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DARWYN FAIR V WILLIE MOODY
State: Michigan
Court: Court of Appeals
Docket No: 278906
Case Date: 12/23/2008
Preview:STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS


DARWYN FAIR and VOLANTE COUNCIL FAIR, Plaintiffs-CounterdefendantsAppellants-Cross-Appellees, v WILLIE MOODY, JASEN COON, GREG PAYNE, FIRST FINANCED MORTGAGE CORP, LAURIE M. MCDONALD, TITLE QUEST INSURANCE AGENCY, and MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., Defendants, and LASALLE BANK, Defendant-CounterplaintiffAppellee-Cross-Appellant

UNPUBLISHED December 23, 2008

No. 278906 Oakland Circuit Court LC No. 2005-063458-CH

Before: Murphy, P.J., and Sawyer and Whitbeck, JJ. PER CURIAM. Plaintiffs appeal as of right the judgment entered by the trial court following a bench trial in this case arising out of a nefarious real estate transaction orchestrated by various defendants, and allegedly plaintiffs, on August 19, 2004. The transaction involved the purported sale of plaintiffs' home to defendant Willie Moody for $378,000. A scheduled foreclosure sale of the home was days away when the transaction at issue supposedly took place. Plaintiffs' existing mortgage debt of $260,051, a tax lien in the amount of $23,641, and property taxes and water bills totaling $6,011 were paid off pursuant to a new mortgage obtained by Moody. The chief question at trial was whether plaintiffs actually participated in the closing on their house and executed a purchase agreement, warranty deed, and other closing documents, or whether the closing documents were all forged without plaintiffs having any knowledge of the sale. The trial court, while suggesting that the evidence left it unclear what actually transpired, concluded that -1-


the closing documents were forged. The court struck the documents and quieted title in favor of plaintiffs. But the court also imposed an equitable mortgage on the home to the benefit of defendant LaSalle Bank (LaSalle), assignee of the Moody mortgage. The amount of the equitable mortgage awarded by the court was approximately $300,000, not the full amount of the $378,000 loan and mortgage obtained by Moody. The equitable mortgage equaled the amount of plaintiffs' debt that was satisfied by the mortgage funds, which included the payoff of the existing mortgage, tax lien, property taxes, and water bills, plus $9,711 in miscellaneous closing costs. Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's ruling imposing the equitable mortgage in favor of LaSalle.1 Subject to us holding that the equitable mortgage ruling constituted error, LaSalle cross appeals the trial court's determination that the deed and other real estate closing documents were forged, thereby depriving LaSalle of its status as a mortgagee pursuant to contract without need to resort to equity to recognize and enforce a mortgage. We affirm the imposition of an equitable mortgage, but reduce it by $9,711. By way of additional background, plaintiffs had repeatedly defaulted on their mortgage with American General Financial Services over a three-year period and multiple foreclosure proceedings had been initiated. The foreclosure proceedings were halted by three Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions filed by Mrs. Fair that were subsequently dismissed, two voluntarily and one involuntarily, which were followed twice by large payments by plaintiffs that temporarily stopped further foreclosure proceedings. The third bankruptcy filing in 2004 was involuntarily dismissed by the bankruptcy court, and Mrs. Fair was barred by the court from filing a new petition for 180 days. Around this time, the spring and summer of 2004, plaintiffs were faced with a continuing default on the mortgage and yet another foreclosure proceeding. Mr. Fair attempted to refinance through Home Team Mortgage Company and its president Ramsey Zawideh, but refinancing and a new mortgage could only be obtained if the IRS tax lien were subordinated to the new mortgage. As Zawideh assisted Mr. Fair with processing a loan application and negotiated with the IRS for subordination on plaintiffs' behalf, Mr. Fair also began communicating with defendant Jasen Coon, a mortgage broker linked to defendant First Financed Mortgage Corporation (FFMC). Coon was able to procure an adjournment of a foreclosure sale scheduled on August 10, 2004, after Mr. Fair asked Coon for assistance in obtaining an adjournment and Coon supplied American General with a signed purchase agreement, showing a conveyance of plaintiffs' home to Moody. Plaintiffs denied ever executing the purchase agreement, and Mr. Fair testified that he did not know how Coon was able to negotiate an adjournment of the sale. The new date set for the foreclosure sale was August 24, 2004, giving, from American General's perspective, time for plaintiffs to close on the sale with Moody. The home was purportedly sold on August 19, 2004, to defendant Moody for $378,000 pursuant to a new mortgage with defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.

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Plaintiffs essentially desire to retain ownership of the home without the burden of any mortgage or tax lien despite the fact that they paid nothing toward those debts and were on the verge of foreclosure.

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(MERS), acting solely as a nominee for lender BNC Mortgage, Inc.,2 resulting in satisfaction of the American General mortgage ($260,051), the IRS tax lien ($23,641), and other debts, including an unsecured loan in the amount of nearly $80,000 supposedly held by FFMC, as invoiced by Coon.3 The buyer's closing took place at the offices of defendant Title Quest, with Coon and Moody present, and under the auspices of a Title Quest agent and closer, defendant McDonald, who also served as the notary. According to McDonald, the sellers' closing took place at plaintiffs' home later in the day with plaintiffs, Coon, and herself being present, at which time plaintiffs executed the warranty deed and all of the closing documents.4 Plaintiffs testified that there was no closing in their home, that Coon and McDonald had never been in their home, that plaintiffs never executed a purchase agreement, warranty deed, or any closing documents, that they never authorized anyone to sell the house, that they had no plans to sell the house, and that they did not sell the house to Moody; it was a blanket denial to any transaction having occurred. Evidence was presented regarding various email and fax communications between Mr. Fair and Coon on August 19 and 20, 2004, which, at a minimum, seem odd and puzzling, given plaintiffs' claims. MERS and, following intervention and substitution, LaSalle proceeded on the theory that plaintiffs' plan was to sell the house to Moody and for Moody then to sell the home back to plaintiffs on a land contract for $325,000;5 a plan emphatically denied by plaintiffs who pointed to their attempts to obtain refinancing through Zawideh and Home Team Mortgage.6 According to MERS and LaSalle, this plan would give plaintiffs some time to find new financing and, when financing was obtained, plaintiffs would purchase the fee or legal title back from Moody.

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LaSalle is an assignee of BNC and MERS.

Evidence presented at trial made it clear that there was no such unsecured loan. Defendants FFMC, Coon, Moody, and Payne, who was an associate of Coon and also linked to FFMC, all answered the complaint, as well as the amended complaint, and participated in the early stages of the trial, with Payne and Moody providing some testimony. However, on the third day of the trial, all three individual defendants invoked their Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. Along with FFMC, they subsequently formally withdrew theirs answers, and default judgments were later entered against all four defendants. We further note that defendants Title Quest and McDonald settled with plaintiffs before trial commenced.

There was testimony and a sketch by McDonald regarding the layout of plaintiffs' home that was consistent with plaintiffs' description of their home, including identification of a black refrigerator. Coon faxed Mr. Fair a land contract on August 20, signed by Moody and notarized by McDonald, which she denied notarizing, but the space designated for Fair's signature on the land contract is blank. Mr. Fair testified repeatedly that he wanted nothing to do with any deal suggested by the land contract, but he did not feel the need to reply to Coon's faxing of the land contract, despite the fact that the contract showed Moody selling plaintiffs' house back to Fair.
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Zawideh expressed disbelief when he discovered that the house had been sold, as he felt that he was close to obtaining subordination of the IRS tax lien, although he conceded that procuring subordination from the IRS was very difficult.

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After the purported transaction, Moody failed to make payments on the new mortgage, nor did plaintiffs make any mortgage or land contract payments. In January 2005, after allegedly first learning of the purported transaction, plaintiffs filed suit. Pursuant to an amended complaint filed in November 2005, plaintiffs sought to quiet title and additionally alleged fraud, emotional distress, and unlawful notarization. Plaintiffs also requested injunctive relief barring MERS from foreclosing on the property. In March 2005, plaintiffs became entangled in a district court action brought by Moody seeking an order of eviction against plaintiffs for forfeiture of the land contract. The district court entered an order staying the eviction proceedings until the current litigation was concluded in the circuit court. Plaintiffs, however, were ordered to make monthly escrow payments in the amount of $2,771, which they did for four months before stopping, without court authorization, when MERS initiated foreclosure proceedings in light of the fact that no payments were being made on the new mortgage. The litigation in this case entailed a seven-day bench trial in which numerous exhibits were admitted, including real estate documents and copies of emails, and the court took testimony from plaintiffs, Payne, Moody, Coon (deposition transcript only), McDonald, Zawideh, Blake Bradsher (branch manager for American General), and Duanne Barber (testified regarding business meeting with Mr. Fair at local restaurant on August 19, 2004).7 The trial court also heard from plaintiffs' handwriting expert, Michael Sinke, who testified that his analysis positively eliminated plaintiffs as authoring the signatures on the closing documents. LaSalle's handwriting expert, Todd Welch, testified that he could not come to a conclusion one way or the other following his analysis. Both experts compared known exemplars against the signatures on the closing documents. For the most part, the signatures at issue looked nothing like the exemplars, and the "n" at the end of Mr. Fair's first name was missing on all of the challenged signatures, while being included on all of the exemplars.8 Both experts noted that, while their was some fluency in Mrs. Fair's exemplars and her purported signatures, the signatures on the documents at issue showed signs of many stops and starts, hesitation, slowness, pen lifts, and blunt beginning and ending strokes. This would be typical of a simulated forgery, i.e., one in which the forger from memory or observation tries to recreate the signature so that it appears similar to a true signature. Welch opined that the challenged signatures showed clear signs of simulated forgeries, given the stops and starts, slowness, and pen lifts, but the problem was that they looked nothing like the exemplars. Although Welch's analysis was inconclusive, he opined that the signatures at issue lent themselves to being disguised or auto forgeries, i.e., an attempt by a person to sign his or her name in a style different than normal so that the signature could be disavowed later. Sinke disagreed that these were disguised or auto forgeries.

The court heard much testimony regarding the events that transpired, or that supposedly transpired, on August 19, 2004. We note that the timelines testified to by Barber regarding his restaurant meeting with Mr. Fair, in which Fair reviewed some legal documents, is inconsistent with Mr. Fair's testimony regarding timelines.
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We note that Mr. Fair's signature on a Home Team Mortgage loan application, which he conceded was his signature, was also missing an "n," although, again, none of his exemplars from that time period revealed a missing "n." The evidence reflected that the loan application omitted information regarding the tax lien and various judgment liens.

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The trial court ruled as indicated above, and plaintiffs appeal as of right the imposition of an equitable mortgage, while LaSalle cross appeals on the possibility that we reverse the trial court's imposition of an equitable mortgage.9 This Court reviews a trial court's findings of fact in a bench trial for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Alan Custom Homes, Inc v Krol, 256 Mich App 505, 512; 667 NW2d 379 (2003), citing MCR 2.613(C) and Chapdelaine v Sochocki, 247 Mich App 167, 169; 635 NW2d 339 (2001). Similarly, equitable decisions are reviewed de novo, and the underlying factual findings made by the trial court in support of its equitable rulings are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. Wengel v Wengel, 270 Mich App 86, 91; 714 NW2d 371 (2006). In the application of the clearly erroneous standard, "regard shall be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it." MCR 2.613(C). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire record is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. Walters v Snyder, 239 Mich App 453, 456; 608 NW2d 97 (2000). Questions of law, in general, are reviewed de novo. Richards v Tibaldi, 272 Mich App 522, 528; 726 NW2d 770 (2006). Plaintiffs also raise issues regarding the trial court's decision allowing LaSalle to intervene in the action and substitute in for MERS and allowing LaSalle to file a counterclaim.10 A trial court's decision on a motion to intervene or for substitution of a party is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Vestevich v West Bloomfield Twp, 245 Mich App 759, 761; 630 NW2d 646 (2001); Mather Investors, LLC v Larson, 271 Mich App 254, 260; 720 NW2d 575 (2006). A trial court's decision on a motion to add a counterclaim is likewise reviewed for an abuse of discretion on appeal. See Weymers v Khera, 454 Mich 639, 658; 563 NW2d 647 (1997). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court chooses an outcome falling outside a principled range of outcomes. Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006). We first address procedural issue raised by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in allowing LaSalle to intervene after the start of trial. Plaintiffs maintain that MERS, as the mortgagee and entity that initiated foreclosure proceedings, was the proper party to be named in the suit, that MERS was carrying out the litigation without any contention that LaSalle should have been a named defendant, that LaSalle's interest was adequately protected by MERS, and that LaSalle had notice of the pendency of the action prior to trial but did not act at that point, nor in a timely manner in general. LaSalle argues that plaintiffs suffered no prejudice when the court allowed LaSalle to intervene and substitute in for MERS, that it was a necessary party but

9

With respect to the cross appeal, LaSalle argues that plaintiffs did not establish a claim of forgery by clear and convincing evidence. LaSalle states, "In the event that this Court concludes that an equitable mortgage in favor of LaSalle Bank was not warranted, the circuit court's opinion and order should be reversed and judgment should be entered in favor of LaSalle Bank on Plaintiffs' claim to quiet title." Because we affirm the imposition of an equitable mortgage, while reducing it slightly, it is unnecessary to reach the issue on cross appeal. We do note that our close inspection of the record leads us to cast some doubts regarding plaintiffs' position that they had no role in the real estate transaction. LaSalle's counterclaim initially alleged causes of action for unjust enrichment and an equitable mortgage, and an amended counterclaim added a claim of equitable subrogation.

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not named as a party by plaintiffs, that it has an interest in the property that LaSalle is entitled to protect, that MERS was merely a nominee and not an authorized agent or representative of LaSalle, and that any judgment against MERS would have been binding on LaSalle under MCR 3.411(H).11 The mortgage obtained by Moody indicates that MERS is a separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for the lender, BNC Mortgage, and the lender's successors and assigns. The mortgage also indicates that MERS is the mortgagee under the security instrument. Plaintiffs did not initially name any mortgagee as a defendant in the complaint because no foreclosure proceedings on the Moody mortgage had commenced, but when they did, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in November 2005 naming MERS as a defendant. Plaintiffs also obtained a stipulated order in October 2005 allowing BNC to be added as a party defendant; however, plaintiffs never followed up on bringing BNC into the litigation. The notice of foreclosure is in the name of MERS as nominee of the lender and states that MERS is the mortgagee. A final pretrial order signed days before trial commenced provides that plaintiffs did not contest that Moody executed a promissory note in favor of lender BNC, that Moody executed a mortgage in favor of MERS as nominee for BNC, that BNC subsequently endorsed the note to LaSalle, and that MERS is also the nominee of LaSalle, who is the current holder of the note and mortgage executed by Moody. Five days of trial took place in March of 2006 with MERS participating as a defendant and LaSalle not participating as a party. The trial was adjourned and set to be continued in July 2006 and, in May 2006, LaSalle filed a motion to intervene as a party defendant "on behalf of LaSalle Bank, National Association, the Trustee of Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-10." MERS filed a motion agreeing to LaSalle's intervention, indicating that it held the mortgage for the benefit of LaSalle. MERS also stated that on May 18, 2006, it executed a corporate assignment of mortgage in favor of LaSalle relative to the Moody promissory note and mortgage. The document was provided to the court.12 Accordingly, MERS asked the court to allow LaSalle to substitute in for MERS. The trial court granted the motion to intervene and allowed LaSalle to substitute in for MERS. The parties do not provide any insight regarding the legal parameters with respect to a lender's nominee or the nature of MERS. To our knowledge, there is no published Michigan case law substantively addressing lender nominees and MERS. In MERSCORP, Inc v Romaine, 8 NY3d 90, 96; 861 NE2d 81; 828 NYS2d 266 (2006), the New York court explained:

MCR 3.411(H) provides that "[e]xcept for title acquired by adverse possession, the judgment determining a claim to title, equitable title, right to possession, or other interests in lands under this rule, determines only the rights and interests of the known and unknown persons who are parties to the action, and of persons claiming through those parties by title accruing after the commencement of the action." No document was ever provided showing the "endorsement" or an assignment as between BNC and LaSalle. The document assigning the mortgage from MERS to LaSalle does state that it was a mortgage executed by Moody to BNC Mortgage.
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In 1993, the MERS system was created by several large participants in the real estate mortgage industry to track ownership interests in residential mortgages. Mortgage lenders and other entities, known as MERS members, subscribe to the MERS system and pay annual fees for the electronic processing and tracking of ownership and transfers of mortgages. Members contractually agree to appoint MERS to act as their common agent on all mortgages they register in the MERS system. The initial MERS mortgage is recorded in the County Clerk's office with "Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc." named as the lender's nominee or mortgagee of record on the instrument. During the lifetime of the mortgage, the beneficial ownership interest or servicing rights may be transferred among MERS members (MERS assignments), but these assignments are not publicly recorded; instead they are tracked electronically in MERS's private system. In the MERS system, the mortgagor is notified of transfers of servicing rights pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act, but not necessarily of assignments of the beneficial interest in the mortgage. [Footnotes omitted.] In Landmark Nat'l Bank v Kesler, 192 P3d 177, 179 (Kan App, 2008), the Kansas appellate court stated that MERS mortgages designate an entity, MERS, as the mortgagee even though it is not the lender, which left the court pondering whether MERS truly is a mortgagee even though it lent no money nor had any rights to loan repayments. MERS argued in Kesler that it was a necessary party to foreclosure proceedings and not just the lender, claiming it held title to the mortgage, although not the real estate. Id. The Kansas court held that MERS was merely an agent for the lender and that the lower court did not err in not allowing intervention by MERS, given that MERS was not the lender, despite being labeled as mortgagee, had no right to repayment of the underlying debt, and had no role in handling mortgage payments. Kesler would suggest that MERS here need not have been included in the litigation commenced by plaintiffs and that BNC and then LaSalle were the parties holding the interest that properly would be subject to the injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs. We, however, find it unnecessary for our purposes to define MERS' interest, MERS' relationship to BNC and LaSalle, or to define the relationship between MERS and Moody. Before trial, plaintiffs agreed that BNC endorsed the note to LaSalle, that MERS was the nominee of LaSalle, and that LaSalle was the current holder of the note and mortgage executed by Moody. LaSalle should have been named as a party defendant and, considering that MERS later assigned whatever interest it had in the mortgage to LaSalle, it is unquestionable that LaSalle ultimately held the interest that would be compromised by an unfavorable ruling by the trial court. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing LaSalle to intervene and substitute in for MERS. LaSalle had a right to intervene, where it claimed an interest relating to the property and the transaction that was the subject of the action, and where it was so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter have impaired or impeded LaSalle's ability to protect that interest. MCR 2.209(A)(3). Further, LaSalle' interest would not have adequately been represented by MERS. Id. Although LaSalle does not appear to dispute plaintiffs' contention that it was aware of the litigation in January 2006, calling into question the timeliness of LaSalle's motion, MCR 2.209(A)("[o]n timely application"), the motion was filed a short few months later, MERS did not assign its interest to LaSalle until May -7-


of 2006, plaintiffs never pursued the matter despite knowing of LaSalle's interest, and absolutely no prejudice occurred to plaintiffs even after five days of trial had been completed. Moreover, inclusion of LaSalle in the suit was proper under MCR 2.205(A)(necessary joinder), where LaSalle had such an interest in the subject matter of the action that its presence was essential to permit the court to render complete relief. Furthermore, substitution on the basis of transfer of interest was appropriate under MCR 2.202(B).13 Plaintiffs also assert that the trial court erred in allowing LaSalle to file a counterclaim. LaSalle attached a proposed answer and counterclaim to its motion to intervene. The proposed counterclaim alleged claims of unjust enrichment and equitable mortgage. While the trial court granted the motion to intervene, it denied LaSalle's request to file a counterclaim, finding it untimely. More than a month before trial resumed, LaSalle filed a motion for reconsideration relative to the denial of the counterclaim request. On the second to last day of trial on July 6, 2006, the court ruled on the motion, changing its position and allowing the filing of a counterclaim. The trial court reasoned that no additional witnesses would need to testify because of the counterclaim, no adjournment was being sought, no further discovery was necessary, and the filing of a counterclaim would not delay conclusion of the trial. The formal order granting reconsideration and an amended counterclaim were not filed until after trial, but before the court issued its written opinion in the case. Plaintiffs complain that the counterclaim was inexcusably untimely and that no palpable error was demonstrated for purposes of the motion for reconsideration. Plaintiffs and LaSalle view this issue as one involving amendment of the pleadings, and plaintiffs wish to attribute the entire time period that MERS was in the litigation to LaSalle with respect to examining the length of the delay. MERS never filed a counterclaim. We first note that this is not a case concerning amendment of the pleadings, considering that LaSalle sought to file an answer and counterclaim immediately on intervention; there was nothing to amend. Further, plaintiffs cite no authority for their proposition that LaSalle is tied to the pleadings filed by MERS. Under MCR 2.209(C)(2), a motion to intervene must "be accompanied by a pleading stating the claim or defense for which intervention is sought." LaSalle attached such pleadings, an answer and a counterclaim, to its motion to intervene. Generally speaking, a counterclaim must be filed with an answer. MCR 2.203(E). Again, this was effectively accomplished by attaching an answer and counterclaim to the motion to intervene. LaSalle could not file a counterclaim before intervention, and we have already determined that intervention was proper. Furthermore, demonstrating palpable error was not required in order for the court to reconsider its prior ruling. MCR 2.119(F)(3) provides: Generally, and without restricting the discretion of the court, a motion for rehearing or reconsideration which merely presents the same issues ruled on by the court . . . will not be granted. The moving party must demonstrate a palpable error by which the court and the parties have been misled and show that a

We also note that the order granting intervention and substitution is entitled a "stipulated order," and there were statements made at the hearing on the motion suggesting that plaintiffs were not fighting the substitution of LaSalle for MERS, only the introduction of a counterclaim attached to the motion. To that extent, the issue was waived.

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different disposition of the motion must result from correction of the error. [Emphasis added.] A trial court can, and did so here, give a party a second chance or rethink its position, and nothing in MCR 2.119(F)(3) precludes a trial court from exercising such discretion. Kokx v Bylenga, 241 Mich App 655, 659; 617 NW2d 368 (2000). While it would have been preferable for the court to grant the request when initially made, doing so on reconsideration was permissible. Even if we treated this issue as one involving amendment of the pleadings, we find no undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motives, repeated failures to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, or futility. MCR 2.118(A)(2); Weymers, supra at 658. Plaintiffs speak of prejudice to their case, but they fail to explain how they were prejudiced, nor do we see any prejudice. The evidence that would support or run contrary to an equitable mortgage was necessarily encompassed by the extensive and fully developed evidence presented at trial regarding the nature of the transaction and the actions of the parties, which related to the claims pursued by plaintiffs. We additionally note that, even had there been no counterclaim, the trial court was faced with a request by plaintiffs to enjoin enforcement of the mortgage and foreclosure proceedings, and we do not believe that it would have gone beyond the court's equitable authority to reject the request on the basis that LaSalle was entitled to an equitable mortgage, thereby granting LaSalle the same relief sought in the counterclaim. We now turn to the substantive issues presented on appeal. The trial court found that the warranty deed and closing documents had been forged, and it struck those documents. When a deed is forged, those ostensibly acquiring an interest under the forged deed, even innocently, are in no better position with respect to title than if the acquisition of the interest was with notice of the forgery. Felcher v Dutton, 265 Mich 231, 233; 251 NW 332 (1933)("The mortgage to the loan association rests on a deed which is in effect a forgery and at any rate is null and void.); Horvath v Nat'l Mortgage Co, 238 Mich 354, 360; 213 NW 202 (1927); Special Prop VI, LLC v Woodruff, 273 Mich App 586, 591; 730 NW2d 753 (2007); Horton v Verhelle, 231 Mich App 667, 677; 588 NW2d 144 (1998), overruled in part on other grounds in Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446 (1999); VanderWall v Midkiff, 166 Mich App 668, 685; 421 NW2d 263 (1988). There is no such thing as a bona fide holder under a forged deed, whose good faith would confer a right against the party whose name was forged, or those claiming under him or her. Felcher, supra at 233; Horvath, supra at 360; Special Prop VI, supra at 591; Horton, supra at 677; VanderWall, supra at 685. Therefore, LaSalle cannot rely on the deed, new mortgage, or any closing documents as against plaintiffs to establish an enforceable mortgage. With respect to equitable mortgages, "[a] court of equity may impose and foreclose an equitable mortgage on a parcel of real property when no valid mortgage exists but some sort of lien is required by the facts and circumstances of the parties' relationship." 1 Cameron, Michigan Real Property Law (3d ed), Mortgages,
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