Preview:

Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 48909 _____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice Justices

Maura D. Cor rigan

Opinion
In re HON. CHRISTOPHER BROWN (AFTER REMAND)
Judge of the Fiftieth District Court,
Pontiac, Michigan.

Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Clifford W. Taylor Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

FILED MAY 30, 2001


No. 111840


_________________________________ PER CURIAM
This judicial disciplinary matter is before this Court
after remand to the Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) to
determine whether statements made by respondent following an
automobile accident resulted in judicial misconduct that was
clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice. In In


re Brown, 461 Mich 1291 (2000), this Court set forth several
factors that were among the criteria to be used in evaluating
judicial discipline cases. We then remanded the present


matter to the JTC for an application of the suggested factors
to the facts of this case. supplemental decision and The JTC, in a June 23, 2000
recommendation, found that


respondent was "attempting to use the prestige of [his] office
to gain a personal advantage" and, thus, recommended a


sanction of suspension from the discharge of all judicial and
administrative duties without pay for a period of fifteen
days. Upon review, we hereby adopt the JTC's recommended


sanction of suspension from the discharge of all judicial and
administrative duties without pay for a period of fifteen
days.
I
These proceedings arise out of statements made by 50th
District Court Judge Christopher C. Brown, respondent,


following an automobile accident involving respondent and
another driver. The JTC filed a complaint and an evidentiary


hearing was held. Following the hearing, the master concluded
in a report that respondent did not abuse his office. The


JTC's examiner then filed written objections to the report
with the JTC. of fact:
(1) Respondent, at all times hereinafter mentioned, was
a Judge of the 50th District Court in the City of Pontiac,
County of Oakland, State of Michigan.
On review, the JTC made the following findings


2


(2) Respondent was involved in an automobile accident
with Sue Lambouris on April 26, 1996.
(3) The Pontiac Police Department was notified of the
accident, and that officers Darryl Cosby and Craig Pesco
responded to the location of the accident.
(4) Respondent knew police officer Darryl Cosby.
(5) Respondent told the police officers that Sue


Lambouris was speeding.

Specifically, Respondent stated that


Mrs. Lambouris was "doing 85 miles per hour."
(6) Respondent requested that Mrs. Lambouris' name be
"run on L.E.I.N. [Law Enforcement Information Network] and
ticketed."
On the basis of its findings of fact, which we adopt for
purposes of this per curiam opinion, the JTC determined that
respondent was "attempting to use the prestige of [his] office
to gain a personal advantage" and that such conduct was
"clearly prejudicial" to the administration of justice in
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons 1, 2A, 2B
and 2C. The JTC then recommended that respondent be suspended
from the discharge of all judicial and administrative duties
without pay for fifteen days.
Upon review of the JTC's decision and recommendation,
this Court remanded this matter to the JTC for the


"articulation of standards of judicial discipline, and for the


3


application of those standards to the instant case." Brown, supra.

In re


As we stated in that case, the development of


standards by the JTC will better enable the JTC to respond to
"equivalent cases in an equivalent manner." Furthermore, the


application of standards by the JTC will allow this Court to
more meaningfully review the JTC's disciplinary


recommendations.

In Brown, supra, we articulated several


factors that were among the criteria to be used in evaluating
judicial discipline cases. follows:
(1) misconduct that is part of a pattern or
practice is more serious than an isolated instance
of misconduct;
(2) misconduct on the bench is usually more
serious than the same misconduct off the bench;
(3) misconduct that is prejudicial to the
actual administration of justice is more serious
than misconduct that is prejudicial only to the
appearance propriety;
(4) misconduct that does not implicate the
actual administration of justice, or its appearance
of impropriety, is less serious than misconduct
that does;
(5) misconduct that occurs spontaneously is
less serious than misconduct that is premeditated
or deliberated;
(6) misconduct that undermines the ability of
the justice system to discover the truth of what
occurred in a legal controversy, or to reach the
most just result in such a case, is more serious
than misconduct that merely delays such discovery;
(7) misconduct that 4
involves the unequal
The recommended factors are as


application of justice on the basis of such
considerations as race, color, ethnic background,
gender, or religion are more serious than breaches
of justice that do not disparage the integrity of
the system on the basis of a class of citizenship.
[461 Mich 1292-1293.]
After remand, the JTC filed a supplemental


recommendation.

In this recommendation, the JTC determined


that respondent was "attempting to use the prestige of [his]
office to gain a personal advantage." Consequently, the JTC


again recommended that this Court suspend respondent from the
discharge of all judicial and administrative duties for a
period of fifteen days. The JTC, however, did not expressly


apply the recommended factors as set forth in In re Brown for
the reason that its membership had changed between the


original recommendation and the remand.

Therefore, before we


"adopt, reject, or modify" the JTC's recommended discipline,
we will engage in a brief analysis of the Brown factors as
applied to Judge Brown himself.
II
Upon review, we conclude that factors 1, 2, 4, and 5 are
relevant to this case. In particular, factors 1 and 4 support
the JTC's recommended discipline of respondent. Pursuant to


factor 1, we find that respondent's conduct was part of a
pattern or practice of misconduct rather than an isolated
instance of misconduct. As the JTC stated in its


recommendation for discipline, respondent had been admonished
5


by the JTC on four prior occasions for acts of misconduct.1
Additionally, pursuant to factor 4, respondent's conduct


implicated the appearance of impropriety.

The record shows


that respondent knew one of the investigating officers who
arrived at the scene. with respondent's This existing relationship, coupled
direction to the officer


attempted

concerning the type of investigation that he should conduct
with regard to the other driver, gave rise to an appearance of
impropriety and had the potential to erode the public's
confidence in the judiciary.2


Even if the dissent is correct that respondent's
behavior is not properly characterized as part of a "pattern
or practice" of misconduct, there is nothing at all
inappropriate in the JTC taking into consideration in its
proportionality decisions altogether unrelated instances of
misconduct.
We do not disagree with the dissent's characterization
of the rules of conduct with regard to "judge-victims." Post
at 7. However, unlike the dissent, we believe that
respondent's conduct went well beyond a mere "report[ing] the
underlying facts involved in the crime." Post at 4. Rather,
in this case, the respondent directed the officer to take two
very specific actions: (a) run Ms. Lambouris' name through the
LEIN system, and (b) issue Ms. Lambouris a ticket. Though a
fine line cannot always be drawn in these matters, the
respondent's direction to the officer, in our judgment, was
not in the nature of a mere call to investigation, it was not
simply a spontaneous expression of anger or pique, and it was
more than a generalized call to the officer to do something
about an unfortunate situation. Rather, when made to an
officer who was aware of respondent's judicial status, such
direction, in our opinion, invoked respondent's judicial
status in an inappropriate manner.
6

2

1

On the other hand, factors 2 and 5 mitigate against
increasing respondent's sanction. Pursuant to factor 2, it is
important to highlight that the misconduct at issue arose out
of statements made pursuant to an automobile accident. The


misconduct did not occur while respondent was on the bench.
Additionally, pursuant to factor 5, the remarks made by
respondent appear to have been made spontaneously and under at
least some stress, with respondent having just been involved
in an automobile accident. When the police officers arrived,


respondent told the officers that Mrs. Lambouris was speeding
at eighty-five miles an hour. With regard to this remark, the
JTC found that "[r]espondent knowingly made a false


statement."

However, pursuant to the circumstances of this


case, this Court concludes that this remark was merely a
speculation concerning the rate of speed of the other driver.
Concerning respondent's request that the officers search Mrs.
Lambouris' name in the LEIN system and ticket her, we reach
the same conclusion. reaction in Respondent's the remark was merely of a
an


spontaneous

immediate

aftermath

automobile accident.

After weighing the above factors, and


applying them to the circumstances of this case, we believe
that respondent's past disciplinary indiscretions, as well as
the appearance of impropriety that resulted from respondent's
statements to the police officers, one of whom he knew,


7


regarding the type of investigation that the officers should
engage in was sufficient misconduct to warrant the adoption of
the JTC's recommendation of discipline. Thus, we hold that


respondent be suspended from the discharge of all judicial and
administrative duties without pay for a period of fifteen
days.
Pursuant to MCR 7.317(C)(3), the Clerk is directed to
issue the judgment order forthwith.
CAVANAGH , concurred.
WEAVER , KELLY , TAYLOR , YOUNG , and MARKMAN , JJ.,


8


S T A T E

O F

M I C H I G A N


SUPREME COURT


In re HON. CHRISTOPHER BROWN (AFTER REMAND)
Judge of the Fiftieth District Court,
Pontiac, Michigan. _________________________________ CORRIGAN, C.J. (dissenting).


No. 111840


I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to
suspend respondent for fifteen days for certain statements he
made in the aftermath of an automobile accident. I would hold
that respondent's actions, while certainly not exemplary, did
not constitute judicial misconduct because his conduct was not
clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice.
I
These proceedings arise from a car accident involving
respondent and another driver in Pontiac. Pontiac police


officers responded to a call for assistance and investigated.
Respondent told an officer with whom he was acquainted that
the other driver had been traveling at eighty-five miles an
hour. He then requested that the officer run the other


driver's name on the Law Enforcement Information Network
(LEIN), and urged the officer to ticket the other driver. The
officer did not, however, issue a ticket. The owner of the


other car later brought an action in 50th District Court to
recover his insurance deductible.
The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) complaint alleged
misconduct arising from (1) respondent's conduct at the


accident scene, (2) respondent's transfer of the district
court action to another judge, and (3) respondent's conduct
during the hearing on the district court lawsuit. The


complaint also alleged misconduct arising from respondent's
conduct during an unrelated criminal case and his unrelated
actions in presiding over uncontested and default matters
involving his court officer.
At the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing, the master
determined that the examiner failed to establish judicial
impropriety and that respondent did not violate the code of
judicial conduct, court rules, or the constitution. The


master found that respondent "informed the officers of [the
other driver's] excessive speed (the testimony varies between
85 and 50 miles per hour) and . . . stated his desire to have
[the other driver] run on a lien [sic] machine and ticketed
. . . ." The master further found that reason existed to


believe that the other driver had been speeding, although the
evidence did not support respondent's claim that the car had
been traveling at eighty-five miles an hour. The master


characterized respondent's statement that the other car was


2


traveling "85 miles per hour" as a "hyperbolic exaggeration
and not a deliberate falsification, similar perhaps to
The
the


claiming that `she was going like a bat out of Hell.'" master rejected all the remaining allegations in

complaint.
The JTC affirmed the master's finding that respondent
made the statements at the accident scene, but rejected the
master's conclusion that respondent had not abused the


prestige of his office.

The JTC found that respondent's


conduct violated Canons 1 and 2(A)-(C) of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.3
1

It found that respondent's conduct constituted


Canon 1 provides in part that participate in establishing, maintaining, should personally observe, high standards the integrity and independence of the preserved."
Canon 2(A)-(C) provides:


"[a] judge should
and enforcing, and
of conduct so that
judiciary may be


A. Public confidence in the judiciary is
eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by
judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and
appearance of impropriety. A judge must expect to
be the subject of constant public scrutiny. A
judge must therefore accept restrictions on conduct
that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen and should do so freely and willingly.
B. A judge should respect and observe the
At all times, the conduct and manner of a
law. judge should promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
Without regard to a person's race, gender, or other
protected personal characteristic, a judge should
(continued...)
3


misconduct

under

MCR

9.205(C)(4)

because

it

was

clearly


prejudicial to the administration of justice. The JTC adopted
the master's findings and conclusions regarding the other
allegations of misconduct. It recommended that this Court


suspend respondent for fifteen days.
II
In this case, the JTC recommends discipline solely on the
basis of respondent's conduct at the accident scene. Thus,


while the complaint certainly alleged other misconduct, I have
confined my review solely to judicial misconduct arising from
respondent's statements to the investigating officers because
this Court may discipline a judge only "[o]n recommendation of
the judicial tenure commission." Const 1963, art 6,

Download IN RE CHRISTOPHER C BROWN.pdf

Michigan Law