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Circuit Court for Prince George's County Case No. CAL96-09420 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 107 September Term, 2000

RITA UNDERWOOD-GARY v. GEORGE J. MATHEWS, et al.

Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Rodowsky, Lawrence F. (retired, specially assigned) JJ.

Opinion by Raker, J. Bell, C.J. Dissents Filed: November 28, 2001

The issue in this case is whether a plaintiff who enters into an agreement and has marked as satisfied a judgment against one tortfeasor is barred from maintaining a second action against two other alleged tortfeasors for the same harm. The Court of Special Appeals held, inter alia, in Mathews v. Gary, 133 Md. App. 570, 758 A.2d 1019 (2000), that petitioner could not maintain the second action on the ground that it was barred by the one satisfaction rule. We agree and shall affirm. This appeal arises out of a medical malpractice action filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, in which Rita Underwood-Gary, petitioner, alleged that George J. Mathews, M.D. and Shaheer Yousaf, M.D., respondents, performed unnecessary surgery upon her. Approximately one week after entry of satisfaction of a money judgment 1 in a 1992

lawsuit stemming from an automobile accident in the Circuit Court for Charles County (the "Thompson litigation"), petitioner filed this malpractice action in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. In this case, we shall hold that the satisfaction2 of the Thompson litigation

judgment precluded petitioner from pursuing claims against George J. Mathews, M.D. and Shaheer Yousaf, M.D., her treating physicians, in the subsequent medical malpractice action.

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Maryland Rule 2-626(a) provides as follows: "Upon being paid all amounts due on a money judgment, the judgment creditor shall furnish to the judgment debtor and file with the clerk a written statement that the judgment has been satisfied. Upon the filing of the statement the clerk shall enter the judgment satisfied."

A satisfaction of a judgment is "`an acceptance of full compensation for the injury.'" Morgan v. Cohen, 309 Md. 304, 312, 523 A.2d 1003, 1007 (1987) (quoting Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CAL. L. REV. 413, 421-22 (1937)).

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On July 10, 1991, Rita Underwood-Gary and Ms. Marie Thompson were involved in an automobile accident in Charles County, Maryland. Following the accident, petitioner

developed severe pain in her lower back and, in August 1991, she began receiving treatment from Dr. Shaheer Yousaf, an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Yousaf treated petitioner over a period of approximately seven months. The treatment did not relieve petitioner's back pain, and Dr. Yousaf concluded that petitioner suffered from an injury to the soft tissue in her back and an injury to the facet joint of the lower back. necessary to relieve petitioner's pain. Dr. Yousaf indicated that surgery might be

He referred her, for a second opinion, to Dr. George

J. Mathews, a neurosurgeon. After Dr. Mathews met with petitioner and reviewed her previous medical treatment, he concurred with Dr. Yousaf's diagnosis of petitioner's injuries and recommended back surgery. On May 20, 1992, Drs. Yousaf and Mathews, along with Dr.

Dadgar, a thoracic and vascular surgeon, performed back surgery on petitioner. On July 22, 1992, petitioner filed a complaint sounding in negligence in the Circuit Court for Charles County against Ms. Thompson, the driver of the vehicle that collided with her on July 10, 1991, seeking recovery for the injuries allegedly suffered as a result of the automobile accident. In her complaint, petitioner alleged that Ms. Thompson negligently

operated her vehicle and caused the collision. Petitioner further alleged that, as a result of the accident, "[She had] sustained serious, painful and permanent injuries in and about her entire body, including but not limited to her head, back, hip, neck and other parts of her body; that the Plaintiff, Rita Lee

-3Underwood, has suffered and will in the future suffer great physical pain, mental anguish and nervous shock; that the Plaintiff, Rita Lee Underwood, has in the past and will in the future be required to expend large sums of money for hospital, rehabilitation, medical and nursing care, treatment and related items." Petitioner also claimed damages for loss of enjoyment of life, loss of income, and loss of earning power. Petitioner requested the Charles County jury to award her damages for her back surgery. Significantly, during pre-trial discovery, petitioner was placed on notice that At the

Thompson's defense included the contention that the back surgery was unnecessary.

latest, petitioner was on notice of the unnecessary surgery defense as of October 18, 1993, when she took the de bene esse deposition of Dr. Kevin Hanley, a defense witness. Respondent contends that Ms. Underwood-Gary knew of the unnecessary surgery defense long before this date, through Ms. Thompson's Answer to the Complaint, discovery responses, and discovery depositions, all of which predated Dr. Hanley's deposition by some time. On October 27, 1993, the Thompson case proceeded to trial before a jury. Petitioner

testified as to her entire course of therapy and treatment following the automobile accident. She offered into evidence all of the medical bills related to her treatment by Drs. Yousaf and Mathews, including the bills for the surgery and the hospital stay. She claimed a total of

$38,195.28 in medical expenses, including all of the medical expenses related to the back surgery, as well as $250,000.00 for pain and suffering. Additionally, petitioner testified to the

pain and physical limitations she experienced both before and after the surgery. She presented evidence that, as a result of the accident, and after the surgery, she was 30 percent permanently

-4disabled. She described her three month recovery at a relative's house, having to miss two to three weeks of work, and her inability to sit for long periods of time. Petitioner testified to

the financial strain that the injury placed on her marriage, the constant pain that she felt in her lower back, and that she could no longer participate in activities that she used to enjoy, such as bowling and walking. During her case-in-chief in the Thompson litigation, petitioner called Drs. Yousaf and Mathews as witnesses to testify on her behalf. In addition to eliciting testimony about the

nature of the surgery, petitioner's counsel inquired of Dr. Yousaf as to the necessity of the surgery: "Q: Now, Doctor, I want to show you, Doctor, let me ask you this, do you have an opinion based on medical probability, the operation you performed in and assisted in was necessary to have in her case? A: Based on indications." Petitioner also called Dr. Mathews, who testified that petitioner's back surgery was related to the Thompson accident.3 Consistent with the pre-trial discovery, Thompson presented

evidence in defense that petitioner suffered from a soft tissue injury, not a facet joint injury, and that the back surgery performed by Drs. Mathews and Yousaf was not necessary. The jury found Ms. Thompson negligent, that petitioner had suffered injuries as a result of the accident, and awarded petitioner damages in the amount of $8,337.00 for medical

In closing argument to the jury in the Thompson litigation, petitioner's counsel argued that the surgery was called for. He argued: "You didn't hear any testimony saying that he shouldn't have done that. It was called for and was an effort to relieve this woman."

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-5expenses, $750.00 for lost wages, and $0 for pain and suffering.4 favor of petitioner for $9,087.00. Judgment was entered in

Petitioner noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals,

and while the appeal was pending, the parties settled the case for the policy limit of $20,000.00. The appeal was dismissed and an order of satisfaction was entered in the Circuit Court on May 15, 1993.5 Approximately one week after the court entered the order of satisfaction in the Thompson litigation, petitioner filed suit against Drs. Yousaf and Mathews, alleging in her complaint that the doctors were negligent in that petitioner did not have any of the accepted indications for surgery and that the lumbar fusion was unnecessary. Petitioner sought recovery for her medical bills, lost wages, and pain and suffering. Prior to trial, Drs. Yousaf and Mathews filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that petitioner's action was barred by the doctrines of judicial estoppel, collateral estoppel, and satisfaction. The Circuit Court for Prince George's County denied the motions. At trial,

petitioner offered evidence that respondents failed to meet the standard of care with regard to the decision to operate and that the surgery was unnecessary. ground that the surgery was necessary. Respondents defended on the

The trial court instructed the jury that the "only issue

The verdict sheet presented to the jury did not include a question or questions requiring it to specify whether it was persuaded that Petitioner's back surgery was necessary or that Petitioner's claimed injuries to her vertebral facets, as opposed to the soft tissue injuries, were caused by the collision with Thompson's vehicle. The record in this case contains no information concerning any release that may have been executed contemporaneously with the dismissal of the appeal and the entry of the order of satisfaction in the Thompson litigation.
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-6in the case is whether the surgical treatment was negligent or not." Petitioner's counsel argued to the jury that petitioner's pain "is caused by a totally completely unnecessary operation and that it didn't have to happen, but it did." The jury returned a verdict in petitioner's favor in the amount of $437,073.69. The

Circuit Court denied respondents' post-trial motions and respondents then filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. That court reversed the judgment on the grounds that the See

claim was barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel and the one satisfaction rule.

Mathews v. Gary, 133 Md. App. 570, 758 A.2d 1019 (2000). This Court granted UnderwoodGary's petition for writ of certiorari. Underwood-Gary v. Mathews, 362 Md. 187, 763 A.2d 734 (2000). The Court of Special Appeals held that the Circuit Court erred in rejecting the doctors' argument that petitioner's claim for all her damages had been satisfied in the Thompson litigation. See 133 Md. App. at 581, 758 A.2d at 1024. We agree. We shall affirm the

judgment of the Court of Special Appeals on the ground that petitioner's claim has been satisfied by the settlement in the Thompson litigation and shall not reach the court's alternative holding that the action is barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel.6

Judicial estoppel has been defined as a principle that precludes a party from taking a position in a subsequent action inconsistent with a position taken by him or her in a previous action. See WinMark Ltd. P'ship v. Miles & Stockbridge, 345 Md. 614, 693 A. 2d 824 (1997). Petitioner argues before this Court that at no time did she attempt to mislead the court in any manner, and, in fact, no such issue has ever been raised in this case. Inasmuch as we decide this case on the basis of the one satisfaction rule, we do not reach the issue of judicial estoppel.

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-7We begin with the general principle that a plaintiff is entitled to but one compensation for her loss and that satisfaction of her claim prevents further action against another for the same damages. See Welsh v. Gerber Products, Inc., 315 Md. 510, 524, 555 A.2d 486, 493 (1989); Morgan v. Cohen, 309 Md. 304, 312, 523 A.2d 1003, 1006 (1987); see also Knutsen v. Brown, 232 A.2d 833, 836 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967); Turner v. Pickens, 711 So. 2d 891, 893 (Miss. 1998). This rule is equitable in nature and the purpose of the rule is to prevent double recovery and, thus, unjust enrichment. See Morgan, 309 Md. at 312, 523 A.2d at 1006; Lanasa v. Beggs, 159 Md. 311, 320, 151 A. 21, 25 (1930) (noting that "[i]t is neither just nor lawful that there should be more than one satisfaction for the same injury, whether that injury be done by one or more."), rev'd on other grounds, Morgan, 309 Md. 304, 523 A.2d 1003; Sacchetti v. Springer, 22 N.E.2d 42 (Mass. 1939); Vaca v. Whitaker, 519 P.2d 315, 319 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974); see also PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS,

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