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Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Opinion
JACQUELYN V. MAGEE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant. _______________________________ PER CURIAM

Chief Justice:

Justices:

Clifford W. Taylor

Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman

FILED MARCH 8, 2005

No. 126219

In this case involving the Civil Rights Act, the Court of Appeals held sex and that age plaintiff's claims and of sexual

harassment,

discrimination,

retaliation

were timely filed, because the lawsuit was brought within three years of the date she resigned her employment with defendant.1 We conclude that plaintiff's claims were not filed

within the limitations period because none of the alleged discriminatory or retaliatory conduct occurred within the

Unpublished memorandum opinion, issued March 2, 2004 (Docket No. 243847).

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three years that preceded the filing of the complaint.

We

therefore reverse that part of the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand of the matter trial to the trial grant court of for

reinstatement

the

court's

summary

disposition to defendant. I Plaintiff Jacquelyn Magee was an hourly production

employee who began work for defendant DaimlerChrysler in 1976. She went on medical leave for emotional distress on

September 12, 1998, and, without first returning to work, resigned her job on February 2, 1999. On February 1, 2002, Magee filed a lawsuit under the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq., claiming that she had been unlawfully of her discriminated twenty-two against at and harassed

during

most

years

DaimlerChrysler.

Magee's complaint lists separate counts for sex harassment based on hostile work environment, sex harassment based on quid pro quo harassment, retaliation, sex discrimination, and age discrimination.2

Magee's complaint also includes a separate count alleging constructive discharge. The trial court dismissed this count, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. Magee did not appeal, and the dismissal of that claim is not before this Court. 2


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In

her

complaint,

Magee

alleges

that

she

suffered

harassment from the 1980s until her last day of work on September 12, 1998, and that her supervisors periodically retaliated against her during this period as a result of her resistance to the harassment. constant harassment caused her Magee alleges that this to leave her job at

DaimlerChrysler on September 12, 1998, and that she decided to resign on February 2, 1999, because she anticipated that the harassment would continue if she returned. DaimlerChrysler moved for summary disposition,

asserting that Magee's February 1, 2002, complaint failed to allege any discriminatory acts after September 12, 1998, and that the complaint was therefore not filed within the three-year period of limitations applicable to Civil Rights Act claims, MCL 600.5805(10). The motion trial court initially denied DaimlerChrysler's to amend her

without

prejudice,

allowing

Magee

complaint to allege harassment or retaliation occurring up to her February 2, 1999, resignation. Magee's amended complaint continued However, because to allege only

harassment and retaliation through September 12, 1998, her last day of work, the trial court granted DaimlerChrysler's motion and dismissed Magee's complaint.

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Magee appealed the trial court's ruling to the Court of Appeals, which relied on this Court's recent decision in Collins v Comerica Bank, 468 Mich 628; 664 NW2d 713 (2003), to reverse the lower court's dismissal of the harassment, retaliation, and discrimination claims. The Court of

Appeals concluded that these claims were timely, because they were filed within three years of the date of Magee's resignation. DaimlerChrysler then sought leave to appeal to this Court. After hearing oral argument from both parties on

the application, this Court has now determined that the Court of Appeals misapplied Collins and erroneously

reinstated Magee's Civil Rights Act claims. II In the absence of disputed facts, whether a cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo. Boyle v Gen Motors Corp, 468 Mich 226, 229-230; 661 NW2d 557 (2003). Likewise, this Court reviews de novo rulings Neal v Wilkes, 470 Mich

on summary disposition motions. 661, 664; 685 NW2d 648 (2004). III

In Collins, supra at 633, this Court held that a cause of action for discriminatory termination does not accrue

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until the date of termination.

The plaintiff employee,

Gwendolyn Collins, was suspended pending an investigation; when the investigation was completed several weeks later, her employment was terminated. Within three years of her

termination, Collins filed a complaint alleging that her termination was the result of race and gender

discrimination. suit was not

The Court of Appeals ruled that Collins's timely under the three-year period of

limitations because her causes of action accrued on the last day that she actually performed employment duties (as opposed disagreed analysis to her with and later the termination Court of date). This Court

Appeals that

last-day-worked a claim for

reversed,

holding

discriminatory discharge cannot arise until a claimant has actually been discharged. Id. Relying on Collins, the Court of Appeals in this case reasoned that Magee's claim also accrued on her termination date as opposed to her last day of work. The Court

acknowledged that Magee resigned, and was not terminated. But it found significant that "her last day of work was followed by a period in which she was on a medical leave of absence" and that she was employed by DaimlerChrysler while on leave. Accordingly, it concluded that her causes of

action, if any, arose on February 2, 1999.

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The Court of Appeals reliance on Collins to reinstate Magee's claims of sexual harassment, sex and age

discrimination, and retaliation is misplaced.

Magee was

never terminated from her employment and does not allege discriminatory termination. claims on alleged She bases her Civil Rights Act conduct that occurred

discriminatory

before her leave of absence.

Indeed, when given a chance

to amend her complaint to plead claims falling within the period of limitations, Magee was unable to do so. Collins,

a discriminatory termination case, simply does not apply in this situation. To determine whether Magee's claims were timely filed, we look to MCL 600.5805(10), which establishes that the applicable period of limitations is three years from the date of injury. Because Magee alleged no discriminatory

conduct occurring after September 12, 1998, the period of limitations on Magee's claims expired, at the latest, three years from that date, or by September 12, 2001.

Accordingly, as the trial court held, Magee's February 1, 2002, complaint was not timely filed. The Civil dissent Act argues within that the the defendant years violated preceding the the

Rights

three

filing of plaintiff's claim by failing to "prevent future harassment . . . ." Post at 3. This interpretation of the

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Civil

Rights

Act

amounts

to

a

continuing

violations

doctrine in which an employer is continuously liable from the time it or its agent violates the act until the time that violation is remedied by the employer. Thus, in

Justice CAVANAGH's view, a plaintiff subjected to a hostile work environment on December 31, 2005, may file a timely complaint in December 2030 if the employer has failed to remedy years. the sexual harassment renders by in the ensuing the twenty-five period in of MCL

This

theory

nugatory the

limitations 600.5805(10).

established

Legislature

It is therefore a theory we must reject.3

For these reasons, we reverse the relevant part of the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Macomb Circuit Court for reinstatement of the order granting DaimlerChrysler's motion for summary disposition. Clifford W. Taylor Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman

3

Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Sys,

465 Mich 53, 60; 631

NW2d 686 (2001).

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S T A T E

O F

M I C H I G A N


SUPREME COURT


JACQUELYN V. MAGEE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant. _______________________________ WEAVER, J. (concurring). I concur in the result of the opinion per curiam that reverses the Court of Appeals judgment in part and remands the matter to the trial court for reinstatement of the trial court's grant of summary disposition to defendant. Under the facts pleaded by plaintiff, the three-year period of limitations1 began to run when plaintiff went on medical leave on September 12, 1998, for emotional distress. No. 126219

Plaintiff's claims were required to be filed within three years of September 12, 1998. Because they were not, the

trial court was correct to grant summary disposition to defendant. Therefore, I concur in the result of the

opinion per curiam. Elizabeth A. Weaver

1

MCL 600.5805(10).

S T A T E

O F

M I C H I G A N


SUPREME COURT


JACQUELYN V. MAGEE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant. _______________________________ CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). I disagree with the majority's contention that No. 126219

defendant engaged in no discriminatory conduct during the three years that preceded the filing of plaintiff's

complaint.

Therefore, I must respectfully dissent. Over of was was

Plaintiff began working for defendant in 1976. the years, plaintiff complained of various that her

incidents foreman

harassment. making sexual to a

Plaintiff advances

complained toward her.

When her

plaintiff former

assigned

different

supervisor,

foreman

still worked in the same complex and continued to harass her. her Because of the harassment, plaintiff was ordered by psychiatrist to take an approximately four-month

medical leave.

When plaintiff returned from her medical

leave, her former foreman was still working in the same complex as plaintiff. A subsequent foreman of plaintiff's also made sexual advances toward her, including intentionally touching

plaintiff's breast.

For an entire year, plaintiff also

complained to defendant about a sign in the men's restroom that referred to plaintiff in a derogatory and sexually suggestive manner. she continued to Because of the stress of the harassment suffer, plaintiff was ordered to take

another medical leave of absence. While she was employed by defendant, plaintiff's union steward also made sexually and touched coworkers body and suggestive her made began in comments an about

plaintiff's manner. comments

"ass"

inappropriate suggestive her with

Plaintiff's about her

sexually hitting

cardboard sticks.

When plaintiff asked her union steward

to intercede, he just laughed and said, "Yea, hit that ass." Plaintiff repeatedly complained to defendant, yet When plaintiff requested a transfer, her

nothing was done.

union steward told her that she could transfer if she had sex with him. Once plaintiff was transferred, the union

steward told her that she "owed" him and he wanted her to have sex with him. He later stopped plaintiff from

training for another position because she was not having

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sex with him.

Plaintiff again complained to a foreman, but Because of the result to take of a the third

he said there was nothing he could do. stress plaintiff was suffering was then as a

harassment,

plaintiff

ordered

medical leave. Because defendant took no steps to stop the harassment while plaintiff was on her third medical leave, she was forced to decide not to return to the harassing

environment. to take

Defendant's discriminatory conduct in failing to prevent future harassment continued

steps

throughout plaintiff's medical leave.

Requiring plaintiff

to return to the harassing setting to work in the unchanged environment would be unreasonable and possibly dangerous to plaintiff's health, considering that her doctor had ordered three medical leaves because of the stress of the

harassment.

As plaintiff explained, in order to have even

been considered for a possible transfer to another plant after having been out on her third harassment-related

medical leave, she would have had to return to the plant she left and hope for a transfer, despite that her multiple complaints had garnered no response before or during her medical leave. leave the Thus, for plaintiff to be able to try and environment, she would have had to

harassing

return to work with the same men who harassed her and whose

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conduct necessitated that plaintiff take medical leaves in the first place, without any assurance that defendant would protect her. This because directly case presents a unique set of circumstances leave was final

plaintiff's related to

doctor-ordered the harassment.

medical

Plaintiff's

medical leave was actually her third leave related to the stress of the harassment she suffered. Defendant

maintained a hostile work environment despite plaintiff's repeated complaints. Defendant's failure to stop the

harassment after these complaints is, under the facts of this case, discriminatory conduct. Because this conduct

occurred during the three years that preceded the filing of plaintiff's lawsuit, I find that her complaint was timely filed. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. Michael F. Cavanagh Marilyn Kelly

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