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State of Maryland v. Thomas No. 86, September Term, 2001 HEADNOTE: VOIR DIRE; VENIRE; PROSPECTIVE JUROR; QUESTION; INQUIRY; MANDATORY; FAIR; IMPARTIAL; JURY; DISQUALIFICATION; CAUSE; BIAS; UNDUE INFLUENCE; PREDISPOSITION; ATTITUDE; STATE OF MIND; CRIME; CHARGE; NARCOTICS The trial court abuses its discretion w here it refuses to propoun d a voir dire question aimed at uncovering a prospective juror's bias related to the nature of the crime with which the d efendant is charged because such an inquiry is directed at biases that are disqualifying w hen they imp air the prosp ective juror's a bility to be fair and impartial.

Circuit Court for Howard County Case No.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND

No. 86

September Term, 2001

STATE OF MARYLAND v. JERROD LEROY THOMAS

Bell, C.J. Eldridge Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia JJ. Opinion by Bell, C.J. Raker and Harrell, JJ. Concur Battaglia, J. D issents

Filed:

May 10, 2002

The issue in this case is whether, when the defendant is charged with distribution and possession of a controlled dangerous substance, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to ask the venire panel if an y of them harbored "strong feelings regarding violations of the narcotics laws." The Court of Special Appeals held that it was, Thomas v. State, 139 Md. App. 188, 207-08, 775 A.2d 40 6, 408 (2001), and the State, the petitioner, by filing a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, requested our review of that judgment. We

granted the petitio n, State v. Thomas, 366 Md. 246, 783 A.2d 221 ( 2001), and now affirm.

I. On May 20, 1999, the respondent, Jerrod Leroy Tho mas, was charged w ith possession and distribution of cocaine. The respondent was tried, and ultimately convicted, by a jury in the Circuit Court for Howard County. During voir dire, the respondent asked the trial

court to propound to the panel, among others, the following voir dire question: "Does any m emb er of the ju ry panel have such strong feelings regarding violations of the narcotics laws that it would be difficult for you to fairly and impartially weigh the facts at a trial where narcotics violations have been alleged?"[1] As to this question, with respect to its compliance with this Court's recent decision in Dingle v. S tate, 361 Md. 1, 759 A.2d 819 (2000), the Court of Special Appeals observed: "Preliminarily, we note that the current "two-part" form of Question No. 10 is unacceptable under the Dingle ruling. As the voir dire in the instant case took place before the Court of Appeals filed Dingle on September 15, 2000, we do not fau lt Thomas for prop osing Question N o. 10 as a two-part question. F urther, we b elieve the issu e of the trial jud ge's discretion is still properly before this Court. In acco rdance with D ingle, the circuit court must pose Question No. 10 to the venire through two questions. The first
1

The trial court refused to do so,2 explaining that the question was "fairly covered by other questions, or the Cou rt does not f ind it necessary to ask" it. Thomas, 139 Md. App. at 195, 775 A.2d at 410. Th e trial court previously had inquired, after apprising the venire of the allegations involved in the case, whether any member of the panel knew anything about the case, had formed an opinion regarding it or had other information about the case. It had also asked whether "there [w as] any other rea son wh y any membe r of this pan el feels that if they are picked as a juror in this case they would not be [able] to be a fair and impartial juror and decide this case based solely on the evidence in this case and the law as I would instruct you

question should identify any jurors who harbor strong feelings about narcotics or th e laws go verning n arcotics. Th en, the trial cou rt should individually ask those mem bers of the venire w ho respon ded affirm atively follow-u p question s regarding their ability to be fair a nd impartia l despite their stro ng fee lings." Thoma s v. State, 139 Md. App. at 202, 775 A.2d at 415. We do not share the intermediate appellate court's interpretation of Dingle as it relates to this case and, thus, we do n ot believe the guidance it offers is nec essary. When the inquiry is into th e state of mind o r attitude of the venire w ith regard to a particular crim e or catego ry of crimes, it is appro priate to phrase the que stion as w as don e in this c ase.
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Urging the trial court to ask the question, the respondent argued:

"I think that [question] goes d irectly to challenge for cause. I think there are some folks who do have such strong feelings. The Court has only asked a general question about whether they haven't been asked about something that might effect them. I think the Defendant is entitled to a question that goes specifically to that ground for challenge for cause, so I take exception to the C ourt no t asking that que stion." 2

in this case." 3 Following his sentencing, the respondent noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. That court, as we have seen, agreeing with the respondent, held that the lower

court abused its discretion by refusing to propound the voir dire question proposed by the respondent and, therefore, reversed the judgm ent of c onvictio n. Thomas, 139 Md. App.

at 193, 775 A.2d at 409. The interm ediate appe llate court conc luded that th e propose d voir dire question was "a valid question reasonably likely to uncover a bias that is directly related to the crime" on trial and that did "pose an obstacle to impaneling a fair and impartial jury," id. at 206, 775 A.2d at 417, and, furthermore, that "[n]o other question asked o f the venire adequate ly covered the area of undue influence [the respondent] sought to discover with [the question]." Id. at 207- 08, 775 A.2d a t 418.

II. The principles pertinent to the condu ct and scope of v oir dire have been addressed by this Court an d the Cou rt of Specia l Appeals so often as to be well-known and well-settled.

In addition, the trial court asked whether any member of the panel knew or "had any prior relation ships, dealing s, involvem ents or con tacts" with th e respond ent, his attorney, the assistant state's attorney, or the witnesses, whether any me mber of the ven ire "was inclined to give more or less weight to the testimony of a police officer or other law enforcement officer than to the testimony of another witness" simply because of the officer's status as a law enforcement officer, whether any member of the venire was unable to attend the two-day trial, whether any member of the venire had been charged with or convicted of a crime, and whether any member or a close family member of that memb er had b een a v ictim of crime. 3

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We most recently reviewed them in Dingle v. S tate, 361 Md. 1, 759 A.2d 819 (2000). We stated as follows: "Voir dire, the process by which p rospective ju rors are exa mined to determine whether cause f or disqu alificatio n exists, see Boyd v. State , 341 Md. 431, 435, 671 A.2d 33, 35 (1996), is the mechanism whereby the right to a fair and impartial jury, guaranteed by Art. 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, ... see Grogg v . State, 231 Md. 530, 532, 191 A.2d 435, 436 (1963), is given substance. See Hill v. State, 339 Md. 275 , 280, 661 A.2d 1 164, 1166 (199 5); Bedford v. State, 317 Md. 659, 670, 566 A.2d 111, 116 (1989). The overarchin g purpose of voir dire in a criminal case is to ensure a fair and impartial jury. See Boyd , 341 Md. 431 , 435, 671 A.2d 3 3, 35 (1996); Hill, 339 Md. 275, 279, 661 A.2d 1164, 11 66 (1995 ); Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 34, 633 A.2d 867, 871 (1993); Bedford, 317 Md. 659, 670, 566 A.2d 111, 117 (1989); Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 217 Md. 595, 605, 143 A.2d 627, 631 (1958); Adam s v. State, 200 Md. 133, 140, 88 A.2d 556, 559 (1952). In Davis [v. State], 333 Md. [27,] 33, 633 A.2d [867,] 871,quoting Langley v. State, 281 Md. 337, 340, 378 A.2d 1338, 1339 (1977) (citing Waters v. State, 51 Md. 430, 436 (1879)), we said, `a fundamental tenet underlying the practice o f trial by jury is that each juror, as far as possible, be impartia l and un biased .' We recognized in Davis that: `There are two areas of inquiry that may uncover cause for disqualification: (1) an examination to determine whether prospective jurors me et the minimum sta tutory qualifications for jury service, see Maryland Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol., 1992 Cum.Supp .), Courts & Jud icial Pro ceedin gs Artic le,

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