the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act (the "Act"), codified in Md. Code (2006 Repl. Vol., 2010 Supp.),

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