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Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Opinion
SUPREME COURT BRIGGS TAX SERVICE, L.L.C., Petitioner-Appellee, v DETROIT PUBLIC SCHOOLS and DETROIT BOARD OF EDUCATION, Respondents-Appellants, and CITY OF DETROIT and WAYNE COUNTY TREASURER, Respondents.

Chief Justice:

Justices:

Marilyn Kelly

Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman Diane M. Hathaway

FILED March 30, 2010 STATE OF MICHIGAN

No. 138168

BRIGGS TAX SERVICE, L.L.C., Petitioner-Appellee, v No. 138179

DETROIT PUBLIC SCHOOLS, DETROIT BOARD OF EDUCATION, and WAYNE COUNTY TREASURER,

Respondents, and CITY OF DETROIT, Respondent-Appellant.

BRIGGS TAX SERVICE, L.L.C., Petitioner-Appellee, v DETROIT PUBLIC SCHOOLS, DETROIT BOARD OF EDUCATION, and CITY OF DETROIT, Respondents, and WAYNE COUNTY TREASURER, Respondent-Appellant. No. 138182

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH KELLY, C.J. The dispute in this case concerns whether respondent's wrongful collection of property taxes from petitioner constitutes a mutual mistake of fact within the meaning of MCL 211.53a. If the assessing officer and petitioner made a mutual mistake of fact, the three-year limitations period of MCL 211.53a applies, and petitioner may pursue its refund claim. If not, petitioner is not entitled to a refund because it did not file its petition within the general limitations period. We 2

conclude that the assessing officer and petitioner did not make a mutual mistake of fact and that MCL 211.53a does not apply to petitioner's claim. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the decision of the Tax Tribunal. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In September 1993, voters in the Detroit Public School district approved a 32.25-mill school operating property tax. The millage authorized respondent

Detroit Public Schools (DPS) to levy property taxes until the millage expired on June 30, 2002. In March 1994, Michigan voters approved Proposal A, a school finance reform proposal. Under Proposal A, local school districts are precluded from levying more than 18 mills in property taxes. However, Proposal A provided that unexpired millages authorized before January 1, 1994, are valid, even if greater than 18 mills. Despite the fact that voter approval for the DPS operating millage expired on June 30, 2002, DPS continued to levy an unauthorized 18-mill tax for tax years 2002, 2003, and 2004. Dr. Kenneth Burnley, the Chief Executive Officer of the Detroit Public School District, approved annual resolutions certifying the tax levies. DPS apparently believed that, when voters approved Proposal A, local school district electors no longer needed to approve a tax rate of 18 mills. In August 2005, DPS published a notice acknowledging that the taxes levied for 2002, 2003, and 2004 were levied without authorization and that the revenue from those taxes might have to be refunded. 3

Petitioner, Briggs Tax Service, L.L.C., filed a claim with the Tax Tribunal against respondents DPS, the Detroit Board of Education, the city of Detroit, and the Wayne County Treasurer. It sought a refund of the unauthorized taxes levied and collected by DPS.1 Petitioner also sought to enjoin future collections without proper authority as well as an award for the damage that the unlawful property tax levies allegedly caused. Additionally, petitioner asserted that respondents violated the Michigan Constitution by unlawfully taking its property and by depriving it and other property owners of due process of law.2 The Tax Tribunal dismissed petitioner's refund claim on jurisdictional grounds because it had not been filed within 30 days of the issuance of the

Pursuant to the Tax Tribunal Act, MCL 205.701 et seq., the Tax Tribunal has exclusive and original jurisdiction over this case. Specifically, MCL 205.731 provided at the relevant time: The tribunal's exclusive and original jurisdiction shall be: (a) A proceeding for direct review of a final decision, finding, ruling, determination, or order of an agency relating to assessment, valuation, rates, special assessments, allocation, or equalization, under property tax laws. (b) A proceeding for refund or redetermination of a tax under the property tax laws. In addition to the action filed with the Tax Tribunal, petitioner and other property owners filed an action in the Wayne Circuit Court seeking class certification and refunds of the property tax that DPS imposed. The circuit court granted summary disposition to respondents on the ground that the Tax Tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction over the claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. Briggs Tax Service, LLC v Detroit Pub Schools, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 13, 2007 (Docket No. 271631).
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applicable tax bills as required by MCL 205.735(2).3 On reconsideration, the Tax Tribunal gave petitioner the opportunity to file an amended petition. In its amended petition, petitioner alleged that a mutual mistake of fact under MCL 211.53a had occurred. Applying MCL 211.53a, petitioner claimed that it had three years in which to file suit to recover the unauthorized taxes. DPS and the county treasurer moved for summary disposition, alleging that the Tax Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the three-year period provided by MCL 211.53a did not apply. The Tax Tribunal agreed, ruling that MCL 211.53a governs a ". . . mutual mistake of fact made by the assessing officer and the taxpayer . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Pursuant to MCL 211.10d(1), the assessing officer is an assessor who has been certified by the state assessor's board and who makes an annual assessment of property. An assessor is not tasked with determining, approving, certifying, or verifying a millage, nor is that person qualified to do so. Moreover, an assessor is not involved in the collection of the tax. Assessors are employed by assessing jurisdictions. While assessing jurisdictions also levy property taxes, not all jurisdictions that levy property taxes are assessing jurisdictions. In the instant case, the assessor was employed by the City of Detroit, not DPS. For these reasons, the Tribunal finds that the assessing officer made no mistake as to the expiration date of DPS' millage.[4] Accordingly, the Tax Tribunal dismissed petitioner's refund claim because it was not filed within 30 days as required by MCL 205.735(2). Effective May 30, 2006, the time limits in MCL 205.735(2) were moved to MCL 205.735(3) and the general limitations period changed from 30 to 35 days. See 2006 PA 174. Briggs Tax Service, LLC v Detroit Pub Schools, 16 MTTR 145, 165 (Docket No. 319592, May 31, 2007).
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The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Tax Tribunal, holding that petitioner was entitled to pursue a claim for a refund under MCL 211.53a.5 It reasoned that the mistake regarding the validity of imposing the tax was a mutual mistake of fact between the taxpayer and the assessor, rejecting the Tax Tribunal's conclusion to the contrary: This litigation arises not from a dispute over a question of law, but from a mutual mistake of fact--both parties erroneously believed that [petitioner] was required to pay the disputed taxes in 2002, 2003, and 2004, although [petitioner] had no such obligation. . . . [T]he question whether the procedures necessary to renew the property tax assessments in order to levy taxes on nonhomestead-property owners for tax years 2002, 2003, and 2004 were followed is one of fact--either the school electors authorized the taxes for those years or they didn't. Similarly, whether [petitioner], a nonhomestead-property owner, was required to pay these taxes (and, hence, whether [petitioner] is entitled to a refund of these taxes) is a factual question. Therefore, the belief apparently held by both [petitioner] and respondents--that respondents were authorized to issue, and [petitioner] was obligated to pay, the disputed taxes in 2002, 2003, and 2004--constitutes a mutual mistake of fact.[6] We granted respondents' applications for leave to appeal to determine whether a mutual mistake of fact occurred such that the three-year limitations period of MCL 211.53a applies.7

Briggs Tax Service, LLC v Detroit Pub Schools, 282 Mich App 29; 761 NW2d 816 (2008).
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Id. at 38-39. Briggs Tax Service, LLC v Detroit Pub Schools, 484 Mich 1024 (2009).

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STANDARD OF REVIEW The standard of review of Tax Tribunal cases is multifaceted.8 If fraud is not claimed, this Court reviews the Tax Tribunal's decision for misapplication of the law or adoption of a wrong principle.9 We deem the Tax Tribunal's factual findings conclusive if they are supported by "competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record."10 But when statutory interpretation is involved, this Court reviews the Tax Tribunal's decision de novo.11 We also review de novo the grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition.12 ANALYSIS This case involves an issue of statutory interpretation. The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.13 The first

Wexford Med Group v City of Cadillac, 474 Mich 192, 201; 713 NW2d 734 (2006). Michigan Bell Tel Co v Dep't of Treasury, 445 Mich 470, 476; 518 NW2d 808 (1994). Id., citing Const 1963, art 6,

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