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STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of J.S.C. and R.C. III, Minors.

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Appellee, v ROBERTO COLON II, Respondent-Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED April 13, 2010

No. 293845 Oakland Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 04-688108-NA

Before: JANSEN, P.J., and CAVANAGH and K. F. KELLY, JJ. PER CURIAM. Respondent appeals by right the trial court order terminating his parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm. The trial court did not clearly err in finding that statutory grounds existed to terminate respondent's parental rights. On appeal from termination of parental rights proceedings, this Court reviews the trial court's findings under the clearly erroneous standard. MCR 3.977(J); In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met by clear and convincing evidence. In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991). There was clear and convincing evidence to support all three statutory grounds for termination. At the adjudication, respondent was incarcerated. At the termination hearing, respondent was again incarcerated, albeit for the lesser crime of violating the curfew imposed as part of his parole. Regardless of the crime, his incarceration prevented respondent from completing or complying with the requirements of the parent/agency agreement. Despite early progress, after two years of services and opportunities, respondent was essentially in the same position as when this proceeding began. Failure to comply with the requirements of the parent/agency agreement is evidence of respondent's failure to provide proper care and custody for the children. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 214; 661 NW2d 216 (2003); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 360-363; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). He had not obtained employment and refused to accept several offers of steady employment because he did not "like" the jobs offered. Thus, he turned down opportunities for steady income, required in order to provide proper care and custody for -1-

his children. Respondent demonstrated that he did not benefit from the programs and services offered to him when he reverted to his criminal lifestyle and used cocaine, absconded from parole, drove a car without permission, and stayed out after his curfew. Finally, the fact that respondent had no history of child abuse was not sufficient to conclude that his children would not be harmed if returned to his care. Respondent demonstrated that he could not take care of himself, let alone two minor children. His willful disregard for the rules of his parole resulted in a return to prison at the time of the termination hearing. Respondent's conduct supported the court's conclusion that there was a reasonable likelihood that the children would be harmed if placed in respondent's care. Respondent contends that he was denied his due process rights because the DHS and the court failed to provide him with an initial service plan. Respondent's failure to preserve this issue for appeal by an objection in the trial court requires him to demonstrate plain error that affected his substantial rights. See People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Respondent bases his due process argument on In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 95-96; 763 NW2d 587 (2009), where the court held, in pertinent part, "Within 30 days of the child's placement, and before the court may enter an order of disposition in a proceeding under

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