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REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 0071 September Term, 2002 ___________________________________

DAVID A. SUMRALL

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND CENTRAL COLLECTION UNIT ___________________________________ Murphy, C.J., Davis, Rodowsky, Lawrence F., (Ret'd, specially assigned), JJ. ____________________________________ Opinion by Murphy, C.J. ____________________________________ Filed: March 28, 2003

On August 21, 2001, in the Circuit Court for Somerset County, David A. Sumrall, appellant, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in which he sought the following relief: It is prayed this Honorable Court ORDER the Central Collections Unit for the State of Maryland to CEASE AND DESIST any and all attempts to collect the Criminal Restitution in Criminal case Sumrall v[.] State of Maryland CT 2394 as being unconstitutional. To Restore petitioners tax returns, and to completely leave petitioner alone in this matter, in the future. And or any other relief this Honorable Court may deem appropriate. On March 6, 2002, the Honorable Daniel M. Long filed an Order that stated: Upon consideration of Defendant's Answer to Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, any response thereto, and upon finding that plaintiff is not entitled to the relief requested in his Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, and that the referral of plaintiff's indebtedness under the December 7, 1981 order of the Circuit Court for Allegany County was proper, it is this 6th day of March, 2002 by the Circuit Court for Somerset County, Declared, Determined, and ORDERED that the relief requested in plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment is denied and this case is dismissed. This appeal followed. Appellant presented one question for our review,1 which we have divided and rephrased as follows:
1

Appellant's original question was as follows: How can a Maryland State Agency Sue a person for there [sic] "Estate" if the Maryland State Constitution in flat terms says they can't?

I.

DOES ARTICLE 27 OF MARYLAND'S DECLARATION OF RIGHTS PROHIBIT A COURT FROM ORDERING A DEFENDANT TO PAY RESTITUTION AS PART OF HIS SENTENCE? DID THE CIRCUIT COURT ERR WHEN IT DETERMINED APPELLANT'S RESTITUTION OBLIGATIONS WERE PROPERLY REFERRED TO MARYLAND'S CENTRAL COLLECTION UNIT FOR COLLECTION, AFTER APPELLANT STOPPED MAKING PAYMENTS TO THE DIVISION OF PAROLE AND PROBATION?

II.

For the reasons that follow, we shall answer "no" to each question above and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. Factual Background On September 10, 1981, appellant entered pleas of guilty to two counts of assault with intent to murder. On December 7,

1981, he was sentenced to the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections.2 As part of appellant's sentence, he was required

to pay a total of $110,854.67 in restitution to his victims. The judgment provided that, upon his release from confinement, appellant was obligated to make the restitution through the Division of Parole and Probation ("Division"). When appellant

was paroled, he began to make payments in conformity with the judgment of the sentencing court. On July 15, 1997, however, appellant's parole was revoked. Shortly thereafter, appellant stopped making restitution payments to the Division. On July 23, 1998, the Division

2

Appellant was sentenced to serve two consecutive thirty-year terms. 2

referred the balance of appellant's restitution obligation to the CCU. On August 29, 2000, the CCU sent a letter to appellant

stating that his outstanding balance of restitution owed by him was $97,343.39, that a 17% collection fee (amounting to $16,548.37) was added to the original amount, and that the total amount of his restitution obligation was $113,891.76. Discussion A declaratory judgment is one that declares the rights of the parties and does not necessarily involve executory process or coercive relief. Davis v. State, 183 Md. 385, 389 (1944). The

declaration of judgment in such a manner is within the sound discretion of the court. Browhawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276

Md. 396, 406 (1975); see also Chaghervand v. CareFirst, 909 F. Supp. 304, 313 (D. Md. 1995). The court is not required to enter Society of Am. Foresters

a declaratory judgment in every case.

v. Renewable Natural Resources Found., 114 Md. App. 224, 238, (1997); Marriott Corp. v. Village Realty & Inv. Corp., 58 Md. App. 145, 153, cert. denied, 300 Md. 316 (1984). Md. Const. art. 27 ("Article 27") provides "[t]hat no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate." According to appellant, this provision prohibits the

CCU from attempting to collect his remaining restitution obligations. Although neither the Court of Appeals nor this

Court has interpreted this provision, we have the benefit of case 3

law from other jurisdictions that have an identical or a very similar provision in their constitutions. In Wellner v. Eckstein, 117 N.W. 830 (Minn. 1908), the Supreme Court of Minnesota considered the question of whether the children of a man who was murdered by his wife could claim an interest in real property owned by their father at the time of his death and thereafter sold by the widow-murderess following probate of the deceased's estate. The Minnesota Constitution

included a provision that "no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate," and that provision was invoked in support of the proposition that the sale was valid. Without

relying upon -- or interpreting -- that provision, a majority of the court held that the District Court for Nicollet County had ruled correctly in sustaining the purchaser's demurrer to the children's complaint. Justice Elliot, however, filed a

dissenting opinion that included the following analysis: The invocation on [the widow-murderessseller's] behalf of the constitutional provision that no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate rests upon a misapprehension of the scope and purpose of that provision. It found its way into the federal constitution in connection with the punishment for treason. It was adopted in the constitutional convention with little discussion as a precautionary measure suggested by the history of the English law of treason. An early act of congress (section 24, c. 9, Acts 1790, 1 St. 117) made the prohibition general by providing that "no conviction or judgment for any of the offenses aforesaid, shall work corruption of 4

blood, or any forfeiture of estate." Similar provisions are found in the constitution of several states. Stimson, Federal & State Constitutions, p. 182, note 6. By the common law a person convicted of a felony was by operation of law placed in a state of attainder, which resulted in forfeiture of estate, corruption of blood, and civil death. This result followed, not from the commission of the crime, but as a result of the conviction thereof. The attainted person was not divested of his land until after [the person was convicted]. So, in the case of goods and chattels, forfeiture had relation only to the time of conviction, and after the commission of a felony and before conviction the guilty party could make a valid sale or assignment of his personal property. These provisions abolish the common-law rule by which corruption of blood and forfeiture of estate resulted from the conviction of a felony. Corruption of blood rendered the felon incapable of inheriting or of transmitting property by inheritance. Forfeiture of estate transferred his property to the state. The heirs were thus deprived of their inheritance and the treasury enriched, and it was to prevent the manifest wrong and injustice to innocent persons which resulted from this doctrine that these constitutional provisions were adopted. 117 N.W. at 840 (citations omitted). Seventy two years later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated: Article III,

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