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STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED March 3, 2011 In the Matter of WOOD, Minor. No. 298794 Kent Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 09-052088-NA

Before: MURPHY, P.J., and MURRAY and SHAPIRO, JJ. PER CURIAM. Respondent appeals as of right from an order that terminated his parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g). The child's mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights and is not participating in this appeal. We affirm because the trial court did not clearly err in finding that statutory grounds for termination of respondent's parental rights were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(K); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 355; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). The minor child was removed from her mother's care in June 2009 after it was discovered that she had been sexually abused by her mother's boyfriend for a number of years. Respondent was incarcerated at the time. Although the Department of Human Services (DHS) proceeded directly with terminating the mother's parental rights, the agency indicated a desire to work with respondent in the event that he would be released within a reasonable amount of time and be able to demonstrate an ability to care for his daughter. Unfortunately, respondent was unable to avail himself of the limited programs offered at the Florence Crane Facility. However, contrary to respondent's assertions, the trial court's decision to terminate his parental rights was not based exclusively on his status as a prisoner; rather, it was clear that respondent was not in a position to care for the child and would not be able to do so within a reasonable amount of time. Respondent spent most of the child's life in prison. Respondent re-offended on March 26, 2008, and was sentenced to a minimum of two years' imprisonment on November 6, 2008. His earliest discharge date was November 2010 and his maximum discharge date was 2034. By his own admission, respondent saw the child a total of "approximately seven, eight, nine, ten times, something like that" during the child's ten years of life. Respondent was released on parole November 9, 2010. Nevertheless, at the time of the termination hearing, there was no evidence that respondent would, in fact, be released at that time. At the time of the termination hearing, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that respondent's possible release some six months later was simply too much time for the child to wait. Respondent would not be able to provide for the child immediately upon his release. Rather he would have to demonstrate -1-

stability for a minimum of six months. This was not an arbitrary time constraint that the trial court made up. Kristin Jelsma from Bethany Services testified that the agency would not even consider placing the child with respondent until he demonstrated stability for at least that amount of time. Respondent's release would entail more than a search for housing and employment, as respondent also had an admitted history of substance abuse and psychological problems. Respondent would need counseling and assessments, and even more importantly, he had a virtually non-existent relationship with his daughter, whom he saw only a number of times during her life. Six months was a generous calculation under the circumstances. Respondent even admitted that he would not be in a position to care for the child upon his release. The following exchange took place between the prosecutor and respondent: Q. Just a couple more questions. You stated you just want to be able to visit

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