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Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Opinion
JOAN B. JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v ESTATE OF RONALD GREEN, Defendant-Appellant.

Chief Justice:

Justices:

Marilyn Kelly

Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman Diane M. Hathaway

FILED JULY 30, 2009

No. 136423

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH CORRIGAN, J. We granted leave to appeal to consider whether an action to partition real estate may go forward when the joint tenant who filed the action died before an order of partition entered. 1 We would hold that title vested in the surviving joint tenant on the decedent's death because the mere filing of a partition action does not sever a joint tenancy and no order granting partition was entered before the death. We would thus affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for

We also granted leave to appeal to consider whether the statute of limitations bars plaintiff's claim for breach of contract. That issue is addressed in separate opinions by Justices Cavanagh, Young, and Markman.

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summary disposition and the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the partition issue. I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS At issue in this case are two parcels of real estate held by plaintiff and defendant as joint tenants and a series of oral loans from plaintiff to defendant.2 In May 1991, defendant negotiated the purchase of a parcel of land on behalf of plaintiff, and the deed conveyed the land to both parties as joint tenants. In September 1991, plaintiff purchased a second parcel of property, which was conveyed to plaintiff and defendant as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship. In 2004, plaintiff filed a breach of contract action, alleging that defendant had failed to repay the loans. Plaintiff also sought to force defendant to relinquish his right to the two parcels of land. The trial court granted summary disposition for defendant regarding the deeds for the properties, holding that the deeds were properly executed and gave defendant valid property interests. Regarding the loans, the court did not accept defendant's argument that the statute of limitations barred plaintiff's claim. A jury found that each check plaintiff issued to defendant was a loan, and the court entered judgment on the verdict in plaintiff's favor.

The defendant's estate was substituted as a party when the original defendant died, but for ease of reference we will refer to both the original defendant and his estate as "defendant."

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Defendant then filed a separate action for partition of the parcels. At plaintiff's request, the partition action was stayed pending the appeal in this case. Defendant unexpectedly died while the appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals. His estate was substituted as the plaintiff in the partition action and as the defendant in this case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that defendant possessed a valid property interest in the two parcels, but held that because no order severing the joint tenancy had issued in the partition action before defendant died, defendant's interests in the parcels reverted to plaintiff upon defendant's death. The Court of Appeals further held that the statute of limitations did not bar plaintiff's breach of contract action for repayment of the loans because the claim did not accrue until plaintiff demanded repayment by filing her complaint in 2004.3 We granted defendant's application for leave to appeal.4 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Whether a partition action may go forward if a joint tenant dies before the joint tenancy is severed is a question of law that we review de novo. Cardinal

Jackson v Green Estate, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued April 1, 2008 (Docket No. 269244).
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482 Mich 981 (2008).

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Mooney High School v Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, 437 Mich 75, 80; 467 NW2d 21 (1991). III. PARTITION We agree with the Court of Appeals that defendant's interest in the parcel of land
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automatically reverted to plaintiff when defendant died.

Thus,

defendant's estate has no interest in the property, and even if defendant's partition action survived his death under Michigan's survival statute, MCL 600.2921, nothing remains to partition. "The principal characteristic of the joint tenancy is the right of survivorship. Upon the death of one joint tenant, the surviving tenant or tenants take the whole estate." Albro v Allen, 434 Mich 271, 274-275; 454 NW2d 85 (1990). An ordinary joint tenancy6 may be severed, and the right of survivorship thereby destroyed, by an act of the parties, conveyance by either party, or levy and sale on an execution against one of the parties. Id. at 275.
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Only the parcel conveyed in the May 1991 deed is currently at issue. Defendant does not dispute plaintiff's right of survivorship in the property conveyed in the September 1991 deed. In addition to an ordinary joint tenancy, Michigan recognizes a distinct category of joint tenancy known as a "joint tenancy with full rights of survivorship," which consists of a joint life estate with dual contingent remainders. Albro, supra at 275; see also 1 Cameron, Michigan Real Property Law (3d ed),

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Michigan Law