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STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

B.A. TYLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v

UNPUBLISHED June 8, 2010

No. 286918 Oakland Circuit Court LC No. 2007-082987-NO

KALLIE A. ROESNER and JAMES YUZWALK, Defendants-Appellees.

WILBERT HUTCHINGS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v No. 287401 Oakland Circuit Court LC No. 2007-082988-NO

KALLIE ROESNER, Defendant-Appellee.

WILBERT HUTCHINGS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v No. 288239 Oakland Circuit Court LC No. 2007-082988-NO

KALLIE ROESNER, Defendant-Appellant.

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B.A. TYLER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v No. 288240 Oakland Circuit Court LC No. 2007-082987-NO

KALLIE ROESNER and JAMES YUZWALK, Defendants-Appellants.

Before: METER, P.J., and BORRELLO and SHAPIRO, JJ. PER CURIAM. In Docket No. 286918, plaintiff Tyler appeals as of right from an order granting summary disposition to defendant.1 In Docket No. 288240, defendant appeals as of right from an order denying a motion for attorney fees and costs. In Docket No. 287401, plaintiff Hutchings appeals as of right from an order granting defendant's motion for summary disposition. In Docket No. 288239, defendant appeals as of right from an order denying another motion for attorney fees and costs. We affirm in all four cases. These appeals arose from disputes among neighbors. Plaintiffs B.A. Tyler and Wilbert Hutchings contended that defendant, apparently upset over losing a property-damage suit, engaged in an ongoing campaign to damage their reputations and otherwise harm them. They filed the instant lawsuits in an attempt to redress the alleged damages, but the suits were summarily dismissed. DOCKET NO. 286918 Plaintiff Tyler argues that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary disposition of his defamation claims. We disagree. On appeal, this Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision regarding a motion for summary disposition. Latham v Barton Malow Co, 480 Mich 105, 111; 746 NW2d 868 (2008). Defendants moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). "A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) is properly granted if the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted . . . ." A & E Parking v Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport Authority, 271 Mich App 641, 643; 723 NW2d 223 (2006) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

1

The majority of allegations in this case are directed against defendant Kallie Roesner; for ease of reference, she will be referred to individually as the singular "defendant" in this opinion.

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The pleadings alone are considered in testing the legal sufficiency of a claim under a MCR 2.116(C)(8) motion. It is well established that for purposes of a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) all factual allegations in support of the claim are accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The motion should be granted only when the claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery. [Capitol Properties Group, LLC v 1247 Center Street, LLC, 283 Mich App 422, 425; 770 NW2d 105 (2009) (internal citations omitted).] In his first amended complaint, plaintiff Tyler cited the following instances of defamation: (1) on July 25, 2004, defendant said that she incurred injury by way of plaintiff Tyler's actions in asking her to remove herself from his property; (2) on August 24, 2004, defendant used her position with Oxford Township to file a complaint against plaintiff Tyler, which resulted in an outdoor lighting ordinance violation that was later dismissed; (3) on August 1, 2005, defendant filed a false report with the Oakland County Sheriff's Department, knowing it would be republished in the Oxford Leader; it claimed that plaintiff Tyler damaged windows at her home on July 22, 2005; (4) on March 4, 2006, defendant filed a false report with the sheriff's department, knowing it would be republished in other forums such as the Oxford Leader; it claimed that plaintiff Tyler threatened to punch her and her father a few months earlier; (5) on May 3, 2006, defendant filed a sworn ex parte petition for a personal protection order (PPO), alleging numerous false allegations against plaintiff Tyler; (6) on May 23, 2006, defendant filed a request for investigation of plaintiff Tyler with the Attorney Grievance Commission,2 and it contained numerous false and defamatory statements that the commission found insufficient to warrant review; (7) on July 28, 2006, defendant filed a report with Oakland County Animal Control that contained false and defamatory statements regarding an alleged attack by plaintiff Tyler's dogs; (8) on July 31, 2006, defendant filed a complaint and sworn affidavit with Oxford Township alleging a second attack by plaintiff Tyler's dogs; (9) defendant repeated these false allegations at a township board of trustees meeting on August 23, 2006, but the township chose not to proceed; (10) on October 13, 2006, defendant filed an ex parte petition for a PPO in the Lapeer Circuit Court containing many false and defamatory statements; (11) on January 2, 2007, defendant filed a report with the sheriff's department alleging that plaintiff Tyler drove by her barn and acted as though he was shooting her; (11) on January 13, 2007, defendant filed a report with the sheriff's department alleging that plaintiff Tyler poisoned and killed her chickens; (12) defendant filed two additional reports with the sheriff's department alleging that plaintiffs Tyler and Hutchings acted together to harm her; and (13) defendant made false and defamatory statements in court proceedings that she was physically injured by plaintiff Tyler or his dogs. The elements of a defamation claim are: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivileged communication to a third party, (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm (defamation

2

Plaintiff Tyler is an attorney.

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per se) or the existence of special harm caused by publication. Campbell, 474 Mich 21, 24; 706 NW2d 420 (2005).] Additionally,

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[a] communication is defamatory if, considering all the circumstances, it tends to so harm the reputation of an individual as to lower that individual's reputation in the community or deter third persons from associating or dealing with that individual. [Kevorkian v American Medical Association, 237 Mich App 1, 5; 602 NW2d 233 (1999).] As stated in Ledl v Quik Pik Food Stores, Inc, 133 Mich App 583, 589; 349 NW2d 529 (1984): [A] claim for defamation must be specifically pled:[3] The essentials of a cause of action for libel or slander must be stated in the complaint, including allegations as to the particular defamatory words complained of, the connection of the defamatory words with the plaintiff where such words are not clear or are ambiguous, and the publication of the alleged defamatory words. [Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.] As noted by the trial court and defendant on appeal, five of plaintiff Tyler's claims of defamation (statements 1 through 5 as listed above) took place before May 17, 2006

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