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LaChance v. Comm'r of Corr. Opinion Summary: Plaintiff, an inmate at a correctional center, was held in administrative segregation in center's special management unit (SMU) on awaiting action status as prison officials sought his transfer or reclassification. During that time, Plaintiff's detainment was given the informal review provided by the Department of Correction (DOC) regulations that govern detention of inmates in an SMU. Claiming that he was entitled the review procedures provided by regulation to inmates housed in a departmental segregation unit, Plaintiff brought suit alleging violations of his constitutional due process rights and of various state statutes and regulations, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as money damages. The superior court granted Plaintiff's partial motion for summary judgment, ruling that Defendants had violated his right to due process. The judge denied Defendants' cross motion for summary judgment insofar as it sought to dismiss Plaintiff's claims as barred under the doctrine of qualified immunity for public officials. The Supreme Court held (1) Plaintiff's administrative segregation was unlawful, but (2) the law in this regard was not clearly established at the time of the underlying events, and with respect to Plaintiff's claim for damages, Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.
Edmund LaCHANCE vs. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & others. [FN1]
SJC-11057.
Essex. May 8, 2012. - November 27, 2012.
Imprisonment, Segregated confinement, Reclassification hearing. Due Process of Law, Prison classification
proceedings. Constitutional Law, Imprisonment. Governmental Immunity.

CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on June 20, 2006.

The case was heard by Thomas R. Murtagh, J., on motions for summary judgment.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court.

William D. Saltzman for the defendants.

Bonita Tenneriello (James Pingeon with her) for the plaintiff.

Amy Fettig, of the District of Columbia, & Matthew R. Segal & John Reinstein, for American Civil Liberties Union of
Massachusetts & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ.

DUFFLY, J.

The plaintiff, Edmund LaChance, is an inmate at the Souza-Baranowski Correctional Center (SBCC) in Shirley. From
January to November, 2006, LaChance was held in administrative segregation in the SBCC special management unit
(SMU) on awaiting action status, as prison officials sought his transfer or reclassification. During that time, his
detainment was given the periodic, informal review provided by the Department of Correction (DOC) regulations that
govern detention of inmates in an SMU. Claiming that he was entitled the review procedures provided by regulation to
inmates housed in a departmental segregation unit (DSU), LaChance brought suit alleging violations of his
constitutional due process rights and of various State statutes and regulations, and seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief as well as money damages. After the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, a judge in the Superior
Court granted LaChance's partial motion, ruling that the defendants had violated his right to due process under the
State and Federal Constitutions. The judge denied the defendants' cross motion, insofar as it sought to dismiss
LaChance's claims as barred under the doctrine of qualified immunity for public officials, and their motion for
reconsideration. [FN2] The defendants appealed, and we transferred the case from the Appeals Court on our own
motion. [FN3]

We conclude that LaChance's ten-month administrative segregation in the SMU on awaiting action status, during
which he had the benefit of only informal status reviews, was unlawful. We conclude also, however, that the law in

this regard was not clearly established at the time of the underlying events, and that, with respect to LaChance's claim for damages, the defendants therefore are entitled to summary judgment, on the basis of qualified immunity.
Background. The relevant underlying facts set forth in the summary judgment record are not in dispute. Beginning in July, 2004, LaChance resided in J-1, a protective custody housing unit at SBCC. On December 21, 2005, he received a disciplinary report for throwing a cup of pudding at a fellow inmate and was referred to the SMU pending disciplinary proceedings. [FN4] Following a hearing on December 22, LaChance was assigned seven days' detention in the SMU as a sanction for the altercation. After learning of the sanction, he allegedly threatened to commit violence against the other inmate; for that infraction, he was assigned an additional seven days' disciplinary detention in the SMU, ending January 5, 2006.
For more than ten months after his disciplinary detention ended, LaChance remained in the SMU on awaiting action status. [FN5], [FN6] During that period, a prison official reviewed LaChance's status on a weekly basis, consistent with SMU regulations, [FN7] and written notifications given to LaChance after each review reflected that the rationale for his detainment in the SMU occasionally changed as a result of this informal review process. [FN8] He was returned to the J-1 unit in November, 2006, after the inmate at whom he had thrown the pudding had been moved out of it.
Throughout his confinement in the SMU, LaChance was held in conditions substantially more restrictive than those he had experienced in the J-1 housing unit. Residents of J-1 were allowed to spend almost five hours outside of their cells each day, during which they could engage in recreation in a variety of indoor and (sheltered) outdoor facilities; they were permitted three weekly "contact" visits, each lasting up to two and one-half hours; they had opportunities to visit the prison library according to a posted schedule; they were allowed to spend up to fifty dollars per week in the canteen, including on food items; and they had access to a broad range of educational, religious, and other programs.
In the SMU, by contrast, LaChance was allowed one hour of recreation each day, five days a week, in an unsheltered, outdoor cage; each week he was allowed to have two "non-contact" visits, each lasting no more than one hour; his library privileges were limited to requesting two books for delivery to his cell on a weekly basis, along with occasional access to a "satellite" law library; he was allowed to spend a maximum of twenty dollars per week in the prison canteen, on specified, nonfood items only; and he was unable to participate in educational, religious, vocational, or rehabilitative programming available to general population inmates. Additionally, unlike inmates in general population, his wrists and ankles were shackled at all times that he was outside his cell.
The present action commenced when LaChance filed a pro se complaint on June 20, 2006, five months into his confinement in the SMU. [FN9] In June, 2007, a judge in the Superior Court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and denied the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, stating that there remained issues of material fact that could not be resolved on the record before him. LaChance obtained representation by counsel and filed an amended complaint, in which he claimed that by depriving him of a hearing as provided by 103 Code Mass. Regs.

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