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Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Opinion
BLACKHAWK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and DEXTER CROSSING, L.L.C., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v

Chief Justice:

Justices:

Clifford W. Taylor

Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman

FILED JULY 13, 2005

No. 126036

VILLAGE OF DEXTER and DEXTER DEVELOPMENT, Defendants-Appellees. _______________________________ BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH CAVANAGH, J. Plaintiffs sought leave to appeal from the Court of Appeals summary decision affirming to the trial court's of grant Dexter of and

disposition

defendants

village

Dexter Development.

Rather than grant leave to appeal, we

reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. I. This case requires INTRODUCTION us to examine the scope of an

easement granted by a private party to a public entity. Specifically, we must determine whether allowing a private

property amenities granted

owner on to a

to

construct subject

access to an

roads

and

related that was of

property

easement express

municipality

for

the

purpose

relocating and improving a public road is within the scope of that easement. Because there is no evidence in the

record that the proposed developments fall within the scope of the express easement, we hold that the trial court erred by holding otherwise. Court of Appeals Thus, we reverse the decision of the remand this case for further

and

proceedings. II. In 1990, defendant BACKGROUND village of Dexter ordered

approximately one acre of a portion of land owned by the Kingsley Trust, which was administered by John Kingsley, condemned. The village intended to use the land to improve

Dan Hoey Road, which was, at the time, a gravel road that intersected with Dexter-Ann Arbor Road in an unsafe manner. The village planned to pave and widen Dan Hoey Road, as well as move it slightly south. In lieu of condemning the land, the village and the Kingsley Trust entered into a settlement agreement through which the trust granted the village an easement to a

portion of approximately one acre in size.

The settlement

agreement stated that the trust would transfer "an easement

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for public roadway purposes . . . ."

The easement grant

read that the trust granted "an easement for the purposes of relocating, establishing, opening and improving Dan Hoey Road . . . ." The village relocated Dan Hoey Road and completed its project, but the project did not consume the entire area subject to the easement. burdened parcel which to then Eventually, the trust sold the Blackhawk a on Development complex, of the

plaintiff developed L.L.C.,

Corporation, plaintiff property.1 developed.

commercial a portion

Dexter

Crossing,

The portion subject to the easement was not

Thereafter, defendant Dexter

John

Kingsley,

through purchased

his

corporation, land

Development,

additional

that adjoined the old Dan Hoey Road but was separated from the new Dan Hoey Road by land subject to the easement. Kingsley then submitted a proposal for developing his land to the village. However, Kingsley's plan included using

portions that were subject to the village's easement for the purpose of constructing access drives, building a pond, and making other developments on that parcel.

For convenience, the singular "plaintiff" will refer to Blackhawk Development Corporation. 3


1

The village informed Kingsley that he would have to buy the affected but land before it would approve the

development, offers.

plaintiff

rejected

Kingsley's

purchase

Consequently, Kingsley's attorney advised Kingsley

to revise his proposal by removing from the plans affecting plaintiff's parcel anything that could be construed as a "private" utilities, development, sidewalks, but and leaving access developments roads. such as

Kingsley

resubmitted his revised plan and proposed to "dedicate" the developments public use. purportedly which the on the affected parcel to the village for

In other words, Kingsley proposed to create "public" village developments could then on plaintiff's by way of land, its

justify

easement. The village authorized the proposal, giving Kingsley permission to construct developments on the subject

property, including two access roads, light poles, trees, landscaping, pond grading, sidewalks, pipes, conduit, sewer lines, and water lines. land subject to the The access roads would use the easement to transect plaintiff's

property and connect Kingsley's property to the new Dan Hoey Road. As part of their agreement, Kingsley

indemnified the village against legal action.

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Neither the village nor Kingsley informed plaintiff of their arrangement, leaving plaintiff to discover it when construction began. After plaintiff's objections to the

village and to Kingsley proved unsuccessful, plaintiff sued for injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, and trespass. Among the facts that emerged during discovery were the following. In a memorandum addressing the matter, village

zoning officer Janet Keller wrote that because Kingsley's land was "landlocked," the village might be "in jeopardy" if it did not approve the access road. Kingsley, however,

acknowledged that his land was not landlocked because of two ingress and egress points at Dexter-Ann Arbor Road. Further, Kingsley testified that he could have built his commercial development without using the land covered by the easement, but that he never submitted plans that did not include land covered by the easement. He also

testified that the access drives served no other purpose than access to the commercial development and that he only built the west driveway because he believed the village required it. Zoning officer Keller testified that the village did not request either road, but after reviewing where Kingsley proposed to place the roads, the village asked Kingsley to align the center road with an opposing road to form a four-

5


way intersection.

Keller stated that the village was never

presented with a plan that did not include the roads and that she did not know why the development could not proceed without them. Keller testified that the access roads were However, both she

not an "improvement" to Dan Hoey Road.

and other village officials agreed that the access roads contributed to the safety of the area and that Kingsley's development as a whole contributed to the general public good. Evidence from the village planner showed that the

access roads did not meet public road standards and that the entrances were designed to meet commercial standards. Moreover, the village attorney testified that when Dan Hoey Road was realigned in 1990, all four of the purposes stated in the easement grant, "relocating, establishing, opening, and improving Dan Hoey Road," were fulfilled. the testimony, village officials had no According to intention to

further utilize the easement in the foreseeable future. Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR

2.116(C)(10),2 arguing that the proposed developments were within the scope of the village's easement because the

Defendant Dexter Development filed the initial motion and supporting brief, and defendant village of Dexter filed a concurring statement. 6


2

access

roads

promoted

public

safety

and

welfare.

Defendants also argued that the utilities were permissible because the permissible than uses of a public road easement Further,

encompass

more

mere

surface

travel.

defendants contended that the use of the land covered by the easement would serve primarily public, rather than

private, purposes. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary disposition, ruling that the terms "roadway purposes" in the settlement agreement and "improvement" in the actual easement grant were ambiguous. However, it found that the

developments benefited the public and were thus within the scope of the easement. Plaintiffs appealed the trial court's ruling. In a

split decision, the Court of Appeals majority held that the trial court reached the correct result, albeit for the

wrong reason.

Blackhawk Dev Corp v Village of Dexter,

unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued January 27, 2004 (Docket No. 240790). The majority

held that the language at issue was not ambiguous, but that the proposed developments were within the scope of the

easement because they benefited the public.

Notably, the

Court of Appeals examined the language of both the easement grant and the settlement agreement. The dissenting judge

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agreed that there was no ambiguity in the language, but he believed that the changes were not "improvements" to Dan Hoey Road and, thus, were outside for leave the scope of the was this

easement. denied, Court. leave and

Plaintiffs' plaintiffs

motion sought

reconsideration to appeal in

In lieu of granting plaintiffs' application for to appeal, we ordered oral argument on the

application.

471 Mich 905 (2004). III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The extent of a party's rights under an easement is a question those of fact, is and a trial for court's determination Unverzagt (1943), of v

facts 306

reviewed 260,

clear 10

error. 849

Miller,

Mich

266;

NW2d

citing A

Harvey v Crane, 85 Mich 316, 322; 48 NW 582 (1891).

trial court's dispositional ruling on equitable matters, however, is subject to review de novo. 394 Mich 375, 383; 230 NW2d 529 (1975). Stachnik v Winkel, The decision to

grant or deny summary disposition is also reviewed de novo. Stewart v Michigan, 471 Mich 692, 696; 692 NW2d 376 (2004). IV. This whether case Dexter presents ANALYSIS the straightforward desired question fall The

Development's

developments

within the scope of the village of Dexter's easement.

inquiry does not center, as defendants seem to suggest, on

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whether defendants' proposed developments afford the public at large some general benefit. this issue is not affected by Further, the analysis of the fact that a private Rather,

developer instituted the proposed developments.

this Court must analyze simply whether the developments are within the scope of the granted easement. The existence of an easement necessitates a thoughtful balancing of the grantor's property rights and the And

grantee's privilege to burden the grantor's estate. while the easement holder's rights are

ultimately

"`"paramount . . . to those of the owner of the soil,"'" the latter's rights are subordinate only to the extent

stated in the easement grant.

Cantieny v Friebe, 341 Mich

143, 146; 67 NW2d 102 (1954), quoting Hasselbring v Koepke, 263 Mich 466, 475; 248 NW 869 (1933), quoting Harvey, supra at 322. Consequently, "[t]he use of an easement must be

confined strictly to the purposes for which it was granted or reserved." 816 (1957). A fundamental principle of easement law is that the easement holder--here, the village--cannot "make improvements to the servient estate if such improvements are unnecessary for the effective use of the easement or they unreasonably burden the servient tenement." Little v Kin, 468 Mich 699, Delaney v Pond, 350 Mich 685, 687; 86 NW2d

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701; 664 NW2d 749 (2003), citing Crew's Die Casting Corp v Davidow, 369 Mich 541; 120 NW2d 238 (1963), Unverzagt,

supra at 265, and Mumrow v Riddle, 67 Mich App 693, 700; 242 NW2d 489 (1976). Stated differently, "`It is an

established principle that the conveyance of an easement gives to the grantee all such rights as are incident or necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement.'" Unverzagt, supra at 265, quoting 9 RCL, p 784.

And "[t]he use exercised by the holders of the easement must be reasonably necessary and convenient to the proper enjoyment of the easement, with as little Id. a two-step necessary and, inquiry: for if the the burden as

possible to the fee owner of the land." From whether these principles evolves

the

proposed

developments use of its

are

village's

effective are

easement they Id.

developments

necessary,

whether

unreasonably

burden plaintiffs' servient estate.

Of course, the

need to answer the second question is obviated where the first question is answered in the negative. The answers to these inquiries originate in the

language or express reservations of the grant. 266-267.

See id. at

The task of determining the parties' intent and

interpreting the limiting language is strictly confined to the "four corners of the instrument" granting the easement.

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Hasselbring, supra at 477. granting instrument is

Only where the language in the may this Court examine

ambiguous

evidence extrinsic to the document to determine the meaning within it. Thus, language of Little, supra at 700. our the first task is to determine is whether the The

granting

instrument

ambiguous.

instrument states that the grantor grants to the village of Dexter "an easement for the purposes of relocating,

establishing, opening and improving Dan Hoey Road in the Village of Dexter, Washtenaw County, Michigan . . . ." only document incorporated by reference is the The

document

that sets forth the legal description of the land subject to the easement. the language, As such, our interpretation focuses on "relocating, establishing, opening and

improving Dan Hoey Road . . . ."

The parties seem to agree

that out of the four terms, the term "improving" is of paramount relevance.3 There is nothing technical or unique about the word "improving" in this context that would require us to rely on anything other than its common sense meaning. question is not so much whether defendant But the Dexter

Notably, defendants do not argue that the developments purport to "open" Dan Hoey Road, which undermines the dissent's attempt to argue otherwise. 11


3

Development

has

proposed

"improvements"

in

the

sense

of

developments that help "improve" something, for certainly these developments could be considered "improvements" in the general sense of the word. The more refined question A

is whether the developments "improve" Dan Hoey Road.4 close examination of the record reveals no

evidence

supporting defendants' claim that the proposed developments are within the scope of the express easement. According to zoning officer Keller, Kingsley's revised development plan included two access roads across the land covered by the easement, and sidewalks, utilities, trees, and "general public improvements" on that land. Clearly,

the access roads served to connect the commercial complex to Dan Hoey Road rather than to complement Dan Hoey Road itself. The utility, water, and sewer lines served to

connect Kingsley's development to main utility, water, and

The dissent reads too much into the comment that the installations could, on some general level, be considered "improvements." See post at 5-6. If the debate were truly over whether roads, sidewalks, and grading are "improvements," certainly there would be as many countering views as supportive ones. But our task is not simply to determine whether the proposed installations are "improvements," but whether, as we clearly state, the installations improve Dan Hoey Road. Likewise, dictionary definitions of "improvement" do nothing to resolve whether sidewalks, utilities, and lighting improve Dan Hoey Road, so the dissent's citation of the dictionary is ineffective. See post at 5. 12


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sewer

lines.

The

sidewalks

and

lighting

on

the

land

covered by the easement were not sidewalks and lighting for Dan Hoey Road, but sidewalks and lighting for the private commerce center and surrounding area. developments improving Dan could Hoey be said to be for Not one of these the purpose of

Road.5

Without

question,

Kingsley's

planned use of the land covered by the easement served the

Kingsley claims he believed that the village "required" one of the access roads on his site plan, but the evidence shows only that the village asked Kingsley to align the road

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