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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS


In the Matter of APRYL MARIE KATHLEEN NELSON, Minor.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY, Petitioner-Appellee, v MAYNARD NELSON, ARDITO and WENDY SUE

UNPUBLISHED January 7, 2000

No. 214364; 214856 Oakland Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 95-059203 NA

Respondents-Appellants.

Before: Gribbs, P.J., and Murphy and Griffin, JJ. PER CURIAM. In these consolidated appeals, respondents appeal as of right an order terminating their parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i) and (g). We affirm. The proceedings in this case date back to early 1995, when the minor child was removed from respondent Nelson's home in response to abusive conduct on the part of respondent Ardito and the unsuitable condition of the home. Between then and the order of termination in September 1998, there were several proceedings, and respondents and the child availed themselves of many services. However, a petition for termination of respondents' parental rights was ultimately filed. As amended, the petition alleged that respondents had substantially failed to fulfill the conditions of their parent-agency agreements and requested termination of respondents' parental rights for the reasons that a condition leading to the original adjudication remained: respondents could not provide proper care and custody and the situation could not be rectified within a reasonable period of time considering the age of the child. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i) and (g).

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After a trial court finds, on clear and convincing evidence, that at least one statutory basis for termination exists, termination is mandatory unless the court finds that termination is clearly not in the child's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Hall-Smith, 222 Mich App 470, 472; 564 NW2d 156 (1997). The trial court's nondiscretionary decision regarding termination is reviewed in its entirety for clear error. Id. The burden of coming forward with evidence that termination is clearly not in the child's best interests is on the respondent. In re Hamlet (After Remand), 225 Mich App 505, 522; 571 NW2d 750 (1997). I
Docket No. 214364
Respondent Nelson raises several issues on appeal. She first contends that the trial court failed to issue adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its decision to terminate respondent's parental rights. We disagree. The procedural sufficiency of a trial court's findings presents a question of law which this Court reviews de novo. People v Melotik , 221 Mich App 190, 198; 561 NW2d 453 (1997). Respondent argues that the lack of statutory citations in both the written opinion of the trial court and the order of termination constitutes a deficiency requiring remand. Respondent cites MCR 5.974(G)(3), which provides that "[a]n order terminating parental rights under the juvenile code may not be entered unless the court makes findings of fact, states its conclusions of law, and includes the statutory basis for the order." However, the rule does not require that the statutory basis for the order be included within the written utterances of the court. That being the case, a court's statements on the record should suffice. In this instance, the trial court indicated in its statements from the bench that it found the statutory bases for termination met under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii) and (g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(ii) and (g), these paralleling the petition on which the court acted. The prosecutor then sought some clarification, observing that the court's statements indicated a finding under

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