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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS


SARAH HANDELSMAN, a Legally Incapacitated Person, SARAH HANDELSMAN TRUST, and ZELIG HANDELSMAN TRUST.

COMERICA BANK, Petitioner-Appellee, v FRANCES GOLDMAN, Respondent-Appellant and ROCHELLE SCHULTZ AND LOWELL SCHULTZ, Respondents-Appellees.

FOR PUBLICATION May 19, 2005 9:00 a.m. No. 252205 Oakland Probate Court LC No. 95-245762-GD

Official Reported Version

Before: O'Connell, P.J., and Markey and Talbot, JJ. PER CURIAM. Respondent Frances Goldman appeals by right an order granting partial summary disposition for petitioner. MCR 7.203(A)(2); MCR 5.801(B)(1). This appeal arises from a protracted dispute between two sisters, daughters of the late Sarah "Sally" Handelsman (Handelsman). Respondent Goldman is one of the sisters; the other, Rochelle Schultz, is married to Lowell Schultz. We hold the trial court did not err in granting partial summary disposition because there was no genuine issue of material fact to decide at trial. We also hold that a gift of the right to receive rents is not a conveyance of an interest in land to which the statute of frauds applies. MCL 566.106. Petitioner, the successor trustee of the Sarah Handelsman Trust, and formerly Handelsman's conservator, moved under MCR 2.116(C)(10) to have the court find that Handelsman gave to Lowell Schultz, as a gift, the right to collect and keep all the rents from the

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second floor of a two-story commercial building that two Handelsman family trusts owned equally. Petitioner claimed that Handelsman gave Lowell Schultz the right to receive the upstairs rents in 1985, before she was found to be incompetent in 1995. Respondent opposed the motion, arguing that (1) whether Handelsman intended the transfer of the "upstairs rents" as a gift remained a genuine issue of material fact for trial, and (2) that the purported gift was void under the statute of frauds because it involved the transfer of an interest in real property without a writing signed by the donor. The trial court ruled that the statute of frauds did not apply and granted petitioner's motion because respondent failed to produce evidence to refute petitioner's evidence that Handelsman intended a gift to Schultz. This Court reviews de novo the grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition to determine if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). Whether the statute of frauds applies to the alleged gift presents a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Forge v Smith, 458 Mich 198, 204; 580 NW2d 876 (1998); Zander v Ogihara Corp, 213 Mich App 438, 441; 540 NW2d 702 (1995). We conclude that the trial court did not err in granting partial summary disposition for petitioner because respondent failed to proffer any admissible evidence in support of her claim that Handelsman did not make a gift of the upstairs rents to her son-in-law. We also find that the trial court correctly determined that the statute of frauds did not apply. A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a claim. Corley v Detroit Bd of Ed, 470 Mich 274, 278; 681 NW2d 342 (2004). The purpose of such a motion is to avoid extended discovery and an evidentiary hearing when a case can be quickly resolved as a matter of law. Shepherd Montessori Ctr Milan v Ann Arbor Charter Twp, 259 Mich App 315, 324; 675 NW2d 271 (2003). The moving party must specifically identify the undisputed factual issues, MCR 2.116(G)(4), Maiden, supra at 120, and support its position with affidavits, depositions, admissions, or documentary evidence, MCR 2.116(G)(3)(b); Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 455; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). Here, petitioner submitted two items of evidence to show that Handelsman made a gift of the upstairs rents to her son-in-law, an affidavit by a Comerica trust department employee and the deposition of the attorney who drew up the Sarah Handelsman Trust agreement. If the moving party carries its initial burden, the party opposing the motion must then demonstrate with admissible evidence that a genuine and material issue of disputed fact exists, otherwise summary disposition is properly granted. MCR 2.116(G)(4); Smith, supra at 455 n 2. We evaluate the trial court's decision on petitioner's motion "by considering the substantively admissible evidence actually proffered in opposition to the motion. A reviewing court may not employ a standard citing the mere possibility that the claim might be supported by evidence produced at trial. A mere promise is insufficient under our court rules." Maiden, supra at 121. In opposing petitioner's motion, respondent attacked the credibility of petitioner's evidence. In addition, respondent argued that (1) Lowell Schultz referred to the management of the upstairs as "his business" in a prior, uncompleted proceeding; (2) that when Handelsman's trust was restated in 1993 there was no mention of the gift to Schultz; (3) that there is nothing to reflect that a gift was intended; (4) that petitioner's employees had been inconsistent in how it characterized the transaction; (5) that no gift tax return was ever filed; (6) that "it seems

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inconceivable that those people all together would have allowed a gift to go improperly treated over all of these years"; and (7) that Handelsman never substantiated the gift in writing. Respondent also argued that the substance of Lowell Schultz's prior testimony would be admissible at trial even though it was inadmissible at the time of the motion because petitioner did not have the opportunity to cross-examine Schultz. MRE 804(b)(1). Respondent additionally argued that the trial court erred by discounting or ignoring Comerica's contradictory treatment of the upstairs rents, Mr. Schultz's prior testimony, and pleadings Mrs. Schultz filed that the arrangement was compensatory. When reviewing submitted documentary evidence on a C(10) motion, the trial court must consider it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Maiden, supra at 120. Further, a trial court may not make findings of fact or weigh credibility in deciding a motion for summary disposition. Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 161; 516 NW2d 475 (1994). Moreover, this Court will be liberal in finding a genuine issue of material fact that requires a trial to resolve. Lash v Allstate Ins Co, 210 Mich App 98, 101; 532 NW2d 869 (1995). Nevertheless, when the party opposing the motion fails to present evidence to establish an issue of material fact, summary disposition is appropriate. Smith, supra at 455 n 2; Porter v Royal Oak, 214 Mich App 478, 484; 542 NW2d 905 (1995). In Davidson v Bugbee, 227 Mich App 264, 268; 575 NW2d 574 (1997) this Court set forth the elements of a valid gift: In order for a gift to be valid, three elements must be satisfied: (1) the donor must possess the intent to transfer title gratuitously to the donee, (2) there must be actual or constructive delivery of the subject matter to the donee, unless it is already in the donee's possession, and (3) the donee must accept the gift. Acceptance is presumed if the gift is beneficial to the donee. [Citations omitted.] Respondent conceded that the upstairs rents were delivered to and accepted by Schulz, leaving as the only material issue of fact whether Handelsman intended to transfer the upstairs rents gratuitously to Mr. Schulz. Respondent attacked the credibility and consistency of petitioner's witnesses because of bias and because petitioner gave a contrary position regarding part of the upstairs rents in a prior proceeding, i.e., that the rents were in part compensatory for management services. But, the critical issue here is not how others viewed the situation; rather it is what Handelsman intended. In that regard, it was undisputed that dating back to 1985 Handelsman wanted Lowell Schultz to have the upstairs rents. Further, although Handelsman also expressed a desire that Lowell be involved in the management of the building, there was no evidence that Handelsman considered the rents as compensatory. Respondent offered no evidence of her own--as opposed to evidence attacking petitioner's evidence or credibility--to support her claim that Handelsman did not intend to give the rents to Schultz. Respondent's arguments--such as about petitioner's motives, the failure to file gift tax returns, etc.--provided no evidence of Handelsman's intent in 1985 when she allowed Schultz to begin collecting and keeping the upstairs rents. In sum, respondent failed to submit to the trial court any independent evidence that Handelsman did not intend that the upstairs rents be a gift to her son-in-law, Lowell Schultz.

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We recognize that summary disposition is rarely appropriate in cases involving questions of credibility, intent, or state of mind. Michigan Nat'l Bank-Oakland v Wheeling, 165 Mich App 738, 744-745; 419 NW2d 746 (1988). Even so, our review de novo of the record convinces us that, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to respondent, reasonable minds could not differ and would find that Handelsman intended the upstairs rents as a gift to Schultz. West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). Accordingly, the trial court did not err by granting partial summary disposition for petitioner. Respondent next argued that Handelsman's gift to Schultz of the upstairs rents is void under the statute of frauds, which provides: No estate or interest in lands, other than leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning lands, or in any manner relating thereto, shall hereafter be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared, unless by act or operation of law, or by a deed or conveyance in writing, subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by some person thereunto by him lawfully authorized by writing. [MCL 566.106.] Respondent cited Brooks v Gillow, 352 Mich 189, 195; 89 NW2d 457 (1958), for the proposition that the statute applies to oral gifts of an interest in real estate. In Brooks, the Court held that the statute of frauds applied to a purported oral gift of a vendor's interest in a land contract. The claimant argued that, under the doctrine of equitable conversion, the vendor's interest in the land contract was personal property and the gift was completed by delivery and acceptance of the contract. See Charter Twp of Pittsfield v City of Saline, 103 Mich App 99, 103; 302 NW2d 608 (1981), quoting 77 Am Jur 2d, Vendor and Purchaser,

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