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Commonwealth v. Butler Opinion Summary: After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape. The appeals court affirmed, concluding that any delay in bringing Defendant to trial did not violate Mass. R. Crim. P. 36. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue to the appeals court that Defendant's motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds should have been allowed under the speedy trial provisions of the state or federal Constitutions. The motion was denied, and the appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel where (1) the speedy trial clock starts when a Massachusetts criminal complaint issues; (2) the speedy trial clock "resumes" when the Commonwealth reinstates charges following dismissal; and (3) although the delay from the attachment of the right to a speedy trial in September 1991 to Defendant's trial in May 2003 was lengthy, the factors set forth in Baker v. Wingo did not establish that Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. COMMONWEALTH vs. Reginald BUTLER. SJC-11073. Suffolk. Dec. 3, 2012. - March 26, 2013. Constitutional Law, Speedy trial, Delay in commencement of prosecution, Assistance of counsel. Practice, Criminal, Speedy trial, Delay in commencement of prosecution, Assistance of counsel. INDICTMENT found and returned in the Superior Court Department on March 23, 1999. A motion for a new trial, filed on June 26, 2008, was heard by Margaret R. Hinkle, J. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Michael J. Fellows for the defendant. Joseph M. Ditkoff, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. SPINA, J. This case presents the central questions for purposes of a defendant's right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or art. 11 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights: (1) when the speedy trial clock starts, and (2) whether the speedy trial clock "resumes" or "resets" when, after the right to a speedy trial attached, the Commonwealth dismisses charges and then reinstates the charges at a later date. We conclude, pursuant to art. 11 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, that (1) the speedy trial clock starts when a Massachusetts criminal complaint issues, and (2) the speedy trial clock "resumes" when the Commonwealth reinstates charges following dismissal. After the Appeals Court concluded that the delay in bringing the defendant to trial did not violate Mass. R.Crim. P. 36, 378 Mass. 909 (1979), and affirmed the defendant's rape conviction, see Commonwealth v. Butler, 68 Mass.App.Ct. 658, 661, 667 (2007) (Butler I ), the defendant filed a motion for a new trial alleging that appellate counsel [FN1] was ineffective for failing to argue to the Appeals Court that the defendant's motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds should have been allowed under the speedy trial provisions of the State or Federal Constitutions. [FN2] See id. at 659, n. 2. The motion for a new trial was denied, and the Appeals Court affirmed. [FN3] See Commonwealth v. Butler, 79 Mass.App.Ct. 751, 759 (2011) (Butler II ). We granted the defendant's application for further appellate review. Like the Appeals Court, we conclude that the defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. Therefore, we affirm the order denying the motion for a new trial. 1. Facts. We summarize the relevant facts as found by the motion judge, supplemented by uncontested facts set forth in Butler I, supra at 659-661.

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On September 16, 1991, a criminal complaint and an arrest warrant issued from the Chelsea District Court against the defendant for rape in violation of G.L. c. 265,

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Massachusetts Law