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Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Opinion
DOREEN JOSEPH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, a/k/a A.C.I.A, Defendant-Appellant.

Chief Justice:

Justices:

Robert P. Young, Jr. Michael F. Cavanagh Marilyn Kelly Stephen J. Markman Diane M. Hathaway Mary Beth Kelly Brian K. Zahra

FILED MAY 15, 2012 STATE OF MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT

No. 142615

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH MARY BETH KELLY, J. We granted defendant Auto Club Insurance Association's bypass application for leave to appeal in this case to determine whether the minority/insanity tolling provision of MCL 600.5851(1) applies to toll the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1) of the no-fault act. The one-year-back rule is designed to limit the amount of benefits

recoverable under the no-fault act to those losses occurring no more than one year before an action is brought. Plaintiff here is seeking to recover no-fault benefits for losses dating back 32 years before she brought her action. In denying defendant's motion for

partial summary disposition, the circuit court relied on Univ of Mich Regents v Titan Ins Co 1 to hold that the minority/insanity tolling provision tolls the one-year-back rule. In Regents, this Court held that a saving provision that tolls a statute of limitations also prevents application of the one-year-back rule. Regents overruled Cameron v Auto Club Ins Ass'n 2 and Liptow v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 3 which had held that the saving provisions at issue only tolled a statute of limitations, not statutes limiting damages. We once again hold that the minority/insanity tolling provision, which addresses only when an action may be brought, does not preclude the application of the one-yearback rule, which separately limits the amount of benefits that can be recovered. These distinctions were recognized in Michigan law both in Cameron as well as several decisions of this Court that predate Cameron. Yet this Court's decision in Regents conflated these distinct concepts in order to effectuate what the Regents majority believed was a broader social good served by expanding the right to recover benefits beyond those allowed by law. We recognize the necessity for, and value of, stability in the law and take no pleasure in overruling a precedent of recent vintage by this Court. But Regents itself simply failed to apply our then recent decision in Cameron, resulting in a decision that patently failed to enforce the requirements of the statutes that it interpreted. Because the holding in Regents contravened the Legislature's clear and unambiguous language in MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL 600.5851(1), Regents is overruled and we reinstate
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Univ of Mich Regents v Titan Ins Co, 487 Mich 289; 791 NW2d 897 (2010). Cameron v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 476 Mich 55; 718 NW2d 784 (2006). Liptow v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 272 Mich App 544; 726 NW2d 442 (2006).

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Cameron. Accordingly, we remand this case to the circuit court for entry of an order granting defendant's motion for partial summary disposition on the basis of the one-yearback rule. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In June 1977, then 17-year-old plaintiff, Doreen Joseph, was involved in an automobile accident in which she suffered traumatic brain injury and quadriplegia. At the time of the accident, plaintiff had automobile insurance coverage through the Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, defendant's predecessor. Defendant later

assumed responsibility for paying plaintiff's personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits. Since the date of plaintiff's injury, defendant has paid more than $4 million in PIP benefits for plaintiff's care. On February 27, 2009, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking additional PIP benefits for allegedly unpaid case-management services provided by plaintiff's family members. The period for which plaintiff seeks recovery dates back to the date of plaintiff's accident in 1977. Defendant moved for partial summary disposition pursuant to MCR

2.116(C)(10), arguing that the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1) barred plaintiff's claim with respect to benefits sought for any period more than one year before the February 27, 2009, commencement date of plaintiff's action. Plaintiff responded that her "insanity" over the past 32 years had operated to toll the one-year-back rule pursuant to the minority/insanity tolling provision of MCL 600.5851(1). 4
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The circuit court held that there exists a question of fact regarding whether plaintiff is "insane" for purposes of MCL 600.5851(1). That determination is not at issue in this appeal.

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The circuit court denied defendant's motion for partial summary disposition, citing Regents for the proposition that the minority/insanity tolling provision tolls the one-yearback rule and, thus, if plaintiff is determined to be "insane," her recovery will not be limited to the year immediately preceding the filing of her complaint. Defendant filed an interlocutory application for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals and then filed a bypass application for leave to appeal in this Court, arguing that the minority/insanity tolling provision does not apply to the one-year-back rule and that Regents was wrongly decided. We entered orders staying the circuit court proceedings 5 and granting

defendant's bypass application to consider whether Regents was correctly decided. 6 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court reviews de novo a circuit court's decision whether to grant or deny summary disposition. 7 Similarly, we review de novo issues of statutory interpretation as questions of law. 8 Our primary goal when interpreting statutes is to discern the intent of the Legislature. 9 To do so, we focus on the best indicator of that intent, the language of the statute itself. 10 The words used by the Legislature are given their common and

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Joseph v ACIA, 802 NW2d 351 (Mich, 2011). Joseph v ACIA, 489 Mich 924 (2011).

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Nastal v Henderson & Assoc Investigations, Inc, 471 Mich 712, 720; 691 NW2d 1 (2005). Id. Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d 686 (2001). Id.

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ordinary meaning. 11 If the statutory language is unambiguous, we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning that it clearly expressed, and further construction is neither required nor permitted. 12 Defendant moved for partial summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). Because a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint, the circuit court must consider the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. 13 If the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 14

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MCL 8.3a; Veenstra v Washtenaw Country Club, 466 Mich 155, 160; 645 NW2d 643 (2002). Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999). Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).

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MCR 2.116(C)(10) and (G)(4); Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996).

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III. ANALYSIS A. THE ONE-YEAR-BACK RULE AND THE MINORITY/INSANITY TOLLING PROVISION This case requires that we again interpret the limitations on recovery of PIP benefits set forth in the no-fault act. The relevant statutory provision of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3145(1), provides in pertinent part: An action for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits payable under this chapter for accidental bodily injury may not be commenced later than 1 year after the date of the accident causing the injury unless written notice of injury as provided herein has been given to the insurer within 1 year after the accident or unless the insurer has previously made a payment of personal protection insurance benefits for the injury. If the notice has been given or a payment has been made, the action may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent allowable expense, work loss or survivor's loss has been incurred. However, the claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced.[15] As early as 1984, this Court explained that this statutory provision contains separate and distinct limitations periods that relate both to the timing in which an action may be brought and the damages that may be recovered. 16 Specifically, we have noted that MCL 500.3145(1) contains two limitations on the time for filing suit and one limitation on the period for which benefits may be recovered: "(1) An action for personal protection insurance [PIP] benefits must be commenced not later than one year after the date of accident, unless the
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Emphasis added. Welton v Carriers Ins Co, 421 Mich 571, 576; 365 NW2d 170 (1984).

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insured gives written notice of injury or the insurer previously paid [PIP] benefits for the injury. "(2) If notice has been given or payment has been made, the action may be commenced at any time within one year after the most recent loss was incurred. "(3) Recovery is limited to losses incurred during the one year preceding commencement of the action."[17] Accordingly, a person filing a claim for PIP benefits must do so within a year of the accident unless the insured gives written notice of injury or previously received PIP benefits from the insurer. If notice was given or payment was made, the action can be commenced within one year of the most recent loss. In any case, though, recovery is limited only to losses that have been incurred during the year before the filing of the action. The final limitation provided in MCL 500.3145(1) is the limitation on damages known as the one-year-back rule. In Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, we discussed the significance of the legislative distinction between statutes of limitations and provisions that limit damages, noting that although a no-fault action to recover PIP benefits may be filed more than one year after the accident and more than one year after a particular loss has been incurred (provided that notice of injury has been given to the insurer or the insurer has previously paid PIP benefits for the injury),

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Michigan Law