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Mary Ellen JOHNSON vs. SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF SANDWICH & others.
Mary Ellen JOHNSON vs. SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF SANDWICH & others. [FN1] No. 11-P-858. January 10, 2012. - June 7, 2012. Open Meeting Law. School and School Committee, Open meetings, Superintendent of schools. Municipal Corporations, Open meetings. CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 1, 2010. A motion to dismiss was heard by Raymond P. Veary, Jr., J. Paul L. Nevins for the plaintiff. John J. Davis for the defendants. Present: Green, Brown, & Agnes, JJ. BROWN, J. The plaintiff was formerly the superintendent of public schools in the town of Sandwich. On April 28, 2010, the school committee (defendants) held a live broadcast meeting in which the plaintiff's contract extension, among other matters, was to be discussed. Concerned about time, the defendants announced their intention to revisit the plaintiff's contract on April 30, 2010, at 6:00 P.M. In addition to the oral announcement, the school committee posted a notice on its bulletin board at the high school; the upcoming meeting was also acknowledged on the front page of a local newspaper. [FN2] On April 30, by a vote of four to two, the plaintiff's contract was extended and signed by all parties present, with the exception of the two dissenting school committee members. On May 6, 2010, following a town election, a new school committee was formed. On May 18, 2010, an assistant district attorney for the Cape and Islands district issued a letter stating that the April 30 meeting violated the Commonwealth's open meeting law. The letter stated that all matters undertaken at the meeting were null and void. Several days later, the school committee's counsel "endorsed" the opinion expressed in the district attorney's letter. No complaint, however, was ever filed in court to invalidate any actions taken at the April 30 meeting. Rather, in an attempt to cure the deficiencies, the defendants held a subsequent meeting on June 16, 2010. At that meeting, the defendants elected not to renew the plaintiff's employment and specifically refused to acknowledge the previous extension of her contract. The plaintiff commenced a civil action seeking specific performance of the employment contract, declaratory relief, relief in the nature of mandamus, and damages on theories of breach of contract and intentional interference with contractual relations. The defendants brought a motion to dismiss pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), which the judge granted. We conclude it was error to allow the defendants' motion, as the plaintiff made sufficient allegations within her verified complaint to overcome that motion. [FN3] See Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 635-636 (2008). General Laws c. 39,

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