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HEADNOTES: Edwin Wright v. State of Maryland, No. 6, September Term, 2009 CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE -- VOIR DIRE -- A criminal defendant was improperly convicted of drug-related offenses where the trial court failed to ensure a fair and impartial jury. The trial court conducted voir dire by posing a list of seventeen questions to the venire panel en masse, and then required venirepersons to wait until the end of questioning before responding. The trial court's method does not adequately illuminate possible causes for juror disqualification. Requiring venirepersons to recall an extensive list of voir dire questions, and to wait a substantial period of time before answering those questions, adds too much uncertainty to an already delicate process. Some potential jurors may find this an easy task, but given the critical nature of voir dire, it is better to use an overabundance of caution in requiring a more careful procedure.

Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No. 106150030

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 6 September Term, 2009

EDWIN WRIGHT v. STATE OF MARYLAND

Bell, C.J. Harrell Battaglia Greene Murphy Adkins Barbera, JJ.

Opinion by Adkins, J. Murphy, J., Dissents

Filed: November 16, 2009

Petitioner Edwin Wright was charged with possession of cocaine, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and unlawful distribution of cocaine. Wright was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, found guilty on the first two charges, and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. During jury selection, the trial court conducted voir dire by posing a roster of questions to the venire in quick succession, and then permitting jurors to respond only after all questions had been asked. Because this method of voir dire did not effectively ensure a fair and impartial jury, we vacate Wright's convictions, and remand the case for a new trial. FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS On May 6, 2006, Petitioner Edwin Wright was arrested and charged with possession of cocaine, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and unlawful distribution of cocaine. He was tried before the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on March 28-29, 2007. Before trial, the trial court conducted a voir dire of the fifty-person venire panel. During the voir dire, the venirepersons were asked, as a group, a roster of seventeen questions. At the end of this collective questioning, each venireperson was called to the bench individually and asked if he or she had any information in response to the voir dire questions. The court then asked the venireperson if he or she could be fair and impartial. At the conclusion of this process, counsel for Wright and for the State moved the trial court to strike a number of jurors for cause, based on the information uncovered during the trial court's questioning. Wright's counsel objected to this voir dire method, arguing that "the problem is [the jurors' abilities] to remember all the questions." The trial court overruled the

objection, saying that in the court's understanding, the chosen method "complie[d] with . . . reported cases." The trial court went on to say that "this is an extremely effective way of accomplishing what is sought to be accomplished in the voir dire process. The jurors do remember the questions." Ultimately, Wright was convicted of possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison without parole. Wright appealed on the grounds that the selected voir dire method prevented the empaneling of a fair and impartial jury.1 In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court. While the Court of Special Appeals characterized the challenged voir dire method as "somewhat flawed," it concluded that the flaws were not so egregious as to constitute an abuse of discretion. We granted certiorari to consider whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in relying on the chosen voir dire method.2 DISCUSSION There is only one issue in this case: did the trial court's voir dire method deprive Wright of a fair and impartial jury, as guaranteed to him by both the United States Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights? See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 21. We evaluate voir dire methodology under an abuse of discretion

Wright also appealed the trial court's decision to restrict a defense witness's testimony after initially ruling the testimony admissible. That issue is not before this Court. We have restated the question presented to illustrate better the problems presented by this case. 2
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standard. See, e.g., Stewart v. State, 399 Md. 146, 160, 923 A.2d 44, 52 (2007). We begin from the premise that the "overarching purpose of voir dire in a criminal case is to ensure a fair and impartial jury." Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 9, 759 A.2d 819, 823 (2000). Indeed, the only purpose of voir dire in Maryland is to illuminate to the trial court any cause for juror disqualification. See Stewart, 399 Md. at 158, 923 A.2d at 51. Without a comprehensive and effective voir dire, a trial judge cannot properly winnow the venire to only those jurors who will be able to perform their duties without prejudice. See White v. State, 374 Md. 232, 240, 821 A.2d 459, 463 (2003) ("Without adequate voir dire, the trial judge is unable to fulfill his or her responsibility to eliminate those prospective jurors who will be unable to perform their duty impartially."). Within this overall framework, however, the trial court has "broad discretion in the conduct of voir dire . . . ." Dingle, 361 Md. at 13, 759 A.2d at 826. That discretion extends to both the form and the substance of questions posed to the venire. See, e.g., White, 374 Md. at 242-44, 821 A.2d at 465 (holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to pose "compound" voir dire questions to the venire as a whole, followed by extensive individual voir dire); Stewart, 399 Md. at 162, 923 A.2d at 53 (holding that the trial court was not required to ask voir dire questions on a subject merely because the questions were requested by a party). A trial court reaches the limits of its discretion only when the voir dire method employed by the court fails to probe juror biases effectively. See, e.g., White, 374 Md. at 241, 759 A.2d at 464 (holding that "the conclusions of the trial judge are entitled to

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less deference" if voir dire is "cursory, rushed, and unduly limited"). In this case, the selected method of voir dire strayed too close to the "cursory" and "unduly limited" techniques that we have proscribed. It is evident from the record that the trial court's questioning did not properly engage at least some members of the venire panel. For example, the following exchange occurred between the trial judge and Juror 567: THE COURT: Do you have any information to give the Court in response to the questions that I've asked? JUROR 567: No. THE COURT: Is there any reason you would not be able to reach a fair and impartial verdict in this case

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