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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS


In the Matter of TROY DENNEY, LAURA DENNEY, and ASHLEY DENNEY, Minors.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY, Petitioner-Appellee, v TROY DENNEY, JR., Respondent-Appellant, and MISSINA BUTT, Respondent.

UNPUBLISHED January 7, 2000

No. 217824 Ogemaw Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 96-010295 NA

Before: Talbot, P.J., and Gribbs and Meter, JJ. PER CURIAM. Respondent appeals by right from an order terminating his parental rights to three minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i) and (g).1 We affirm. Respondent first argues that the trial court violated MCR 5.974(E)(1) by basing its termination decision, in part, on hearsay evidence. MCR 5.974(E)(1) indicates that a factual finding of parental unfitness resulting from "circumstances new or different from the offense that led the court to take jurisdiction" must be based on "[l]egally admissible evidence." Respondent argues that because the "the offense that led the court to take jurisdiction" in this case was physical abuse against his daughter, only "acts of abuse, or therapy" could be proven with hearsay evidence. Respondent contends that the trial court violated this rule by basing termination, in part, on hearsay evidence of respondent's mental instability and unfit housing environment. We review the trial court's decision to admit the challenged

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evidence for an abuse of discretion. See In re Vasquez, 199 Mich App 44, 50-51; 501 NW2d 231 (1993) (implicitly indicating that a trial court's decision to admit evidence in termination proceedings is reviewed for an abuse of discretion). We disagree that the trial court abused its discretion by considering hearsay evidence of respondent's housing situation and mental state. As indicated in In re Snyder, 223 Mich App 85, 89 91; 566 NW2d 18 (1997), a court is bound by the rules of evidence when considering termination based on "grounds . . . unrelated to the basis on which the probate court initially established jurisdiction over the children . . . ."2 See also MCR 5.974(E)(1). However, when the "basis for the court taking jurisdiction of a child is related to the basis for seeking termination of parental rights," the court need not limit itself to legally admissible evidence when considering termination. Snyder, supra at 89-90. Instead, the court may consider "all relevant and material evidence, . . . even though such evidence may not be admissible at trial." MCR 5.974(F)(2); Snyder, supra at 89-90. Here, the basis for the court taking jurisdiction over the children was indeed related to the basis for seeking the termination of respondent's parental rights. The court took jurisdiction over the children because of physical abuse by respondent against his daughter. The termination decision, too, was based on physical abuse, as evidenced by the court's statement that grounds for termination existed under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i) because "the conditions [i.e., respondent's physical abuse problem] that led to the adjudication [i.e., to the taking of jurisdiction over the children] continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time." The evidence that respondent challenges

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