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REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 45 September Term, 2008

VALERIE WOOLDRIDGE, ET AL. v. LINDA D. PRICE, ET AL.

Eyler, Deborah S., Woodward, Sharer, J. Frederick (Ret'd, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Eyler, Deborah S., J.

Filed: March 5, 2009

Robert H. Wooldridge, Jr. (the "decedent") was killed when the skateboard he was riding was struck by a car in which Richard Price and Linda Price, the appellees, were traveling. In the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Valerie Wooldridge, the decedent's surviving wife and personal representative of his estate, the appellant, brought a wrongful death and survival action on behalf of herself, their minor children, and the decedent's parents. After discovery was undertaken, the Prices moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion in a memorandum opinion and order. Mrs. Wooldridge noted this appeal, presenting three questions for review, which we have reordered and slightly rephrased: I. Was the circuit court legally correct when it ruled that the decedent was not a pedestrian, that a skateboard is a vehicle, that the boulevard rule applies as a matter of law, and that the decedent was contributorily negligent as a matter of law? Was the circuit court legally correct when it ruled that the doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to the facts in this case, viewed most favorably to the appellant, as a matter of law? Was the circuit court legally correct when it ruled that Mrs. Price was entitled to summary judgment because any dispute over whether she was driving at the time of the accident was not material to the issue of liability?

II.

III.

For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm the circuit court's grant of summary judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The accident in this case happened on July 15, 2006. The decedent was 44 years old and was living with his wife and children in a single family residence at 10526 Sweetbriar

Parkway, in Silver Spring. The decedent's in-laws (Mrs. Wooldridge's parents) lived across the street at 10545 Sweetbriar Parkway. Jennifer Raymond, Mrs. Wooldridge's sister, lived next door to the decedent. The Prices lived in a single family residence at 1801 Kimberly Road, in the same neighborhood. Indeed, Kimberly Road begins where Sweetbriar Parkway ends. The accident happened on Sweetbriar Parkway at approximately 12:49 p.m. The weather was clear and sunny with temperatures in the 80's, the road was dry, and the traffic was light. It was a Saturday. The Prices were on their way to Henderson Hall Marine Barrack to do some shopping and have lunch. Both Mr. and Mrs. Price were 57 years old. The decedent was on the driveway of his in-laws' house, across the street from his own house. The driveways of the two houses are directly across the street from each other. The decedent had been riding his skateboard down one driveway, across the road, and up the other driveway. The Prices were proceeding south on Sweetbriar Parkway, at 15 miles per hour, which was less than the posted speed limit of 25 miles per hour. The accident happened when the decedent, on his skateboard, traveled from his in-laws' driveway into the street, apparently to cross over to his own driveway. The decedent was heading in a westerly direction, meaning that he was approaching the Prices' car from the left, driver's side. The Prices' vehicle struck the decedent in the middle of Sweetbriar Parkway. The decedent ended up underneath the Prices' car, behind the front wheels. He died from the injuries sustained in

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the accident. The only people present who witnessed the accident were the Prices and the decedent. According to the Prices, when the accident happened, Mr. Price was driving their car (a 2001 Volvo) and Mrs. Price was sitting in the front passenger seat. She was looking down into her purse and for that reason did not see what happened. Mr. Price saw the decedent come out of a driveway at a rapid speed and in a crouched position and fall down in front of the Prices' car. Mr. Price immediately applied his brakes and tried to turn the car to the right, to no avail. According to Mrs. Wooldridge, upon hearing the sound of the crash, Jennifer Raymond (her sister), and Jaclyn Leimbach (their mother) ran to the scene, arriving within seconds. Ms. Raymond would testify that she noticed that Mrs. Price was holding car keys in her hand and that she saw Mrs. Price get out of the driver's side of the car, walk around to the back of the car, and lean on the rear driver's side of the car with her head in her hands. Ms. Leimbach would testify that she saw Mr. Price sitting in the front passenger seat of the car and that she saw Mrs. Price walking around the driver's side of the car to the trunk, which she leaned on. The Montgomery County Police Department investigated the accident and prepared a written report. Mrs. Wooldridge hired Gregory Manning, an accident reconstructionist, who prepared a report about the accident and its cause. Mrs. Wooldridge filed suit, alleging that her husband's death was the result of negligence on the part of the Prices. Discovery ensued. On December 20, 2007, the Prices
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filed a motion for summary judgment, which was supported by a memorandum of law and interrogatory answers by each of them. Mrs. Wooldridge filed an opposition to the motion, supported by affidavits by Ms. Raymond, Mrs. Leimbach, and Mr. Manning. The Manning affidavit attached his report of September 11, 2007. The Prices filed a reply memorandum of law to which they attached the "State of Maryland Motor Vehicle Accident Report" and excerpts from Mr. Manning's deposition. The court held a hearing on the summary judgment motion on February 5, 2008. Thereafter, on February 8, 2008, it issued a memorandum opinion and order granting summary judgment because: 1) the boulevard rule provision of the Transportation Article governed the accident; 2) under that rule, the decedent was contributorily negligent as a matter of law; 3) if Mrs. Wooldridge were able to generate evidence of negligence on the part of the Prices, her claims nevertheless would be barred by contributory negligence because, as a matter of law, the doctrine of last clear chance did not apply; and 4) whether Mr. Price or Mrs. Price was driving the car at the time of the accident was not a material fact, and therefore the parties' apparent dispute over that fact did not preclude the grant of summary judgment. The order was entered on February 13, 2008. Mrs. Wooldridge filed a timely notice of appeal. We shall include additional information as necessary to our discussion of the issues.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
As this Court recently explained, the standard of review for the grant of summary judgment is as follows:
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We review a circuit court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Crickenberger v. Hyundai Motor America, 404 Md. 37, 45, 944 A.2d 1136 (2008). Our review is two-fold. First, we determine whether there was or was not a genuine dispute of material fact on the summary judgment record. Hill v. Cross Country Settlements, LLC, 402 Md. 281, 294, 936 A.2d 343 (2007). A material fact is a fact that, if found one way or the other, will affect the outcome of the case. Miller v. Bay City Property Owners Ass'n, 393 Md. 620, 631, 903 A.2d 938 (2006). Second, if there is no genuine dispute of material fact, we determine whether the party that obtained summary judgment was entitled to judgment in its favor, as a matter of law. Crickenberger, supra, 404 Md. at 45, 944 A.2d 1136. Zitterbart v. Am. Suzuki Motor Corp., 182 Md. App. 495, 501-02, cert. denied, 406 Md. 581 (2008).

DISCUSSION
Mrs. Wooldridge's three questions presented really are three arguments as to why, in her view, the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Prices. I. Duty of Care/Application of Boulevard Rule Mrs. Wooldridge's first argument is that a skateboard is not a "vehicle," within the meaning of the "rules of the road," as set forth in Md. Code (1977, 2006 Repl. Vol.), sections 21-101 et seq. of the Transportation Article ("TR"), and therefore the "boulevard rule," one such rule of the road, did not apply. And, even if the boulevard rule did apply, the decedent was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law, and the circuit court's ruling to the contrary was in error. Not surprisingly, the Prices argue the opposite. The portion of the boulevard rule in question here appears in TR section 21-404, which provides, in relevant part:
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(a) Entering highway from other than a highway

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