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The appellant-plaintiff, Ronald J. Teufel, sued the appelleedefendant, Eric George O'Dell, for damages suffered as a result of a collision between motor vehicles operated by the two of them. At

the close of all of the evidence before a Charles County jury, the appellant-plaintiff moved for judgments in his favor on the issues of 1) the defendant's primary negligence and 2) his own lack of contributory negligence. The court denied the motion and the case The jury's verdict was that the

was submitted to the jury.

appellee-defendant was guilty of primary negligence, but that the appellant-plaintiff was also guilty of contributory negligence. The appellant moved for judgment n.o.v. on the issue of

contributory negligence. timely followed.

That motion was denied and this appeal

The collision occurred on August 24, 1994 at the intersection of St. Charles Parkway and Md. Route 5 in Waldorf. Both the

appellant and the appellee were operating their vehicles in the southbound lane of St. Charles Parkway. was in front of the defendant's. right-hand turns onto Route 5. The plaintiff's vehicle

Both drivers intended to make As the plaintiff initially

approached the intersection, he observed that the traffic signal was displaying a red light for him and accordingly he brought his vehicle to a complete stop. The defendant also brought his vehicle

to a complete stop behind the plaintiff's vehicle. The plaintiff testified that he was still stopped when his vehicle was suddenly struck in the rear by the defendant's vehicle

-2and that all of this happened before the plaintiff had begun to move again. The defendant, on the other hand, testified that both

vehicles had initially stopped at the red light but that both vehicles had started to move again, when the plaintiff's vehicle came to a second, unexpected, and "sudden" stop, as a result of which the defendant struck him in the rear. The jury, as was its

prerogative, apparently chose to believe the defendant's version of the occurrence. The question is whether even that version

justified submitting the case to the jury. In determining whether the circuit court improperly denied the appellant's judgment n.o.v., this Court must "assume the truth of all credible evidence and all inferences of fact reasonably

deducible from the evidence supporting the party opposing the motion. If there exists any legally competent evidence, however

slight, from which the jury could have found as they did, a judgment n.o.v. would be improper." Houston v. Safeway Stores,

Inc., 109 Md. App. 177, 183, 674 A.2d 87 (1996), rev'd on other grounds, 346 Md. 503, 697 A.2d 851 (1997). In the context of this

case, therefore, we will accept as true that version of the accident testified to by the appellee-defendant. According to the defendant's trial testimony, the plaintiff's vehicle, after having come to a complete stop, began to proceed forward in an apparent attempt to make a right-hand turn onto Route 5. The defendant, in turn, then began to move forward, also The

intending to make a right-hand turn despite the red signal.

-3defendant testified that he turned his head to look left toward the oncoming traffic on Route 5, thereby diverting his attention momentarily from the plaintiff's car. It was that moment that the

defendant's vehicle struck the rear of the plaintiff's car. There is no dispute as to the defendant's primary negligence. The only issue is whether the defendant's testimony that the plaintiff "suddenly stopped" after beginning to make a right-hand turn onto Route 5 is sufficient evidence for the trial court to have submitted to the jury the issue of the plaintiff's

contributory negligence. Although the pertinent case law is part of the genre generally characterized as the "sudden stop" cases, it might be more precise to characterize the case before us as belonging to the sub-genre of "false start" cases. The law will not be different, but the more

precise label will help convey a more accurate picture of just what happened. When two automobiles are travelling in tandem, each has a duty of care toward the other. The duty on the rear driver not to hit

the car in front of him was clearly expressed by Brehm v. Lorenz, 206 Md. 500, 505, 112 A.2d 475 (1955): The general rule has been established in this State that every automobile driver must exercise toward other travelers on the highways that degree of care which a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under similar circumstances. In the Maryland Motor Vehicle Law there is also this provision: "The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and

-4prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway." Code 1951, art. 66-1/2, sec. 189(a). Thus it is the duty of the rear driver to keep a safe distance between vehicles, and to keep his machine well in hand, so as to avoid doing injury to the machine ahead, so long as the driver is proceeding in accordance with his rights. Just how near the driver of an automobile may follow another automobile and still exercise ordinary care depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied). There is also a reciprocal duty on the driver of the lead vehicle not to make, absent some sudden emergency, a sudden stop without giving an appropriate and timely signal of his intention to do so to the trailing vehicle. Brehm v. Lorenz, 206 Md. at 505-06,

also spoke of that reciprocal duty: The driver of the front car must exercise ordinary care not to stop or slow up without giving the driver of the rear car adequate warning of his intention to do so. The driver of the rear car must exercise ordinary care to avoid colliding with the front car. Just how much warning the driver of the front car must give of his intention to stop or slow up, and what precautions the driver of the rear car must take to avoid colliding with a car which stops or slows up in front of him, cannot be formulated in any precise rule. The question whether due care was used by either of the drivers is a question for the jury except when the case is one where reasonable minds would not differ. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied). The "sudden stop" cases in which the driver of the lead vehicle may be guilty of contributory negligence almost always

-5involve the sort of situation described in Clark v. Junkins, 245 Md. 104, 107, 225 A.2d 275 (1967): The alleged sudden stop without warning occurred in the middle of a block, at a point where a stop or sudden decrease of speed or a turn is not a probability ordinarily to be anticipated. This was not remotely such a case and that is why the scenario before us can be better conceptualized as an arguably "false start" rather than as a "sudden stop" case. The plaintiff was required by law to come to a complete stop at the red signal. He did so. See Md. Code Ann., Transp.

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