Preview:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
)
ANDREW CHAPMAN                                                                                      )
)
Plaintiff,                                                                                          )
)
v.                                                                                                  )                                                  Civil Action No. 12-10525-JCB
                                                                                                    )
OFFICER BRANDON FINNEGAN, et al.                                                                    )
                                                                                                    )
Defendants.                                                                                         )
____________________________________)
                                                                                                    ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
                                                                                                    [Docket No. 41]
                                                                                                    June 7, 2013
Boal, M.J.
Plaintiff Andrew Chapman (“Chapman” or “Plaintiff”) brings this action against three
Marblehead police officers, Brandon Finnegan, Dean Peralta, and Shaun Brady, the Chief of
Police of the Town of Marblehead, Robert Picariello, and the Town of Marblehead.  The action
arises out of his arrest for domestic assault and battery on April 1, 2009.  He brings claims for
violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and assault and battery.
On July 17, 2012, the parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States
Magistrate Judge for all purposes.  Docket No. 15; see also Docket No. 36.  The Defendants have
moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims.  Docket No. 41.  For the following
reasons, this Court grants the motion.
I.                                                                                                  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Chapman filed his Complaint on March 22, 2012.  Docket No. 1.  He filed an Amended
-1-




Complaint on July 24, 2012.  Docket No. 16.  Defendants filed their answer on July 26, 2012.
Docket No. 17.
Discovery closed in January 2013.  On February 25, 2013, Defendants filed their motion
for summary judgment.  Docket No. 41.  Chapman filed his opposition on April 12, 2013.
Plaintiff did not file a response to the Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts as required by
Local Rule 56.1 and the Court’s scheduling order.  Accordingly, on April 16, 2013, the Court
ordered Plaintiff to file his response no later than April 17, 2013.  Docket No. 49.  On April 18,
2013, Plaintiff filed a response to Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts.  Docket No. 50.
However, Plaintiff’s response failed to cite to any admissible evidence of record as required by
Local Rule 56.1 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).  Accordingly, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file a
revised response, along with copies of all referenced documentation, by April 26, 2013.  Docket
No. 51.  Plaintiff requested an extension of that deadline, which the Court granted.  Docket Nos.
52, 53.  On May 23, 2013, Plaintiff filed a copy of certain exhibits in support of his opposition to
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment but he did not file a revised response to Defendants’
statement of undisputed facts with cites to admissible evidence of record.  Docket No. 55.  At
oral argument, Plaintiff requested one more opportunity to file a response to Defendants’
statement of undisputed facts that complied with Local Rule 56.1 and the Court ordered that he
may do so by June 7, 2013.  On June 7, 2013, Chapman filed a “List of Deposition Exhibits,”
which referenced certain portions of his testimony that he contends create an issue of material
fact.  Docket No. 57.  He still did not, however, file a response to Defendants’ statement of
undisputed fact which cites to admissible evidence of record.  In any event, even if the
referenced testimony was properly aligned to particular statements of undisputed facts, it would
-2-




make no difference to the Court’s analysis on the merits.    Docket No. 48.
The Court heard oral argument on June 5, 2013.
II.                                                                                                FACTS1
On April 1, 2009, Marblehead police officers Brendan Finnegan and Dean Peralta
arrested Chapman for domestic assault and battery.  SOF ¶ 3.2  At the time, Chapman was 62
years old, while the alleged female victim, Ashley Phelan, was 22 years old.  SOF ¶¶ 1-2.
Phelan had called Marblehead police and reported that Chapman, her boyfriend of two years, had
shoved her and grabbed her by the throat.  SOF ¶ 4.  She also reported that she had to knee
Chapman to get him away before calling the police.  Id.  As a result of the call, Finnegan and
Peralta were dispatched to Chapman’s residence for a domestic disturbance and were informed
that Phelan would meet them in front of Chapman’s residence.  SOF ¶¶ 5-6.  They were also told
that the Plaintiff had an active license to carry firearms.  SOF ¶ 5.
Upon arrival at Chapman’s residence, Finnegan and Peralta found Phelan crying and
emotional in the front driver’s seat of her car.  SOF ¶ 7.  She told Finnegan and Peralta that
Chapman grabbed her by the throat and told her to get out of his house.  SOF ¶ 8.  She also told
Finnegan and Peralta that Chapman grabbed her so tight around the neck that she could not
1 The facts, unless otherwise noted, are undisputed and are derived from Defendants’
statement of undisputed facts and Chapman’s responses.   (Docket Nos. 43, 50).  Because this
case is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment, the Court sets out any disputed facts
in the light most favorable to Chapman, the non-moving party.  See DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124
F.3d 298, 302 (1st Cir. 1997).  However, Chapman cannot create an issue of fact without citing
to competent evidence of record. See Hidalgo v. Overseas Condado Ins. Agencies, Inc., 120 F.3d
328, 338 (1st Cir. 1997).
2 “SOF” refers to the Plaintiff’s response to the Defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 statement of
undisputed facts.  Docket No. 50.
-3-




breathe, and that she had to kick Chapman in the groin to release his grip.  SOF ¶¶ 9-10.  She
showed the officers bruising and red marks on her neck, which the officers thought were
consistent with being strangled.  SOF ¶¶ 12-13.  Phelan informed the officers that Chapman was
in his second floor apartment and that he had firearms in his house.  SOF ¶ 14.
Finnegan and Peralta then went to Chapman’s apartment and spoke with him.  SOF ¶ 15.
Chapman told the officers that Phelan was looking for a “fix” and that he did not touch her in
any way.  Id.  He also told the officers that he had a casual relationship with Phelan and that he
had to stop Phelan from entering his house.  Id.  Chapman was arrested for domestic assault and
battery.  SOF ¶ 17.
Although Chapman denies assaulting Phelan and her version of the events, he does not
dispute the Defendants’ version of what they were told by Phelan or that they observed marks in
her neck.3  He disputes, however, that the marks were red.  Chapman alleges that the marks were
yellow and were from an earlier incident where Phelan’s father pulled her off her mother after
she attacked her mother.  SOF ¶ 12.
At the police station, EMT officer overheard a conversation and offered to go to
3 In his response to the Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts, Chapman responds to
all statements regarding what Phelan did or told the police by stating that he cannot admit or
deny the statement because he does not know what Phelan did or told the officers.  See, e.g.,
SOF ¶¶ 4-11, 14.  A party opposing summary judgment cannot create a genuine issue of fact by
denying statements, which the moving party contends are undisputed and supported by sufficient
evidence, on the basis that he lacks knowledge and information to admit or deny the statement.
See, e.g., Cooper v. City of New Rochelle, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2013 WL 684747, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 26, 2013).  Discovery allows the party opposing summary judgment to obtain the facts
necessary to determine whether it must admit or deny the moving party’s statements of fact.
AFL Fresh & Frozen Fruits & Vegetables, Inc. v. De-Mar Food Servs. Inc., No. 06 Civ. 2142,
2007 WL 4302514, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Thus, whenever Chapman responds that he does not
have knowledge sufficient to admit or deny a fact, the Court deems that fact admitted for
purposes of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
-4-




Chapman’s residence to retrieve some diabetes medication that Chapman needed.  SOF ¶ 18.
The EMTs later returned with the medication and Chapman injected himself with the
medication.  SOF ¶ 22.  Chapman was then booked and transferred to the Essex County House of
Correction.  SOF ¶¶ 23-24.  Chapman estimates that he was at the Marblehead Police Station for
approximately 30 to 45 minutes.  SOF ¶ 26.
III.                                                                                                   ANALYSIS
A.                                                                                                     Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a).                                                                                                 “A dispute is ‘genuine’ if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could
resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party.”  Sanchez v. Alvarado, 101 F.3d 223, 227
(1st Cir. 1996) (quotations and citations omitted).  A material fact is one which has “the potential
to affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law.”  Id.   (quotations and citations
omitted).
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of
material fact.  See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).  If that burden is met, the
opposing party can avoid summary judgment only by providing properly supported evidence of
disputed material facts that would require trial.  See id. at 324.   “[T]he non-moving party ‘may
not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading,’” but must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.  LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841
(1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986)).
“[T]he material creating the factual dispute must herald the existence of ‘definite,
-5-




competent evidence’ fortifying the plaintiff’s version of the truth.  Optimistic conjecture . . . or
hopeful surmise will not suffice.”  Hidalgo, 120 F.3d at 338.  In addition, a plaintiff may not
attempt to create an issue of fact by contradicting his prior deposition testimony.  Morales, 246
F.3d at 32.
The court must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and
indulge all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.  See O’Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905,
907 (1st Cir. 1993).   “If, after viewing the record in the non-moving party’s favor, the Court
determines that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate.”  Walsh v. Town of Lakeville,
431 F. Supp. 2d 134, 143 (D. Mass. 2006).
B.                                                                                                     Chapman’s Claims Against The Town Of Marblehead And
Chief Of Police Picariello Fail As A Matter Of Law
Chapman brings claims against the Town of Marblehead and Chief of Police Picariello
under Section 1983 (Count One) and based on theories of “vicarious liability” and “respondeat
superior” (Counts Four through Seven). 4  These claims fail as a matter of law.
1.                                                                                                     Claims Against The Town Of Marblehead
Under Section 1983, it is well established that a municipality is not liable for the actions
4 Although Chapman brings separate claims for vicarious liability (Counts Four and Six)
and respondeat superior (Counts Five and Seven), they are different names for the same concept.
See Adams v. Hyannis Harborview, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 676, 691 (D. Mass. 1993) (“Respondeat
superior imposes vicarious liability on a principal for the acts or conduct of its agent.”); compare
Black’s Law Dictionary 927 (7th ed. 1999) (defining vicarious liability as “[l]iability that a
supervisory party bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate (such as an
employee) because of the relationship between the two parties”) with Black’s Law Dictionary
1313 (defining “respondeat superior” as “[t]he doctrine holding an employer or principal liable
for the employee’s or agent’s wrongful acts committed within the scope of the employment or
agency”).
-6-




of its employees simply by virtue of the employment relationship.  Monell v. Dep’t of Social
Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978).  Instead, under Monell and subsequent
cases, a plaintiff seeking to prove municipal liability under Section 1983 must identify a
municipal policy or custom that caused the plaintiff’s injury.  Id. at 694; City of Oklahoma City
v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 818 (1985); Young v. City of Providence, 404 F.3d 4, 25 (1st Cir. 2005).
“Locating a ‘policy’ ensures that a municipality is held liable only for those deprivations
resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or of those officials whose
acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality.”  Board of the County of Comm’rs of
Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997).   “Similarly, an act performed
pursuant to a ‘custom’ that has not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker may
fairly subject a municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant practice is so widespread
as to have the force of law.”  Id. at 404.
A Section 1983 claim based on a theory of municipal policy is only viable where “the
action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.”
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.   “The governmental policy must be so tied to the challenged acts that it
can be said to be the moving force of the constitutional violation.”  Bibbo v. Mulhern, 621 F.
Supp. 1018, 1027 (D. Mass. 1985) (internal citations omitted).
Similarly, in order to establish a Section 1983 claim against a municipality based on a
theory of municipal custom, a plaintiff must demonstrate a practice by City officials that is so
“well settled and widespread that the policymaking officials of the municipality can be said to
have either actual or constructive knowledge of it yet did nothing to end the practice.”
-7-




Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151, 1156 (1st Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).  Where the
Section 1983 claim is based on a municipality’s alleged failure to train, discipline or supervise
its officers, this failure must be so extreme and pervasive that it amounts to a deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the officers come into contact.  DiRico v. City of
Quincy, 404 F.3d 464, 468-69 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388
(1989) and Bordanaro, 871 F.2d at 1159).  In addition, the plaintiff must prove that the “custom
must have been the cause of and the moving force behind the deprivation of constitutional
rights.”  Bordanaro, 871 F.2d at 1156.
Chapman has not pointed to any evidence that would create a genuine issue of fact
regarding municipal liability.  He has pointed to no policy or custom that caused the alleged
constitutional violations.  Indeed, in his opposition, Chapman simply states that “a municipality
may, in certain circumstances, be held liable under section 1983 for constitutional violations
resulting from its failure to train its employees.”  Docket No. 48 at 5 (citations omitted).
Chapman does not, however, point to any evidence that would support a finding that any such
circumstances are present in this case.  Accordingly, the Court finds that summary judgment in
favor of the Town of Marblehead is appropriate.
2.                                                                                                     Claims Against Chief Picariello5
“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that
5 The Amended Complaint’s caption states that Chapman’s claims against Chief
Picariello and the defendant police officers are brought “individually and in their official
capacities as police officers.”  However, a state official acting in his official capacity cannot be
sued for damages in a Section 1983 action.  Wang v. New Hampshire Board of Registration in
Medicine, 55 F.3d 698, 700 (1st Cir. 1995); Rafferty v. Cranston Pub. Sch. Comm., 315 F.3d 21,
28 (1st Cir. 2002).  Therefore, Chapman cannot pursue money damages against Defendants in
their official capacity for his Section 1983 claims and those claims will be dismissed.
-8-




each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, have violated
the Constitution.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).   “Absent vicarious liability, each
Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own
misconduct.”  Id. at 677.
Absent participation in the challenged conduct, a supervisor may be held liable for
constitutional violations only if “(1) the behavior of [his] subordinates results in a constitutional
violation and (2) the [supervisor’s] action or inaction was affirmative[ly] link[ed] to the behavior
in the sense that it could be characterized as supervisory encouragement, condonation or
acquiescence or gross negligence [of the supervisor] amounting to deliberate indifference.”
Pineda v. Toomey, 533 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).  The plaintiff must show
causation linking the supervisor’s conduct to the subordinate’s violative act or omission.
Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriquez, 23 F.3d 576, 582 (1st Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
Causation may be satisfied if the supervisor knew of, overtly or tacitly approved of, or purposely
disregarded the conduct.  Id. (citations omitted).  Causation may also be satisfied if there is a
long history of widespread abuse sufficient to alert a supervisor to ongoing violations and the
supervisor fails to take corrective action.  Id. (citations omitted).
Here, Chapman has pointed to no facts affirmatively linking Picariello to Finnegan and
Peralta’s decision to arrest Chapman or their actions in connection with Chapman’s medical
condition.  He has pointed to no evidence that he was involved in any way in the events at issue
in this case or that he even knew about the events.  He also fails to point to any evidence of
widespread abuses that would have alerted Picariello to any ongoing violations.  Absent any
factual basis to support a claim that Chief Picariello’s conduct constituted supervisory
-9-




encouragement, condonation or gross negligence amounting to a deliberate indifference to
Chapman’s constitutional rights, Chapman has failed to create a genuine issue of fact regarding
supervisory liability.  Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Chief
Picariello.
C.                                                                                                     Chapman’s Claims For False Arrest And Failure To Investigate
Section 1983 is a vehicle through which individuals may sue certain persons acting under
the color of state law for deprivation of federally assured rights.  Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d
301, 306 (1st Cir. 2008).  Specifically, Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ...
42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Section 1983 is “not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides
a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.”  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
393-4 (1989).
“A claim under Section 1983 has two essential elements.  First, the challenged conduct
must be attributable to a person acting under color of state law” and “second, the conduct must
have worked a denial of rights secured by the Constitution or by federal law.”  Soto v. Flores,
103 F.3d 1056, 1061 (1st Cir. 1997).  The Defendants do not dispute that they were acting under
color of state law.  However, Defendants contend that Chapman has failed to state a claim that
they deprived him of any constitutional rights.
Chapman alleges that his arrest violated his constitutional rights.  An arrest is lawful if
the officer has probable cause.  Holder v. Town of Sandown, 585 F.3d 500, 504 (1st Cir. 2009)
-10-




(citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985)).   “A police officer has probable cause when,
at the time of the arrest, the ‘facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge . . . are
sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the
circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit and
offense.’”  Id. (citations omitted).
In determining whether the officer has probable cause, this Court must view the
circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable person in the position of the officer.  Roche
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 255 (1st Cir. 1996).  Probable cause requires
only a probability that the defendant committed the crime.  Holder, 585 F.3d at 504 (citations
omitted).   “The test for probable cause does not require the officers’ conclusion to be ironclad, or
even highly probable.  Their conclusion that probable cause exists need only be reasonable.”
Acosta v. Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc., 386 F.3d 5, 11 (1st Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Whether the officers had probable cause to arrest is an objective inquiry.  Holder, 585
F.3d at 504 (citing Bolton v. Taylor, 367 F.3d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 2004)).   “The ‘actual motive or
thought process of the officer is not plumbed.’” Id.   “The only relevant facts are those known to
the officer.  When these facts are in reasonable dispute, the fact-finder must resolve the dispute.”
Id. (citing Bolton, 367 F.3d at 7).   “However, when the underlying facts claimed to support
probable cause are not in dispute, whether those ‘raw facts’ constitute probable cause is an issue
of law.”  Id. (citations omitted).
Here, there is no dispute regarding the underlying facts claimed to support probable
cause. While Chapman disputes that he in fact assaulted Phelan, it is undisputed that she called
-11-




the police to report that Chapman had assaulted her.  SOF ¶ 4.  It is also undisputed that when
Officers Finnegan and Peralta showed up, Phelan was crying and emotional, that she told them
that Chapman was her boyfriend and that he had grabbed her by the neck so tight that she had to
kick him to release his grip, and that she had marks and bruising in her neck.  SOF ¶¶ 7-12.
Given Phelan’s version of events and visible injuries, a competent officer could believe that it
was reasonably objective to arrest Chapman for domestic assault and battery.
Chapman argues that Finnegan and Peralta had a duty to investigate further before
making an arrest because they were informed by Chapman that (1) he has a diabetic neuropathy
on both sides, rendering it physically impossible for him to grab Phelan in the way she
described; (2) the marks on Phelan’s neck were yellow, not red, indicating an older incident; and
(3) the marks were from Phelan’s father pulling her away from her mother, who she had attacked
on an earlier date.  Docket No. 48 at 4.    This Court disagrees.
Probable cause determinations are “preliminary and tentative.”  Acosta, 386 F.3d at 11
(citation omitted).  Accordingly, police officers do not have a standing obligation to investigate
potential defenses before finding probable cause.  Id. (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,
145-46 (1979)).  In most circumstances, an officer may terminate his investigation when he
accumulates facts that demonstrate sufficient probable cause.  Id. (citations omitted).  However,
in B.C.R. Transport Co. v. Fontaine, 727 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1984), the First Circuit recognized that
a duty to investigate may arise in certain special circumstances.  In that case, police officers
effected an arrest by relying upon an incoherent individual’s allegations without further
investigation.  Id. at 10.  Under those circumstances, the jury could find that there was no
probable cause.  Id. at 10-11.
-12-




Here, there was no reason, inherent in the situation, to disbelieve Phelan’s account.  She
reported an assault perpetrated by her boyfriend.  Her affect was consistent with the story she
told the police officers and she told a coherent story that the police officers found credible.
Although Chapman denied her allegations and may have provided the officers with a different
story, further investigation was not likely to clarify, in any definitive way, who may have been
telling the truth.  In such situations, officers are not obligated to make a definitive credibility
judgment about differing accounts.  Holder, 585 F.3d at 506.  Under the circumstances, Officers
Finnegan and Peralta has a reasonable basis for believing there was probable cause to arrest
Chapman.  Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of the Defendants and
against Chapman on his false arrest claims.
D.                                                                                                    Denial Of Medical Care Claims
Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of action for
a violation of the Eighth Amendment under Section 1983.6  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105
(1976).  To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, Chapman must show that: (1) objectively,
the deprivation alleged is sufficiently serious; and (2) subjectively, that Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his health or safety.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
A medical need is “serious” if “it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor’s attention.”  Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st
6 As a pretrial detainee, Chapman’s claims derive from the due process protections
afforded under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  Gaudreault v. Municipality
of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990).  The Fourteenth Amendment grants pretrial
detainees a right to adequate medical care analogous to the Eighth Amendment rights of
convicted prisoners.  Id.
-13-




Cir. 1990).  The seriousness of an inmate’s needs may also be determined by reference to the
effect of a delay in treatment.  Id.
An Eighth Amendment claim based on medical mistreatment requires more than “an
inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care” and must involve “acts or omissions
sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”  Feeney v.
Correctional Medical Services, 464 F.3d 158, 161 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at
105-106).  Deliberate indifference “may be manifested by prison doctors in their response to the
prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care
or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.”  Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-5.
Chapman can demonstrate deliberate indifference only if the medical attention he received is “so
clearly inadequate as to amount to a refusal to provide essential care” and must be “so
inadequate as to shock the conscience.”  Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1991)
(citations omitted).
Although issues concerning state of mind, such as deliberate indifference, are often
unsuited to resolution on summary judgment, summary judgment is appropriate when there is no
evidence that a plaintiff received treatment “so inadequate as to shock the conscience.”  See
Torraco, 923 F.2d at 234; see also, Sires, 834 F.2d at 13 (finding summary judgment appropriate
where the only evidence produced “demonstrated carefully thought-out medical decisions.”);
Massey v. Rufo, No. 92-1380, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 6202 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that there
was no material question of fact that defendants were not deliberately indifferent to the
plaintiff’s needs and that “discovery would not aid plaintiff.”).  Such is the case here.
Although Chapman disputes how he obtained his diabetes medication, he does not
-14-




dispute that he was able to inject himself with his diabetes medication while at the Marblehead
police station.  SOF ¶ 22.  He also does not dispute that he was at the Marblehead police station
for only 30 to 45 minutes and was then transferred to the Essex County House of Correction at
Middleton, Massachusetts.  SOF ¶¶ 23, 26.  Accordingly, he has presented no evidence that the
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs while at the Marblehead police
station.
Chapman appears to argue that the officers’ failure to refrigerate his medication shows
deliberate indifference.  Docket No. 48 at 2.  He alleges that despite being told that his
medication needed to be refrigerated, the officers did not put the medication in the refrigerator.
Id.  Therefore, the medication spoiled and he was unable to take it during the three days that he
was in custody at the Essex County House of Correction.  Id.  However, Chapman has presented
no evidence that the failure to refrigerate the medication was anything other than negligent.7  In
any event, Chapman was in the custody of Defendants for only 30 to 45 minutes and was
transferred to the custody of the Essex County House of Correction thereafter, where he was
housed in the Medical Unit.  SOF ¶¶ 26-27.  He has presented to no evidence that his failure to
receive medication was the result of the actions of the Defendant officers, and not of the actions
of Essex County House of Corrections personnel, who are not defendants in this action.
Accordingly, he has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support a constitutional claim of
deliberate indifference and the Court grants summary judgment in favor of the Defendants and
against Chapman on that claim.
7 Negligence alone on the part of an official does not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation.  See DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1991).
-15-




E.                                                                                                  Assault And Battery Claims
In Counts Two and Three of the Complaint, Chapman alleges that Officers Finnegan and
Peralta committed assault and battery when they arrested him.  Assault and battery is “the
intentional and unjustified use of force upon the person of another, however slight, or the
intentional doing of a wanton or grossly negligent act causing personal injury to another.”
Spencer v. Roche, 755 F. Supp. 2d 250, 268 (D. Mass. 2010) (citation omitted).  Massachusetts
law allows for assault and battery claims against police officers who use excessive force in
conducting an arrest.  Raiche v. Pietroski, 623 F.3d 30, 40 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Powers v.
Sturtevant, 199 Mass. 265 (1908)).  However, Massachusetts law also allows an officer to use
reasonable force in conducting a lawful arrest.  Id.
Here, Chapman has pointed to no evidence that Officers Finnegan and Peralta used
excessive force in conducting his arrest.  For example, he has not alleged, let alone adduced any
evidence, that he was injured directly as a result of his arrest.  Accordingly, Chapman’s assault
and battery claims fail as a matter of law.
IV.                                                                                                 ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, this Court grants the Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment.
/s/ Jennifer C. Boal
JENNIFER C. BOAL
United States Magistrate Judge
-16-

Download 26912.pdf

Massachusetts Law