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State of Maryland v. Kai Ruchell Lee No. 81, September Term 2001 HEADNOTE: FOURTH AMENDMENT; SEARCH; WARRANT; KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE; EXCLUSIONARY RULE; INEVITABLE DISCOVERY; INDEPENDENT SOURCE Evidence seized pursuant to a warrant, executed without knocking and announcing the police presenc e prior to forc ing the doo r to the prem ises, is not adm issible pursua nt to either the inevitable discovery or the independent source exceptions to the exclusionary rule.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND

No. 81

September Term, 2001

STATE OF MARYLAND v. KAI RUCHELL LEE ______________________________________________ Bell, C.J. Eldridge Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia, JJ.

Opinion by Bell, C.J.

Filed:

April 23, 2003

The sole issue, which the State of Maryland, the petitioner, raises in this Court is whether evidence seized pursuant to a warrant, executed without knocking and announcing the police presence prior to forcing the door to the premises, is admissible pursuant to the inevitable discovery exc eption to the exclusiona ry rule. The Circuit Court fo r Harford County denied the motion to suppress, filed by the respondent, Kai Ruchell Lee, ruling that the possibility of the destruction of the cocaine recovered was an exigent circumstance that justified the una nnoun ced en try. The Court of Special Appeals reversed. Lee v. State , 139 Md. App. 7 9, 774 A.2d 1183 (2001). It held that the failure to knock and announce,

without justifica tion, ren dered th e entry, albeit with a valid warrant, unreasonable and requires exclusion of the evidence seized. Id. at 94, 77 4 A. 2d at 1192 . Application of the doctrine of inev itable dis covery u nder th e circum stances of this c ase, the intermediate appellate court concluded in resp onse to the State's motion f or reconsideration, "wo uld render the knock - and - announce provision of the Fourth Amendment meaningless." Id. We granted the writ of certiorari at the petitioner's request and, for the reasons that follow, we sh all affirm the judg ment o f the inte rmedia te appe llate cou rt.

I. During the month of Aug ust, 1998, the responde nt made tw o separate sales of cocaine to a confidential informant, acting at the direction of the Baltimo re County Police. After subsequent police surveillance, a warran t to search the responden t's home in Harfo rd County was obtained from a District Court judge. The warrant did not contain a "no-knock

clause;" authorizing entry, even by force, without first knocking and announcing police presence.1 The Court of Special Appeals described the search as follows: "Early on a weekday morning late in September 1998, a large combined task force of law enforcement officers fro m the Ba ltimore Co unty Police Department, the H arford County Sheriff 's Office, the Harfo rd County Police Department, and the Maryland State Police, assembled in front of a single -fam ily, colonial style home in a residential area of Harford County. The task force, which arrived in several cars and trucks, surrounded the home, while eight Harford County deputy sheriffs, wearing black hoods and fatigue style uniforms, battered down the door of Lee's home with a two handled "ram," which is e ssentially a pipe fille d with concrete. Once inside, the task force `secured the premises' by dispersing throughout the house. Task force officers handc uffed two ad ults fou nd ups tairs in the master bedroo m, gathered three small children from other bedroom s, and then h erded all five members of the household together in the downstairs family room. The task force leader, a Maryland State P olice troope r, and the H arford C ounty deputy sheriffs then sum monsed the remain ing task for ce officers to enter and search the entir e hous e." Lee, 139 Md. App. at 81 - 82, 774 A.2d at 1185. Seized in the search were a clear plastic bag containing 26 grams of cocaine2 ; four smaller baggies containing a total of 6.6 grams of cocaine; $1,369 dollars in U.S. currency; a rental agreement; and a 1986 white Chevy Astro Van. T he resp onden t, who acknowledged that the cocaine seized was his, was arrested and charged with possession with the intent to distribute a controlled dangerous
1

Whether Maryland permits the issuance of "no-knock" warrants has not been questioned and, thus, is not an issue in the instant case. According to the Maryland State Police Property Record, the weight of the cocaine was 29.1 grams. On the other hand, the Property Received As Evidence By Circuit C ourt Fo r Harf ord Co unty indic ates the w eight of the coc aine to b e 26 gra ms. We sha ll use the evid ence am ount. 2
2

substance. Before trial, the respondent moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search. He asserted that the search w as invalid be cause the ta sk force, lac king a reaso nable suspicion to believe exigent circumstances existed to permit its doing so, failed to knock and announce its presence before entering his home. The motion was denied by the Circuit Court for Harford County. The court reasoned: "[The police] make a determination that they are going to enter without first knocking. They make that determination based on the hand-to-hand buys that were known....They make that determination based on the ease with which evidence may be destroyed. They make that determination on the basis of the fact that they had a reasonable expectation they would find cocaine in that location and that Mr. Lee was known to them. * * * *

"So when I look at the fact that they arrived there, [the officer] brings the warrant, they have a discussion about what they are going to do and they make a decision, at that time, based on those factors, that the y are going to enter without first knocking and the reason is...because of the ease with which the evidence could be destroyed. When I look at the totality of the circumstances in this case I have no reason to doubt that that was a tactical decision they made an d based o n the totality of the circumstan ces it was an approp riate one ." The respondent noted an appeal of that judgment to the Court of Special Appeals, which, as we have seen, reversed. The intermediate appellate court held that the failure of the police to knock and announce their presence prior to entering the respondent's residence was not justified by exigent circumstances: "It is clear that, although Maryland law and the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States presumptively require knocking and announcing 3

before entry when searching w ith a proper w arrant, the law also forgives the failure to do so when there are legally sufficient exigent circumstances. It is equally clear that there is no blanket or per se exception for drug searches. Rather, in each case, the police must articulate a reasonable suspicion, based upon, particularized facts, that exigent circumstances exists which justify not knock ing and annou ncing. * * * *

"At the suppre ssion hearin g, the only witnesses to testify were two Maryland State Police tro opers called b y the State, one of w hom testifie d primarily about having taken a statement from the appellant and not about the conduct of the sear ch. Th e other tr ooper, w ho led th e task fo rce, candidly admitted that the only reason he had for not knock ing and an nouncing was that this was a cocaine case, and he always battered down the doors in cases where the object to be seized was narc otics, such as cocaine , that could be easily `flushed down the toilet.' The troop er testified that th e only excep tions wou ld occur, hypothetically, if the q uantity of drugs exc eeded the occupan t's ability to dispose of them, or the o ccupants were not at hom e. The State was una ble to elicit from the task force leader any particularized evidence about Lee, Lee's home, or anything else that would qualify as exigent circumstances, as contemp lated by Wilson [3] and Richards.[4]" Lee, at 89 - 90, 774 A.2d at 1189 - 90. The State filed a motion for reconsideration, asking the court to address whether exclusion of the evidence was re quired in view of the inevitable discovery doctrine, arguing that, in any event, it w ould have bee n discove red inevitab ly pursuant to the validly issued search warrant. A lthough the Court of Special A ppeals gran ted the mo tion for

reconsideration, it rejected the in evitable discovery argument. That exception should not
[3]

Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 115 S. Ct. 1914,131 L. Ed. 2d 976 (1995).

[4]

Richards v. Wiscon sin, 520 U.S. 385, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997). 4

be applied in the case sub judice, the intermediate appellate court opined, because: "To apply the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusiona ry rule in this instance would re nder the kn ock-and -announ ce provision of the Fourth Amendment meaningless. The application of inevitable discovery in such cases negates the rule against per se exceptions to the knock-and-announce requireme nt. The Un ited States Su preme C ourt has tw ice unanim ously affirmed the requirement to knock and announce. In light of two rulings from the nation's highest court, finding this requirement to exist in both our common law and th e Constitutio n, it would be wrong and utterly inconsistent for Maryland, in effect, to expunge this requirement and establish such an exception as was created in Michigan,[5] by attaching the doctrine of inevitable discovery to violations of the well established knock-and-announce require ment." Id. at 94, 774 A. 2d at 1192. We granted the State's Petition for Writ of Certior ari, State v. Lee, 366 Md. 246, 783 A.2d 221 (2001), to address this case of first impression. In its petition, the State did not challenge the determination by the intermediate appellate cou rt that there were no exigent circumstances at the time of the una nnoun ced en try. Thus, we will address only whether the doctrine of inevitable discovery applies und er the facts o f this case. Stated differently, all we shall decide is the correctness of the Court of Special Appeals' holding that the evidence seized s hould h ave be en sup pressed .

II. A. The K nock and Annou nce Rule

[5]

See People v. Stevens, 597 N. W. 2d 53, 56 (Mich. 19 99). 5

It is well settled in Maryland, and long has been so, that a police officer executing a search warrant "mus t give prope r notice of h is purpose a nd author ity and be den ied admittance before he can use force to break and enter" the premises to be se arched . Henson v. State, 236 Md. 518, 521-22, 204 A. 2d 516, 518-19 (1964); Goodm an v. State,178 Md. 1, 8, 11 A.2d 635, 639 (1940) ("A demand is necessary prior to the breaking in of th e doors only where some perso n is found in charge o f the buildin g to be searc hed."); Frankel v. State, 178 Md. 553, 561, 16 A.2d 93, 97 (1940) (citing Cornelius on Search and Seizure, 2nd Ed., sec. 218 , for "the rule that an officer, in executing a warrant to enter a house, which warrant is valid on its face, may bre ak open th e doors if denied admittance, but a demand is necessary prior to breaking doors w hen the premises are in c harge of some one."). In

Henson, the app ellant arg ued, inter alia, "that the police officers who executed the search warrant broke open the door of the house being searched without first announcing who they were and mak ing dema nd that entry be granted, an d that this was illegal and vitiated all that follow ed." 236 M d. at 520 , 204 A .2d at 51 8. Characte rizing the claim as the extension of "the old rule," id. at 521, 204 A. 2d at 518, and one "of long standing," id. at 522, 204 A. 2d at 519, which has been codified in f ederal la w and a num ber of th e states, id., citing Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 309 n. 8, 78 S. Ct. 1190, 1195 n. 8, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1332, 1338 n. 8 (1958),6 the Court stated the reasons underlying the rule: "the law abhors

6

The federal statute, 18 U.S.C.

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