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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS


BARBARA A. SUMMERS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v HARRY W. SUMMERS, Defendant-Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED November 14, 1997

No. 196883 Ottawa Circuit Court LC No. 95-023363-DM

Before: O'Connell, P.J., and MacKenzie and Gage, JJ. PER CURIAM. Defendant appeals as of right from the entry of a default judgment of divorce. We affirm. On July 20, 1995, plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce against defendant. Because defendant failed to plead or otherwise defend within twenty-one days of being served, a default was entered against him the following October. Defendant's attorney then entered an appearance, and in January 1996, defendant moved to set aside the default. Following a February 5 hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion from the bench. On March 26, 1996, plaintiff filed a motion to enter judgment and proof of service. Notice of hearing on this motion was mailed to defendant's counsel at the address found in the 1995 Michigan Bar Directory. That address proved to be inaccurate and defendant's attorney did not receive notice of the motion until April 1, 1996, four days before the hearing. Following a two-day hearing on the motion, April 5 and June 13, 1996, the trial court entered the default judgment of divorce. Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for an adjournment on the day of the April 5, 1996, hearing because plaintiff did not provide defense counsel seven days' notice of the hearing on the motion for entry of default judgment, as required under MCR 2.603(B)(1). We review a trial court's decision whether to grant or deny a motion for an adjournment for an abuse of discretion. Lansing v Hartsuff, 213 Mich App 338, 350; 539 NW2d 781 (1995). Under the circumstances of this case, we find no abuse of discretion. The purpose of the notice requirement of MCR 2.603(B)(1) is to inform defaulting parties of the possibility of entry of judgment so that they may have an opportunity to participate in any hearing -1

necessary to ascertain the amount of damages or other form of remedy to be granted. Dollar Rent-ACar Systems v Nodel Construction, 172 Mich App 738, 743; 432 NW2d 423 (1988). However, this Court has recently held that a defaulting party in a divorce case is not necessarily entitled to the full participatory rights normally associated with the entry of a default judgment. Draggoo v Draggoo, 223 Mich App 415; 566 NW2d 642 (1997). Furthermore, it is difficult to see how defendant was prejudiced by the court's failure to grant an adjournment. Hartsuff, supra. Two months had passed since the court denied defendant's motion to set aside the default, providing ample time to prepare for the eventual entry of a default judgment. Upon receiving notice of the hearing, counsel still had four days to prepare for the first day of the hearing, and a full 2

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