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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS


FREDERICK MANNING and LINDA MANNING, Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v CITY OF EAST TAWAS, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, and BLINDA A. BAKER, Defendant-Appellee.

UNPUBLISHED January 22, 1999

No. 202143 Iosco Circuit Court LC No. 95-009300 NZ

Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Doctoroff and O'Connell, JJ. PER CURIAM. Plaintiffs appeal as of right, and defendant City of East Tawas (the City) cross-appeals, from an order granting summary disposition in favor of the City on plaintiffs' due process claims based on the ripeness doctrine as set forth in Paragon Properties Co v Novi, 452 Mich 568; 550 NW2d 772 (1996). The parties also challenge prior orders entered in connection with their motions for summary disposition. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. This action stems from plaintiffs' proposal to build a recreational vehicle park within the City under the planned unit development (PUD) article of the City's zoning ordinance. The City's planning commission recommended to the city council that plaintiffs' PUD application and site plan be approved, with conditions. The city council denied the request. On August 29, 1994, plaintiffs attempted to bring the matter before the City's Zoning Board of Appeals, but the request for hearing was denied for procedural reasons. Plaintiffs then filed the instant action in the circuit court against the City and its clerk, Blinda Baker, alleging a deprivation of due process and requesting equitable relief, damages, and a writ of mandamus. Defendants filed a joint motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4), on the ground that plaintiffs could not invoke the circuit court's jurisdiction in its appellate capacity

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because they did not timely file an appeal to the circuit court from the city council's decision. The trial court denied the motion based on representations by plaintiffs' attorney that plaintiffs were raising only constitutional issues. Plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint with three constitutional due process counts and a count pursuant to the Michigan antitrust reform act (MARA), MCL 445.771 et seq.; MSA 28.70(1) et seq. The amended complaint neither named Baker as a defendant nor sought a writ of mandamus. The City moved for summary disposition of the three constitutional counts under MCR 2.116(C)(10), while plaintiffs sought judgment in their favor under MCR 2.116(I)(2). The trial court determined that there were disputed issues of material fact and thus denied the motions. The City then moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4), asserting that the claims were not ripe for judicial consideration, and the trial court granted the motion for all three counts. I. Ripeness Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition in favor of the City under the ripeness doctrine and, alternatively, that the City is barred by its own conduct or that of its representatives from arguing that plaintiffs did not receive a final decision from the City. We decline to consider the latter argument because plaintiffs failed to brief that argument or otherwise cite authority for the proposition that it is material to the ripeness doctrine. A party may not merely state a position and then leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for the claim. In re Hamlet (After Remand), 225 Mich App 505, 521; 571 NW2d 750 (1997); In re Toler, 193 Mich App 474, 477; 484 NW2d 672 (1992). Accordingly, we will confine our review to the question whether plaintiffs' due process counts were ripe for judicial consideration. Our review is de novo. Walker v Johnson & Johnson Vision Products, Inc, 217 Mich App 705, 708; 552 NW2d 679 (1996). When reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4), this Court "must determine whether the pleadings demonstrate that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law or whether the affidavits and other proofs show that there was no genuine issue of material fact." Walker, supra at 708. A citizen's right to due process of law when facing certain kinds of adverse action at the hands of the state or one of its subdivisions is guaranteed under both the federal and state constitutions. US Const, Am XIV,

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