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Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Opinion
v CARMODY-LAHTI REAL ESTATE, INC, a MICHIGAN CORPORATION

Chief Justice:

Justices:

Clifford W. Taylor

Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman

FILED MAY 27, 2005

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, No. 124413

Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee. _______________________________ BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH YOUNG, J. In interest Michigan, parties 1873, in to the Quincy property Mineral Mining located Range a Company in conveyed an

real the

Houghton

County, The the

Railroad "right

Company. of way" in

labeled

this

interest

written deed.

The precise nature of this right-of-way--

whether it was an easement or a fee estate, whether it was limited to railroad purposes and, if so, what such a

limitation would mean--is the subject matter of this appeal. Plaintiff, Resources, is the the Michigan in Department interest of of the Natural Mineral

successor

Range Railroad Company.

It asserts that it owns a fee

simple interest and is therefore entitled to use the rightof-way as a snowmobile and recreation trail. Carmody-Lahti Real Estate, Inc., is the Defendant, in

successor

interest of the Quincy Mining Company and maintains that plaintiff's predecessor in interest enjoyed only an

easement, which it abandoned before purporting to convey it to plaintiff. We conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly

determined that the 1873 deed conveyed an easement rather than a fee simple. However, we conclude that the panel

erred in holding that the easement was neither limited to a specific purpose nor abandoned by plaintiff's predecessor in interest. an easement Properly construed, the instrument conveyed for railroad purposes in only. Thus, when

plaintiff's

predecessor

interest

unambiguously

manifested its intent to relinquish any use of the rightof-way for railroad purposes and took action consistent Defendant,

with that intent, the easement was abandoned.

as successor in interest to the original grantor, now has an unencumbered fee simple interest in the land formerly subject to the easement. We Appeals therefore and reverse to the judgment of the for Court entry of of

remand

the

circuit

court

summary disposition in defendant's favor. 2


I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY


In 1873, Quincy Mining conveyed a "right of way" to Mineral Range through a written instrument that provided: This indenture made this twentyfirst day of October in the Year of Our Lord [1873] between the Quincy Mining Company . . . and The Mineral Range Railroad Company . . . witnesseth that [Quincy Mining] for and in consideration of the sum of one dollar to it in hand paid by [Mineral Range], the receipt whereof is hereby . . . acknowledged has granted, bargained, sold, remised, aliened and confirmed and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell, remise, release, alien and confirm unto [Mineral Range] its successors and assigns forever a right of way for the railroad of [Mineral Range] as already surveyed and located by the engineer of [Mineral Range] and according to the survey thereof on file in the Office of the Registrar of Deeds for the County of Houghton, Michigan to consist of a strip of land one hundred feet in width being fifty feet on each side of said surveyed line across the following described tracts or parcels of land situated in said county of Houghton: [describes parcels/plats]. Also a right of way for said railroad surveyed and located as aforesaid and according to the survey thereof on file as aforesaid to consist of a strip of land one hundred feet in width being twenty feet in width on the north side of said surveyed line and eighty feet in width on the south side of said surveyed line across the tract or parcel of land known . . . as [describes parcels/ plats]. Reserving to [Quincy Mining] and to its successors and assigns all ore and minerals on said strip of land and the right to mine the same from underneath the surface in such manner as not to interfere with the construction or operation of said railroad. Provided that [Quincy Mining] shall not in any case mine within fifteen feet of the surface of the [rock?] without the consent in writing of [Mineral Range] together with all and singular the hereditaments 3


and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appearing to have and to hold the said strip of land with the appurtenances, for the purpose and uses above stated and subject to the reservations aforesaid unto [Mineral Range] its successors and assigns forever In Witness Whereof [Quincy Mining] has caused its corporate seal to be affixed and these presents to be executed by its President and Secretary the day and year first above written. Signed, sealed and delivered . . . . Quincy Mining, the grantor, subsequently transferred its remaining interest in the Houghton County property to the Armstrong-Thielman Lumber Company, which, in turn, sold its interest to defendant Carmody-Lahti Real Estate, Inc. Mineral Range later conveyed its right-of-way to the Soo Line Railroad to Company, utilize which, the until the early for 1980s, railroad

continued purposes.

right-of-way

Although economic

the

railroad of our

industry nation in

was the

central

to

the

vitality

mid-nineteenth

century, its dominance began to wane in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries--the years following the But the

initial transfer of the Houghton County right-of-way.1 even as railroading itself declined in importance,

United States Congress determined that the rail corridors

See, generally, Wright & Hester, Pipes, wires, and bicycles: Rails-to-Trails, utility licenses, and the shifting scope of railroad easements from the nineteenth to the twenty-first centuries, 27 Ecology L Q 351 (2000). 4

1

themselves might prove vital for future economic growth.2 Accordingly, 1920, which Congress required, enacted among the other Transportation things, that Act of

railroad

companies seek and obtain the permission of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) before abandoning any extant rail line.3 Congress has since amended this procedure with the

Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act (RRRRA) of 1976,4 and again with the Staggers Rail Act of 1980.5

See Preseault v Interstate Commerce Comm, 494 US 1, 5-6; 110 S Ct 914; 108 L Ed 2d 1 (1990). See also Wild, A history of railroad abandonments, 23 Transp L J 1 (1995). Transportation Act, 41 Stat 456 (1920). See Wild, supra, p 4 (noting that the Transportation Act was largely concerned with "railroad rate policies"). Abandonment is to be distinguished from mere discontinuance of service. See Preseault, supra at 6 n 3. The former involves relinquishing rail lines and underlying property interests. Discontinuance, on the other hand, "allows a railroad to cease operating a line for an indefinite period while preserving the rail corridor for possible reactivation of service in the future." Id.
4 3

2

1976, 7-8.
5

Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of PL 94-210, 90 Stat 31 (1976). See Wild, supra, pp

Staggers Rail Act of 1980, PL 96-448, 94 Stat 1895 (1980). See also Wild, supra, p 9. Congress abolished the ICC in 1995, ICC Termination Act of 1995, 109 Stat 803, and vested authority over railroad abandonment in the Surface Transportation Board, 49 USC 10903. See RLTD R Corp v Surface Transportation Bd, 166 F3d 808, 810 (CA 6, 1999). After Soo Line abandoned its Houghton County rightof-way in 1982, Congress amended the National Trails System Act, 16 USC 1241 et seq., to create a "railbanking" program. See 16 USC 1247(d). 5

In

September

1982,

Soo

Line,

which the

then

owned

the

right-of-way

originally

granted

to

Mineral

Range

Railroad in 1873, sought federal permission to abandon the railway. on The ICC granted this request in a written order 29, 1982. The order placed specific

September

conditions on Soo Line's abandonment of its railway: Soo Line shall keep intact all of the rightof-way underling [sic] the track, including all the bridges and culverts, for a period of 120 days from the decided date of this certificate and decision to permit any state or local government agency or other interested party to negotiate the acquisition for public use of all or any portion of the right-of-way. In addition, Soo Line shall maintain the Houghton Depot for 120 days from the decided date of this certificate and decision. During this time, Soo Line shall take reasonable steps to prevent significant alteration or deterioration of the structure and afford to any public agency or private organization wishing to acquire the structure for public use the right of first refusal for its acquisition. Six years after the ICC granted its request to abandon the railway, the Soo Line conveyed Department the of right-of-way Natural to

plaintiff, (MDNR).

Michigan

Resources

By that time, the railroad tracks that originally The

occupied the right-of-way had been largely removed.

record reveals that, by 1988, there were no railroad tracks on the thirty-foot strip of land at issue in this case and there were only remnants of track scattered along the

easement.

Thus, the task of reconstructing the path of the The

railroad for litigation purposes was a difficult one. 6


parties

offered and

on each

this

issue

the a

testimony

of

several in

surveyors,

described

painstaking

process

which they consulted a number of maps and searched for remaining physical evidence of the railroad. The MDNR used the right-of-way as a snowmobile and recreation fence that trail until a 1997, when defendant of the installed a

blocked

portion with its

right-of-way, use, and

substantially

interfered

recreational

spawned the present litigation. In December 1997, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking an order to enjoin defendant from blocking the right-of-way with its fence. Plaintiff argued that it had an unlimited

right to use the right-of-way for any purpose because the 1873 deed conveyed to Mineral Range Railroad, its

predecessor in interest, a fee simple estate. argued in response that the deed had conveyed

Defendant only an

easement limited to railroad purposes. the scope of the easement, defendant

The MDNR exceeded argued, and had

thereby extinguished the right-of-way. The trial court initially granted summary disposition in plaintiff's favor, concluding that the 1873 instrument conveyed a fee estate rather than an easement and that

plaintiff was therefore permitted to use the right-of-way as a snowmobiling trail. remanded the matter to The Court of Appeals reversed and the 7
trial court. Unpublished

opinion 222645). easement

per

curiam,

issued

June

5,

2001

(Docket

No.

The panel held that the 1873 deed conveyed an rather than a fee simple and, accordingly,

remanded to the circuit court for a determination whether the easement had been extinguished. When the matter returned to the trial court, defendant filed a motion for summary disposition, arguing that the right-of-way had been extinguished by abandonment or by a 1920 tax sale of the servient estate. rejected plaintiff, both and claims, ordered granted the summary The trial court disposition to of

injunctive

relief--removal

defendant's fence--sought by plaintiff. Defendant Appeals. appealed this judgment to the Court of

There, defendant no longer asserted that Soo Line

had abandoned the easement as a result of the 1920 tax sale. Rather, defendant maintained that plaintiff's

predecessor abandoned the easement.

The Court of Appeals,

like the trial court, rejected this argument. The panel affirmed Quincy the Mining judgment had of the trial court, holding for that any

not

conveyed

the

easement that Soo

"particular

purpose"

and,

therefore,

Line's

termination of rail service through the right-of-way was not an abandonment of its easement. Unpublished opinion

per curiam, issued June 3, 2003 (Docket No. 240908).

8


Assessing

the

specific

language

of

the

1873

instrument, the Court of Appeals stated: [W]e believe that the phrase in the 1873 deed, "a right of way for the railroad of [the Mineral Range Railroad]," cannot be construed as a defeasance clause or as granting the easement for a particular purpose only. In making this determination, Quinn [v Pere Marquette R Co, 256 Mich 143; 239 NW 376 (1931)] is instructive. The phrase is akin to a statement of purpose. The declaration that the easement was for the Mineral Range Railroad's construction of a railroad was "merely an expression of the intention of the parties that the deed is for a lawful purpose." Quinn, supra at 151. Thus, Soo Line's cessation of rail service and subsequent sale of the easement to be used for non-railroad purposes did not automatically extinguish the easement. [Slip op at 6-7.] The panel also rejected the argument that Soo Line's

abandonment application to the ICC in 1982 constituted an abandonment of the easement.6 In the end, the panel

determined that Soo Line had a legitimate property interest to convey to plaintiff and that plaintiff was therefore entitled to summary disposition.

6

The Court stated:

In regards to the ICC certificate of abandonment, the ICC only regulates and approves cessation of railroad operations, it "does not determine abandonment." [Id. at 9 (citation omitted).] 9

This Court granted defendant's application for leave to appeal on June 3, 2004, and solicited amicus briefs.7 initially denied from the plaintiff's the first application Court of for leave We to

cross-appeal (holding However,

Appeals an we

opinion

that after

1873

deed oral

conveyed arguments,

easement). requested

hearing

additional briefing on the question whether the 1873 deed conveyed a fee simple or an easement.8 II. A trial court's STANDARD OF REVIEW decision to grant or deny summary

disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is subject to review de novo.9 Under this court rule, a party is entitled to

summary disposition when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment . . . as a matter of law."10 III. ANALYSIS Plaintiff, the Michigan Department of Natural

Resources, asserts the right to use of a former railroad right-of-way in Houghton County, Michigan, as a public

Dep't of Natural Resources Estate, Inc, 470 Mich 868 (2004). Dep't of Natural Resources Estate, Inc, 687 NW2d 298 (2004).
9 8

7

v v

Carmody-Lahti Carmody-Lahti

Real Real

Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich 109, 129; 683 NW2d 611 MCR 2.116(C)(10). 10

(2004).
10

snowmobile

and

outdoor

recreation

trail.

Defendant,

Carmody-Lahti Real Estate, Inc., purports to own the land underlying the trail in fee simple and claims the legal right to bar public recreational use of the right-of-way. At first blush, then, this case seems to concern land use policy. Moreover, it is a policy question on which both

our federal and state legislatures have spoken: Congress has enacted the National Trails System Act,11 which codifies a federal policy of preserving our nation's rail corridors; the Michigan Legislature has enacted the State

Transportation Preservation Act legislative preference for

in 1976, which declares a dormant railways as

using

recreational trails.12 But the question of how the land ought to be used is not before us. more modest Instead, this appeal presents us with the of discerning the meaning of a late-

task

nineteenth century deed.

In order to determine whether

plaintiff is entitled to the injunctive relief granted on remand by the trial court, we must determine, first,

whether the "right of way" conveyed by the 1873 deed in question is an easement or a fee simple. way is an easement, we must then If the right-ofestablish whether

11 12

16 USC 1241-1249.
MCL 474.51 et seq.
11


plaintiff has exceeded the scope of the easement or has abandoned it. A. RIGHT-OF-WAY
AS

FEE SIMPLE

OR

EASEMENT

Our initial task is to establish the precise contours of the property interest conferred upon Mineral Range

Railroad, plaintiff's predecessor in interest.

According

to plaintiff, the 1873 deed conveyed the land itself to Mineral Range Railroad. Thus, plaintiff argues that, as

Mineral Range's successor in interest, it owns the land described argues, by the 1873 that deed the in fee simple. Defendant only an

however,

deed

transferred

easement--the right to use the land--rather than the land itself. An inquiry into the scope of the interest conferred by a deed such as that at issue here necessarily focuses on the deed's plain language,13 and is guided by the following principles: (1) In construing a deed of conveyance[,] the first and fundamental inquiry must be the intent of the parties as expressed in the language thereof; (2) in arriving at the intent of parties as expressed in the instrument, consideration must be given to the whole [of the deed] and to each and every part of it; (3) no language in the instrument may be needlessly rejected as meaningless, but, if possible, all the language of a deed must be harmonized and construed so as to make all of it meaningful; (4) the only purpose of rules of construction of conveyances
13

Quinn, supra at 150. 12


is to enable the court to reach the probable intent of the parties when it is not otherwise ascertainable.[14] These four principles stand for a relatively simple

proposition: our objective in interpreting a deed is to give effect to the parties' intent as manifested in the language of the instrument. The instrument's granting clauses are a natural The

starting point for discerning the parties' intent.15

deed purports to convey a "right of way" that "consist[s]" of a "strip of land . . . across [the parcels described in the deed]." As we recognized over seventy years ago in

Quinn, a deed granting a right-of-way typically conveys an easement, whereas a deed granting as land itself a fee is or more some

appropriately other estate:

characterized

conveying

Where the grant is not of the land but is merely of the use or of the right of way, or, in

Purlo Corp v 3925 Woodward Avenue, Inc, 341 Mich 483, 487-488; 67 NW2d 684 (1954) (citations omitted). Although it may look at first glance as though the deed grants two separate rights-of-way, the instrument grants only a single right-of-way, one that is positioned slightly differently within the first and second sets of plats described in the deed. The entire right-of-way is measured from a single line surveyed across a series of plats. For the first set of plats, the right-of-way is one hundred feet total in width, measured fifty feet on either side of the survey line. For the second set of plats, the right-of-way is still one hundred feet total in width, but it is measured twenty feet on one side of the surveyed line and eighty feet on the other. 13
15

14

some cases, of the land specifically for a right of way, it is held to convey an easement only. Where the for railroad designation of in fee and not land itself is conveyed, although purposes only, without specific a right of way, the conveyance is of an easement.[16]

Here, the deed's granting clause conveys only a right-ofway. The plain language of the deed, as well as the rule Quinn, therefore indicate rather than a fee

of construction articulated in that the deed conveyed an

easement

simple. Plaintiff relies on Quinn for the proposition that the term "right-of-way" "has two meanings in railroad parlance: the strip of land upon which the track is laid, and the legal right to use such strip."17 The former meaning, in

plaintiff's view, is an estate in real property, whereas the latter--the right to use property--is an easement only.

Quinn, supra at 150-151 (citations omitted). A similar distinction was made in Jones v Van Bochove, 103 Mich 98, 100; 61 NW 342 (1894): We think the court below was correct in holding that the deed conveyed an easement only, and not a fee. It does not purport to convey a strip of land 40 feet wide, etc., but the right of way over a strip 40 feet wide. Cases, undoubtedly, can be found in which the operative words of the grant relate to the land itself; but such construction cannot be given to this deed. Quinn, supra at 150. See also anno: Deed to railroad company as conveying fee or easement, 6 ALR 3d 973 (1966); 65 Am Jur 2d, Railroads,

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