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STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

BRENT HARRIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, Defendant/Third-Party PlaintiffAppellee, and BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF MICHIGAN, Third-Party Defendant/Appellee.

UNPUBLISHED December 27, 2011

No. 300256 Oakland Circuit Court LC No. 2009-102219-NF

Before: O'CONNELL, P.J., and MURRAY and DONOFRIO, JJ. PER CURIAM. Plaintiff appeals as of right from a circuit court order denying plaintiff's motion for summary disposition and granting summary disposition in favor of Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (BCBSM) with respect to plaintiff's claims and the third-party claims of defendant Auto Club Insurance Association (ACIA).1 The court also granted ACIA's motion for summary disposition with respect to plaintiff's claims against it, pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2). On appeal plaintiff only challenges the trial court's order dismissing his claims against Blue Cross. We reverse the trial court's order insofar that it granted summary disposition to BCBSM, and affirm the denial of plaintiff's motion for summary disposition and the dismissal of ACIA, and remand for further proceedings.2

1

ACIA did not file an appeal in this case, and so does not challenge the trial court's order dismissing its third-party claims against Blue Cross. From the record presented it is undisputed that ACIA has paid all outstanding medical bills, and continues to do so. Plaintiff's counsel appeared to concede as much at oral argument before this Court.
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The pertinent facts are not disputed. On July 1, 2008, plaintiff was injured when the motorcycle he was riding was hit by a vehicle insured by ACIA. Plaintiff also had a health insurance contract (also known as a "certificate") with BCBSM. ACIA acknowledges that its policy is an uncoordinated policy that provides full coverage for plaintiff's medical expenses.3 ACIA has paid those expenses. The parties dispute whether the BCBSM certificate coordinates with the no-fault policy. The trial court determined that the BCBSM certificate coordinated benefits with the nofault policy and, therefore, ACIA was liable for payment of plaintiff's medical expenses. Accordingly, the court granted summary disposition to BCBSM with respect to both plaintiff's and ACIA's claims against BCBSM and denied plaintiff's motion for summary disposition. The court also granted summary disposition to ACIA on plaintiff's claims against it. Summary disposition may be granted under MCR 2.116(C)(10) when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment . . . as a matter of law." This Court reviews a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). This Court also reviews de novo the proper interpretation of a contract. Flint v Chrisdom Props, Ltd, 283 Mich App 494, 498-499; 770 NW2d 888 (2009). An insurance policy is treated like other contracts. Smith v Physicians Health Plan, Inc, 444 Mich 743, 759; 514 NW2d 150 (1994). If contractual language is clear and unambiguous, its meaning is a question of law, and courts must interpret and enforce the contract as written. Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Masters, 460 Mich 105, 111; 595 NW2d 832 (1999). Although BCBSM contends that plaintiff is seeking a "windfall" by obtaining duplicative payment of his medical expenses from two sources, the availability of double recovery for a person entitled to benefits from two contracts depends on the specific contracts. Both Shanafelt v Allstate Ins Co, 217 Mich App 625; 552 NW2d 671 (1996), and Bombalski v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 247 Mich App 536; 637 NW2d 251 (2001), establish that recovery of benefits for medical expenses from two different policies is available and depends on the particular policies. The Supreme Court has recognized this possibility as well, stating, "[i]t is when both the no-fault automobile insurance and the health insurance are uncoordinated policies that multiple recovery is possible for the insured." Smith, 444 Mich at 752. The trial court was persuaded by BCBSM's argument that it was not liable to pay plaintiff's medical expenses because of certain provisions in its policy. Two of these provisions are similar in referring to benefits paid by other plans. The contract states: PHYSICIAN AND OTHER PROFESSIONAL SERVICES THAT ARE NOT PAYABLE

3

An "uncoordinated" no-fault policy means that "the no-fault automobile insurance would pay benefits regardless of whatever other insurance the insured may have." Smith v Physicians Health Plan, Inc, 444 Mich 743, 747; 514 NW2d 150 (1994).

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The following services are not payable:

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