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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS


JANETTE H. KILBOURN, Petitioner-Appellee, V

UNPUBLISHED June 20, 2006

DONALD A. MORRISON, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 267211 Oakland Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 05-712655-PP

Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Fort Hood and Servitto, JJ. PER CURIAM. Respondent appeals as of right an order of the court granting a personal protection order ("PPO") to petitioner and an order denying respondent's motion to terminate the first order. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the PPO, we affirm. The parties in this matter dated for a few months toward the end of 2003. After their break-up, petitioner alleged that respondent engaged in harassing and intimidating behavior and subsequently sought a PPO. After a hearing at which several witnesses testified, the trial court granted petitioner's request for a PPO. Respondent first objects to the court's failure to give written reasons explaining its order granting the PPO. However, respondent has alleged no prejudice other than stating that written reasons would have aided in the presentation of his case. Furthermore, respondent has made no argument concerning what remedy should be available if the court rules were violated. He may not simply announce his position on appeal and leave it to this Court to rationalize his claim, if any, under the court rules. Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100 (1998). His failure to properly address the merits of his assertions of error constitutes abandonment of the issue. Yee v Shiawassee County Bd of Comm'rs, 251 Mich App 379, 406; 651 NW2d 756 (2002). Respondent next argues that the court deprived him of a hearing when he attempted to challenge the PPO. According to the relevant court rule: (a) The petitioner may file a motion to modify or terminate the personal protection order and request a hearing at any time after the personal protection order is issued. -1-


(b) The respondent may file a motion to modify or terminate the personal protection order and request a hearing within 14 days after being served with, or receiving actual notice of, the order unless good cause is shown for filing the motion after the 14 days have elapsed. [MCR 3.707(A)(1).] *** The court must schedule and hold a hearing on a motion to modify or terminate a personal protection order within 14 days of the filing of the motion . . . . [MCR 3.707(A)(2).] The court refused to grant respondent another hearing to challenge the PPO and to present witnesses. There is a paucity of case law interpreting this court rule. Interpretation of a court rule is subject to the same basic principles that govern statutory interpretation. St George Greek Orthodox Church v Laupmanis Assoc, 204 Mich App 278, 282; 514 NW2d 516 (1994). A court rule should be construed in accordance with the ordinary and approved usage of the language and in light of its purpose and the object to be accomplished by its operation. Id. Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review on appeal. Id. By analogy, interpretation of court rules is also subject to de novo review on appeal. Id. It is clear from the expansive and mandatory language of the court rule that respondent was entitled to request modification or termination of a personal protection order within 14 days and that the court "must schedule and hold a hearing on a motion to modify or terminate a personal protection order." MCR 3.707(A)(2) (emphasis added).1 The court therefore erred when it skirted the rule by styling respondent's motion as a motion for reconsideration. While the motion no doubt sought reconsideration, it sought reconsideration in the form of an order terminating the original PPO, which makes the motion a motion to terminate. It is also clear that respondent did not receive a hearing because the court did not allow him to present witnesses, stating that he already had an opportunity at the original hearing and that the only difference was that at the second court date he had an attorney. Based upon the unambiguous language of the court rule, this Court would ordinarily remand to the trial court for a hearing on defendant's motion to terminate the PPO. However, the PPO having already terminated by its own terms, this issue is moot. We therefore reach respondent's fourth issue, which challenges the merits of the court's grant of a PPO. A PPO is an injunctive order. Pickering v Pickering, 253 Mich App 694, 700; 659 NW2d 649 (2002). An order granting or denying injunctive relief is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. "An abuse of discretion is found only if an unprejudiced person, considering

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