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Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Opinion
SUPREME COURT 2000 BAUM FAMILY TRUST, BAUM FAMILY TRUST, JOSEPH BEAUDOIN, SANDRA BEAUDOIN, ADELE MEGDALL REVOCABLE TRUST, PAUL NOWAK & JOAN NOWAK TRUST, MARILYN ORMSBEE, MARK SCHWARTZ, WENDY SCHWARTZ, and THOMAS THOMASON, Plaintiffs/CounterdefendantsAppellants, v WILLIAM BABEL, JUDY BABEL, JAMES CAHILL, GLORIA CAHILL, DANIEL ENGSTROM, PENNY ENGSTROM, ARTHUR A RANGER TRUST, PATRICIA L RANGER TRUST, and CHARLEVOIX COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION, Defendants/CounterplaintiffsAppellees, and AL GOOCH, ELIZABETH GOOCH, JESSE HALSTEAD, and LINDA HALSTEAD,

Chief Justice:

Justices:

Marilyn Kelly

Michael F. Cavanagh Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman Diane M. Hathaway Alton Thomas Davis

FILED DECEMBER 29, 2010 STATE OF MICHIGAN

No. 139617

Intervening Defendants/ Counterplaintiffs-Appellees, and CHARLEVOIX TOWNSHIP, Defendant-Appellee. BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH MARKMAN, J. This case involves riparian rights.1 Specifically, the parties ask us to decide an issue that was treated as unsettled by the lower courts: who possesses riparian rights to a portion of a lake, persons who are owners of property fronting the lake but separated from the water by a public road or a county road commission that has accepted a statutory dedication of the road and maintains it as such? The trial court ruled that the property owners (plaintiffs) did not possess riparian rights, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, further holding that the road commission (defendant) was in "no way" limited in the type of use it could make of the public road. 2000 Baum Family Trust v Babel, 284 Mich App 544, 561; 773 NW2d 44 (2009). We reverse. The road at issue, along Lake Charlevoix, was dedicated under the 1887 plat act. Many lots alongside Michigan's some 11,000 inland lakes were platted during this period and are separated from the water by a public road running parallel to the shoreline. The As others have done, we observe that "[s]trictly speaking, land which includes or abuts a river is defined as riparian, while land which includes or abuts a lake is defined as littoral." Thies v Howland, 424 Mich 282, 288 n 2; 380 NW2d 463 (1985). However, "the term `riparian' is often used to describe both types of land," id., and will be used in such a manner in this opinion.
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term of art that Michigan courts have long used to describe the property interest in dispute is a statutory "base fee." Patrick v Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Kalamazoo, 120 Mich 185, 191; 79 NW 208 (1899). Decisions of this Court dating back well over a century illuminate the nature of this property interest and the corresponding rights the county receives through a statutory dedication. Bay Co v Bradley, 39 Mich 163, 166 (1878) (stating that the county "acquire[d] no beneficial ownership of the land"); Wayne Co v Miller, 31 Mich 447, 448-449 (1875) (stating that the county did not receive "title in the nature of a private ownership"); Backus v Detroit, 49 Mich 110, 115; 13 NW 380 (1882) (stating that the county did not receive "the usual rights of a proprietor," but took title to the extent that it could "preclude questions which might arise respecting the public uses, other than those of mere passage"). Consistent with these holdings, the Court of Appeals has held that a statutory base fee does not divest front-lot2 property owners of their riparian rights. Mich Central Park Ass'n v Roscommon Co Rd Comm, 2 Mich App 192; 139 NW2d 333 (1966); Sheridan Drive Ass'n v Woodland Backproperty Owners Ass'n, 29 Mich App 64; 185 NW2d 107 (1970); Kempf v Ellixson, 69 Mich App 339; 244 NW2d 476 (1976); McCardel v Smolen, 71 Mich App 560; 250 NW2d 496 (1976), vacated in part on other grounds in 404 Mich 89 (1978). On the authority of this caselaw, and mindful that the imperatives of stare decisis are particularly strong in the area of property law, we hold that plaintiffs in this case have riparian rights, as similarly situated persons have always had in Michigan.
2

"Front-lot" properties are in the first row of lots on the landward side of the disputed road. "Back-lot" properties are one or more rows further removed from the road and the lake.

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I. FACTS AND HISTORY Plaintiffs own front lots in a platted subdivision on the northern shore of Lake Charlevoix. Their lots do not touch the shoreline. Rather, Beach Drive, which runs east to west and parallel to the lake, abuts the shoreline and separates plaintiffs' lots from the lake. In other words, plaintiffs' lots extend to the edge of the road, not to the water's edge. In addition to the Charlevoix County Road Commission (CCRC), defendants include back-lot owners and Charlevoix Township. The plat includes six named streets, including Beach Drive. All these streets run parallel to the lake, except for Central Avenue, which cuts through the center of the plat and runs perpendicular to, and terminates at, the lake. The plat depicts a single dock extending into the lake at the end of Central Avenue, but there is no indication in the record whether this dock was ever built, or, if it did exist, how it was used. The Charlevoix County Board of Supervisors accepted the plat and the dedication of the streets on August 7, 1911.3 Concerning the roadways in the plat, the dedication includes the following language: "[T]he streets and alleys as shown on said plat are hereby dedicated to the use of the public." It is undisputed that the public has continued

The record does not contain information about the identity of the original plat proprietor. The minutes of the August 7, 1911, meeting at which the plat was accepted state that "Mr. D. C. Littleton presented the plat of North Charlevoix," although the plat itself indicates that its proprietor was "D. C. Nettleton." However, as we will discuss, the plat proprietor's identity is not material. All that is necessary to know for the purposes of this case is that the original plat proprietor completely parted with his interest in the land by conveying the lots without reserve. See Turner v Holland, 65 Mich 453, 463; 33 NW 283 (1887) ("[I]f there was no reservation, riparian rights would attach to lots bounded by navigable waters or natural water-courses.").

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since that time to accept the dedication of the roadways, including Beach Drive. Today, the CCRC maintains Beach Drive, which is now paved.4 From the time it accepted the dedication in 1911 until the instant lawsuit, the CCRC had never asserted a claim to riparian rights as a necessary incident to its interest in Beach Drive. The CCRC has never installed a dock along the lakeshore or otherwise engaged in riparian activities. Over the years, however, plaintiffs have used the lake in front of their lots and have built seasonal docks extending into the lake in order to moor boats and other water-related equipment. Furthermore, it is undisputed that there is neither a reservation nor a grant of riparian rights in plaintiffs' deeds and that their lots are taxed as "water view" properties rather than "waterfront" properties. Allegedly, various back-lot owners began using the waterfront in front of plaintiffs' homes to maintain docks and store boats. In response, plaintiffs filed a

complaint against defendants alleging claims of trespass and nuisance and seeking injunctive and equitable relief. The CCRC counterclaimed, alleging that plaintiffs had trespassed on Beach Drive by maintaining encroachments on the drive, including docks. The individually named back-lot defendants also counterclaimed, asserting claims of The CCRC did not exist at the time of the dedication. 1931 PA 130 transferred to the county road commissions the responsibility for the laying out and construction, improvement, and maintenance of township roads. Robinson Twp v Ottawa Co Bd of Co Rd Comm'rs, 114 Mich App 405, 410; 319 NW2d 589 (1982). As with all county road commissions, the CCRC is a statutorily created entity charged with the duty to construct and improve roads. MCL 224.19. As this Court has made clear, it is "only a governmental agency in the hands of the State highway commissioner used in the discharge of certain governmental duties, i. e. the repair and maintenance of State highways." Johnson v Ontonagon Co Bd of Rd Comm'rs, 253 Mich 465, 470; 235 NW 221 (1931).
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adverse possession or, alternatively, seeking a declaration that they possess easements, either by acquiescence or by prescription. Plaintiffs moved for partial summary disposition against the CCRC alone, claiming that there is no issue of material fact regarding which party is entitled to riparian rights. Plaintiffs argued that because their lots were separated from the water by a roadway parallel to the water, their lots were riparian. In plaintiffs' view, the CCRC has a right to the use of Beach Drive as a roadway only. In response, the CCRC argued that plaintiffs did not possess riparian rights because the public holds Beach Drive in fee pursuant to the statutory dedication under the plat act, which means that plaintiffs' lots are not riparian. The back-lot defendants also filed a motion in response, arguing that plaintiffs did not possess riparian rights because, as shown on the plat, none of their properties abuts the lake. The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion, ruling that they did not possess riparian rights. The court framed the issue as "whether Beach Drive is an easement with the fee title residing in the front lot owners or whether the public holds fee title." It ruled that the effect of a dedication is to "vest fee title in the local unit of government . . . ." It followed, in the court's view, that because plaintiffs "do not hold fee title to the waterfront land in front of their respective lots, they do not possess riparian rights." The Court of Appeals granted plaintiffs' interlocutory application for leave to appeal and affirmed. Baum, 284 Mich App at 546, 549. That Court applied a "two-tier analysis: First, whether a valid statutory dedication was created under the 1887 plat act and, second, if so, what type of fee interest has been vested in the public." Id. at 562. On the first question, the Court concluded that the act was "unambiguous" and that it clearly 6

vested in the public a fee for public uses of the road. Id. at 557-559. The second question, the Court reasoned, required discerning the intent of the plat proprietor by examining the dedication.5 The Court concluded that the "language of the dedication in no way limits what type of use may occur on the depicted streets or alleys or who may use them." Id. at 561. We granted leave to appeal, including among the issues to be argued (1) whether the fee title resulting from the dedication of land for public uses in a plat under the 1887 plat act in land that runs along the shore of a lake conveys the riparian rights to the lake to the county or whether the conveyance is limited to public uses of the road as a road and (2) whether caselaw stating that front-tier lots adjacent to a road running along a waterway have riparian rights, unless such rights are expressly excluded, remains valid. 2000 Baum Family Trust v Babel, 485 Mich 1051 (2010).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The question presented on appeal is a question of law: Whether plaintiffs have riparian rights in this context in which their lots abut a roadway that runs parallel to the lakeshore and was dedicated under the 1887 plat act. We review issues of statutory interpretation and other questions of law de novo. Eggleston v Bio-Med Applications of Detroit, Inc, 468 Mich 29, 32; 658 NW2d 139 (2003).

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Plat proprietors are also known as "plattors."

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III. LAW OF DEDICATION The lower courts held that the nature of the property interest conveyed to the CCRC in the dedication of Beach Drive under the applicable plat act is such that it divested front-lot plaintiffs of their riparian rights. In addition, the Court of Appeals interpreted the dedication language as granting the CCRC unlimited use of the streets and alleys within the plat. Analysis of these conclusions requires an understanding of several aspects of Michigan property law. Therefore, before turning to the central questions at issue-- (a) what is the nature of the property interest conveyed by the plat act and (b) how does this property interest affect riparian rights-- some general legal background is necessary. In particular, we survey the law of dedication and consider the creation of public roads by dedication and the rights of landowners abutting such roads. A. BACKGROUND A "dedication" of land is an "appropriation of land to some public use, accepted for such use by or in behalf of the public." Clark v Grand Rapids, 334 Mich 646, 656657; 55 NW2d 137 (1952). The essence of a dedication is that the covered land will be for the use of the public at large. See Patrick, 120 Mich at 191. From its earliest days, this Court has frequently considered disputes involving the dedication of land to the public. See, e.g., People v Beaubien, 2 Doug 256 (Mich, 1846); Wanzer v Blanchard & Buckland, 3 Mich 11 (1853); Lee v Lake, 14 Mich 12 (1865). These early decisions drew on a well-established body of law that had developed in federal, state, and English courts. See Beaubien, 2 Doug at 272-282, noting that the doctrine of dedication had been "of late much considered" and surveying the leading cases of the day, including City of

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Cincinnati v White's Lessee, 31 US (6 Pet) 431; 8 L Ed 452 (1832); Wyman v New York Mayor, 11 Wend 486 (NY, 1834); Hobbs v Town of Lowell, 36 Mass (19 Pick) 405 (1837); and numerous English cases on the subject. This realm of law was said to be "anomalous," in that "[u]nder it, rights are parted with and acquired in modes and by means unusual and peculiar." Patrick, 120 Mich at 193 (citations and quotation marks omitted). First, although ordinarily some conveyance or written instrument is required to transmit a right to real property, a "dedication may be made without writing, by act in pais [an act performed outside of legal proceedings], as well as by deed." Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). In other words, the statute of frauds is not applicable to the dedication of land to the public. See Baker v Johnston, 21 Mich 319, 348 (1870). Second, like a charitable trust, there need be no grantee in being at the time of the dedication to give it effect. Patrick, 120 Mich at 190. Third, and most significant to the instant case, [i]t is not at all necessary that the owner should part with the title which he has, for dedication has respect to the possession, and not the permanent estate. Its effect is not to deprive a party of title to his land, but to estop him, while the dedication continues in force, from asserting that right of exclusive possession and enjoyment which the owner of property ordinarily has. [Id. at 193 (citation and quotation marks omitted).] The enforcement of dedications was left to the law of estoppel. See White's Lessee, 31 US at 438 (holding that the original owner was estopped from revoking a dedication). But see Lee, 14 Mich at 17 (holding that "[n]o estoppel . . . could spring" unless the "circumstances in the case . . . make it inequitable" for the owner to revoke the dedication). This Court in Patrick, 120 Mich at 193, gave this straightforward

explanation of the "principle upon which the estoppel rests":

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[I]t would be dishonest, immoral, or indecent, and in some instances even sacrilegious, to reclaim at pleasure property which has been solemnly devoted to the use of the public, or in furtherance of some charitable or pious object. The law therefore will not permit any one thus to break his own plighted faith; to disappoint honest expectations thus excited, and upon which reliance has been placed. The principle is one of sound morals and of most obvious equity, and is in the strictest sense a part of the law of the land. It is known in all courts, and may as well be enforced at law as in equity. [Citation and quotation marks omitted.] The law will give effect to a dedication of land that has been "solemnly devoted to the use of the public" for as long as the land continues to be exercised in accordance with its dedicated public use. Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also White's Lessee, 31 US at 438.6 In sum, the rules of property governing dedications of land to the public are distinct, yet deeply rooted in the Anglo-American legal tradition. These rules have developed to accommodate the coexisting rights of the dedicator of land, his or her grantees, and the public. In balancing these rights, the use to which the dedication was made has always been at the fore. See White's Lessee, 31 US at 438 ("All public dedications must be considered with reference to the use for which they are made[.]"). We are guided in the instant case by this first principle, and reaffirm the precept that we Quoting the New York case of Hunter v Village of Sandy Hill Trustees, 6 Hill 407, 414415 (NY, 1844), which concerned a dedication of a public graveyard, Patrick, 120 Mich at 194, provided this description of how long one is bound by a public dedication: "When these graves shall have worn away, when they who now weep over them shall have found kindred resting places for themselves, when nothing shall remain to distinguish this spot from the common earth around, and it shall be wholly unknown as a graveyard, it may be that someone who can establish a good `paper title' will have a right to its possession, for it will then have lost its identity as a burial ground, and with that all right founded on the dedication must necessarily become extinct."
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articulated well over a century ago in resolving a dedication dispute: "This being a case to which the law of dedication applies, the use for which the dedication was made must determine the extent of the right parted with by the owner of the land and acquired by the public." Patrick, 120 Mich at 193 (citation and quotation marks omitted). B. PUBLIC ROADS BY DEDICATION For a road to become public property, there must be (a) a statutory dedication and an acceptance on behalf of the public, (b) a common-law dedication and acceptance, or (c) a finding of highway by public user. Village of Grandville v Jenison, 84 Mich 54, 6568; 47 NW 600 (1890) (discussing these three modes). Although it is undisputed that the road at issue here was dedicated by statute and accepted on behalf of the public, we will consider aspects of both common law and statutory dedications to gain insight into the similarities and differences between these modes of dedication. 1. COMMON-LAW DEDICATION A valid common-law dedication of land requires (a) intent by the property owner to offer the land for public use, (b) an acceptance by, and maintenance of the road by, public officials, and (c) use by the public generally. Bain v Fry, 352 Mich 299, 305; 89 NW2d 485 (1958). If these are present, the dedication is sufficient regardless of form. Badeaux v Ryerson, 213 Mich 642, 647; 182 NW 22 (1921). With regard to an intention to dedicate, all facts and circumstances bearing on the question are considered. See Lee, 14 Mich at 18. Acceptance is similarly fact-specific. It "may be either formal, by resolution or ordinance, or informal `through user or expenditures of public money for the repair, improvement and control of the highway.'" Rice v Clare Co Rd Comm, 346 Mich 658, 665; 78 NW2d 651 (1956) (citation omitted). 11

"A dedication must be accepted within a reasonable time or the offer will be considered as withdrawn." Cass Co Bd of Supervisors v Banks, 44 Mich 467, 476; 7 NW 49 (1880). Offers to dedicate are considered withdrawn when the owners of property use it in a way that is inconsistent with public ownership. Lee, 14 Mich at 18. What qualifies as an inconsistent use depends on the circumstances of each case. See Field v Village of Manchester, 32 Mich 279, 280 (1875), in which the Court considered the fact that the landowner had erected buildings, fenced in an enclosure, and planted fruit trees in a portion of a disputed street as evidence of use inconsistent with dedication and public ownership. "Common-law dedications do not ordinarily convey the fee. In fact, under the strict rule they never do." Patrick, 120 Mich at 211. "`By the common law, the fee in the soil remains in the original owner, where a public road is established over it; but the use of the road is in the public. The owner parts with this use only.'" People, ex rel Dep't of Conservation Dir v LaDuc, 329 Mich 716, 719; 46 NW2d 442 (1951), quoting Barclay v Howell's Lessee, 31 US (6 Pet) 498, 513; 8 L Ed 477 (1832). Accordingly, as this Court stated in Loud v Brooks, 241 Mich 452,456; 217 NW 34 (1928): We hold the correct rule to be that a conveyance of land bounded on a highway, street, or alley carries with it the fee to the center thereof, subject to the easement of public way, provided the grantor at the time of conveyance owned to the center and there are no words in the deed showing a contrary intent . . . . 2. STATUTORY DEDICATION To create a public road by statutory dedication, two elements are required: (a) "a recorded plat designating the areas for public use, evidencing a clear intent by the plat

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proprietor to dedicate those areas to public use, and [b] acceptance by the proper public authority." Kraus v Dep't of Commerce, 451 Mich 420, 424; 547 NW2d 870 (1996). While this Court has stated that the "acknowledgment and recording of the plat had all the force and effect of an express grant," Kirchen v Remenga, 291 Mich 94, 109; 288 NW 344 (1939), public acceptance is always required, Miller, 31 Mich at 448-449. In Miller, Justice COOLEY explained why public acceptance is necessary regardless of whether a recorded plat is considered a grant or offer to dedicate: Without venturing to express any definite opinion whether such a plat should be regarded as a grant or as a mere offer to dedicate, it is very clear to our minds that it is one or the other, or perhaps partakes of the nature of both, and that some action by competent public authority is essential before it can have the intended effect. If the plat is only an offer to dedicate, the offer must be accepted or it may be withdrawn, and after any considerable lapse of time must be regarded as no longer open for acceptance, unless the circumstances are such as to make the offer continuous. On this subject our own decisions have been full and explicit. But if the plat is regarded as a grant, it is equally necessary that there should be acceptance. No one can thrust a grant upon another without his assent. It is true, acceptance of a grant may be presumed when it is beneficial, but there can be no conclusive presumption that a grant of land for a public way is so. [Id. at 449-450 (citations omitted).] Under any other rule, duties and financial responsibilities would be imposed on the government for dedicated roads that it never knowingly or intentionally accepted. Equally undesirably, land would become waste property, owned or developed by no one. These concerns were addressed in Miller, 31 Mich at 449: As the execution and recording of the plat is wholly a private matter, subject to no public supervision whatever, this view would enable proprietors of lands to lay out so many streets and avenues as they might see fit, and wherever their private interests should determine; and whether the streets were desired by the public or not, the private ownership would

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be displaced. Either one of two consequences must then follow: the public must be under some obligations to treat the land as constituting a street, and be subject to such liabilities as that fact would impose, or the land must remain waste property, in the hands of an owner who cannot use it for the purposes of profit, and who at the same time refuses to put it to the purposes contemplated in making the plat. For this reason, a statutory dedication requires the same acceptance by the public as a dedication at common law. As in a common-law dedication, before acceptance, an offer to dedicate may be withdrawn formally,7 or informally by using "the property in a way that is inconsistent with public ownership."8 If a platted roadway is never accepted, the public acquires no rights in the roadway, and "the owners of the lands fronting thereon, may again take possession of the property, and treat it as though, in all respects, no offer of dedication had ever been made." Field, 32 Mich at 281. This overview of common-law and statutory dedications illuminates the principal similarities and differences between these modes of dedication. To create a public road at common law or by statute, there must be a clear intent on the part of the owner to dedicate, along with an acceptance by the public within a reasonable time. By either
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An offer may be formally withdrawn by vacating the plat, Gregory v Ann Arbor, 127 Mich 454, 458; 86 NW 1013 (1901), or by formal resolution of a governmental body vacating the street, Plumer v Johnston, 63 Mich 165, 172; 29 NW 687 (1886), overruled on other grounds by Loud, 241 Mich at 456. See MCL 560.255b for the requirements for withdrawals by plat proprietors in a statutory dedication under the current platting statute, the Land Division Act (LDA), MCL 560.101 et seq. Kraus, 451 Mich at 431, citing Lee, 14 Mich at 18. Now, under the LDA, lands dedicated to public purposes in recorded subdivision plats are presumed by statute to be accepted, absent timely and proper withdrawal by the plat proprietor within 10 years after the plat is first recorded. MCL 560.255b; Kraus, 451 Mich at 426 n 2.
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mode, "the question of dedication is one largely of intention . . . ." Weihe v Macatawa Resort Co, 198 Mich 334, 341; 164 NW 510 (1917). The difference is how the requisite intent-- the animus dedicandi (the intent to dedicate)9-- is made manifest. In a statutory dedication, "the intent of the owner is clear, and has been formally manifested in the plat recorded." Rice, 346 Mich at 664. By contrast, in a common-law dedication, the intent of the owner is implied from "all such acts connected with, or relating to the premises, tending to show the design and object of the dedication which is alleged . . . ." Beaubien, 2 Doug at 276. In this way, the intent to dedicate in a statutory dedication is easier to prove and the dedicator is estopped from denying the dedication by virtue of the requirement that the plat be recorded. Simply put, the landowner either did or did not properly record a plat and, if the former, is bound by this act. A clear and prescribed method of evidencing intent is especially important in this area of the law, because other aspects of public dedication-- namely, public acceptance and questions of withdrawal-are highly fact-specific.10

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See Beaubien, 2 Doug at 276.

See Alton v Meeuwenberg, 108 Mich 629, 634-636; 66 NW 571 (1896), in which the Court included an illustrative excerpt of the fact-intensive jury instructions required to determine the intent of the parties with respect to a putative highway: "How did [the putative dedicator] act, at the time and afterwards? What use did he make of the lands, as showing an intent upon his part of dedicating the land? How was the land treated by the public authorities, with reference to its being a highway? Did they open a highway all along the line? Or what portion of it did they open? . . . These are questions for you to determine, from the evidence in the case; and, unless you believe, from the evidence, that they did, then that certain portion never became a public highway."

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C. RIGHTS OF ABUTTING LANDOWNERS The owner of property abutting upon a street "sustains a threefold relation to the street": 1. As one of the general public. 2. As owner of the reversionary interest to the center of the street. 3. As owner of a lot, possessed of the right of ingress and egress to and from the street. [Detroit City R Co v Mills, 85 Mich 634, 653; 48 NW 1007 (1891) (opinion by GRANT, J.).] First, the abutting landowner "has the right, in common with every other member of the public, to the use of the street." Id. As Mills stated in this respect, "[f]ree passage is all the law gives him." Id. "A highway is a public passage for all," Beaubien, 2 Doug at 285, and thus every person-- including the abutting landowner-- is entitled to use public ways for travel. However, in addition to right of public travel, other public uses may be implied from the dedication of land as a public way. For instance, in Mills, this Court considered whether the city of Detroit could authorize the construction of a new system of electric street cars on a city street. A plurality concluded that this use was implied by the dedication and did not impose a new burden on the abutting landowners. Id. at 654. "It may now be considered the well-settled rule that the streets of a city may be used for any purpose which is a necessary public one, and the abutting owner will not be entitled to a new compensation, in the absence of a statute giving it." Id. This "extension of the public rights in the streets" includes uses necessitated by "increased needs for heating,

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lighting, draining, sewerage, water, etc. . . . ." Id. at 653. The rationale for this rule is that [t]he dedication of land . . . must be understood as made and accepted with the expectation that it may be required for other public purposes than those of passage and travel merely, and that under the direction and control of the public authorities it is subject to be appropriated to all the uses to which village and city streets are usually devoted, as the wants or convenience of the people may render necessary or important[.] [Warren v Grand Haven, 30 Mich 24, 28 (1874) (holding that the municipality had the right to construct sewer lines beneath land dedicated for a public road).] As this makes plain, the extension of public rights in the streets set forth in Mills has not been thought to be contrary in any way to the central principle of dedication, i.e., that the use of land dedicated to the public depends on the dedicator's intention and may not be appropriated to an entirely different use. See White's Lessee, 31 US at 438; Weihe, 198 Mich at 341. Rather, the rule in Mills is grounded on the premise that, in dedicating a street, the dedicator's intention was to appropriate the land to all uses to which public streets are usually devoted, including all uses incidental to public travel. Mills respects the municipality's "exclusive control" over a roadway in accordance with the use to which it was dedicated. In re O'Brien, 119 Mich 540, 541; 79 NW 1070 (1899). However, this Court's precedent also recognizes that "if a dedication is made for a specific or defined purpose, neither the legislature, a municipality or its successor, nor the general public has any power to use the property for any other purpose than the one designated, whether such use be public or private, and whether the dedication is a common-law or a statutory dedication[.]" [Baldwin Manor, Inc v City of Birmingham, 341 Mich 423, 430-431; 67 NW2d 812 (1954) (citation omitted).]

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Following this fundamental proposition, this Court held in Baldwin Manor that the city was prohibited from putting a road across land dedicated for use as a park because that use was inconsistent with the purpose of the dedication. Id. at 434. Similarly, in Village of Kalkaska v Shell Oil Co (After Remand), 433 Mich 348, 358; 446 NW2d 91 (1989), we held that the village's property interest in streets dedicated under the 1887 plat act did not include mineral rights because those rights were not necessary to the use and purpose for which the street was dedicated. Our caselaw is clear that a public entity's use of land dedicated to the public is limited to the purpose of the dedication. And in the case of a public road, "[w]hether the fee is nominally in county, city, or private owners, the public control is only in trust to secure to the public those rights of a public nature that exist in public ways of that kind." Detroit v Detroit City R Co, 76 Mich 421, 425; 43 NW 447 (1889). Second, the abutting landowner possesses a reversionary interest to the center of the street. "It is elementary that upon the vacation of a street or alley the land reverts to the abutting owner or owners." Mich Central R Co v Miller, 172 Mich 201, 208; 137 NW 555 (1912). This rule applies to common-law and statutory dedications alike. As we have explained: "We see no reason to distinguish between the two types of

dedication for the purposes of the law of abandonment. It is clear that the need for certainty of title exists equally in both instances." Clark, 334 Mich at 657. In a commonlaw dedication, unencumbered title to the property is restored in the abutting landowners when the street becomes free of the public easement. See 12 Michigan Civil

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