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STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

SHARON L. STROZEWSKI, as Next Friend of AMYRUTH L. COOPER and LORALEE A. COOPER, Plaintiff-Appellee,
V

UNPUBLISHED May 28, 2009

AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 261736 Washtenaw Circuit Court LC No. 03-000367-NF ON REMAND

Before: Murphy, P.J., and Meter and Davis, JJ. PER CURIAM. This case returns to this Court on remand from the Supreme Court for resolution of issues initially placed before, but not decided by, this Court. We now affirm the trial court. Amyruth L. Cooper and Loralee A. Cooper were, respectively, one and two years old in 1987, when they sustained severe brain injuries in an automobile accident. At the time, they were passengers in a car driven by their mother and next friend in this case, Sharon L. Strozewski. Both children initially required skilled care, but after two years, only one continued to require continuous skilled care. The other child could be cared for at home. Defendant insurer encouraged the mother to leave her job and to provide that at-home care herself. Defendant offered her various rates of compensation. The mother commenced this suit in 2003, alleging that defendant underpaid her. Our Supreme Court has provided a comprehensive discussion of the procedural history of this case. See Cooper v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 481 Mich 399, 402-405; 751 NW2d 443 (2008). In salient part, the mother contended that she was entitled to additional PIP benefits under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq, and in addition, she contended that she had been fraudulently induced to accept an unreasonably low rate of compensation. Defendant filed a variety of motions for summary disposition, which were denied. The parties stipulated to an award of damages, subject to defendant's right to appeal. When we first considered this matter, we viewed the only functional issue as whether the mother was entitled to anything at all for damages that were incurred more than a year prior to her filing of the suit. In other words, the issue as we saw it was whether the one-year-back rule found in MCL 500.3145(1) applied to the entirety of the claims. We concluded that the minority tolling provision, MCL 600.5851(1), was inapplicable to the one-year-back rule, and further that the fraud claim was merely a restatement of the no-fault claim. -1-

However, on appeal, our Supreme Court explained that "[t]here is a distinction between claiming that an insurer has refused to pay no-fault benefits to its insureds and claiming that the insurer has defrauded its insureds." Cooper, supra, 481 Mich at 407. The Supreme Court discussed the distinction at length, but the gravamen is that it reversed the portion of this Court's opinion that held that the fraud claim was merely a re-labeled restatement of the no-fault claim. Furthermore, the Supreme Court explained that a fraud claim was actionable "even where a selfcontained system, such as the no-fault system, exists." Id. at 410. It just so happens that, on the basis of the allegations, the loss from the alleged fraud would be primarily a loss of statutory benefits

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