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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS


JOYCE L. SHEPHERD, Plaintiff-Appellant, V GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, DALE ERDMAN, DAN GRIESHABER and ANN HOBBS, Defendant-Appellees, and TERRY RADCLIFF, JOEL VASQUEZ, RICHARD MERKEL, LARRY CLEMONS and SUE MINCE, Defendants.

UNPUBLISHED July 26, 2005

No. 260171 Oakland Circuit Court LC No. 03-047560-CD

Before: Neff, P.J., and Smolenski and Talbot, JJ. PER CURIAM. Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court's grant of summary disposition in favor of defendants on plaintiff's claims of employment discrimination and hostile work environment. We affirm. I Defendant General Motors Corporation hired plaintiff, who is African American, as a data preparation operator in December 1978. Plaintiff was employed in various clerk positions until 1997, when she became an associate coordinator. On December 13, 2002, plaintiff then fifty-nine years old, filed this action under the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act (CRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq., alleging age and race discrimination and sex discrimination based on a hostile work environment.1 Plaintiff alleged that General Motor supervisors and employees engaged in

Plaintiff also alleged counts of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence, which were dismissed by the trial court and are not at issue on appeal.

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a plan and pattern of harassment designed to force plaintiff to retire. Her claim was based on allegations of improper comments about her race, age, and sexual orientation by coworkers; improper touching by female coworkers; that coworkers sprayed a foul odor on plaintiff; unidentified persons tampered with her work and office environment. She further alleged that General Motors installed a hidden camera in her office, emitted foul odors into her office through the vent, and permitted its employees to contrive the scheme to eliminate older employees through intimidation and unlawful employment tactics. Plaintiff further subsequently averred that on March 30, 2004, General Motors informed her that as of April 1, 2004, she was displaced from her current position and would be laid off effective October 1, 2004 unless she found another position. According to General Motors, plaintiff's workgroup upgraded its computers, which resulted in the elimination of some tasks performed by clerks such as plaintiff. Because part of plaintiff's job was data entry concerning the assignment of new tool numbers, which would be automatically entered by the new computer system, sixty percent of plaintiff's job would be eliminated. However, three other clerks in plaintiff's group also had their duties diminished or eliminated because of improved computerization. Consequently, she and three coworkers were offered a special retirement package, which all accepted except plaintiff.2 In May 2004, defendant moved for summary disposition of plaintiff's claims pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) (statute of limitations) and C(10). Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court granted summary disposition of all claims and dismissed plaintiff's case. II We first address plaintiff's argument that the trial court erred in ruling that the continuing violations doctrine was inapplicable to her claims. We find no error. This Court reviews de novo whether a party's claims are time barred. Bryant v Oakpointe Villa Nursing Ctr, 471 Mich 411, 436; 684 NW2d 864 (2004). Plaintiff filed her complaint on December 13, 2002. In support of her action, she relied on conduct that allegedly began in 1995.3 The trial court concluded that evidence predating December 13, 1999, would be barred. An action under the CRA must be brought within three years after the cause of action accrued. MCL 600.5805(10). The continuing violations doctrine permitted recovery for incidents that occurred outside the applicable limitations period, if an individual asserts a series of allegedly discriminatory acts or statements that are so sufficiently related that they constitute a pattern of harassment or discrimination and at least one of the acts alleged occurred within the limitations period. Sumner v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 427 Mich 505, 538-539; 398 NW2d 368 (1986), overruled Garg v Macomb Co Comm Mental Health Services, 472 Mich 263; 696 NW2d 646 (2005); see also Meek v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 193 Mich App 340, 343-345; 483 NW2d 407 (1992). Factors in evaluating whether timely and untimely incidents result in a
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The record does not indicate plaintiff's current employment status with defendant.

Plaintiff cites nine instances of conduct that occurred outside the limitations period. The trial court referenced five.

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continuing violation include whether the same type of discrimination is alleged, the frequency of the incidents, and whether the incidents demonstrate the "degree of permanence which should trigger an employee's awareness of and duty to assert his or her rights . . . ." Sumner, supra at 538. After plaintiff filed her appeal, our Supreme Court overruled its prior recognition of the continuing violations doctrine. Garg, supra at 283-284. Noting the absence of any language or "provision in Michigan law that even implicitly endorses the `continuing violations' doctrine," the Court ruled that the "`continuing violations' doctrine is contrary to Michigan law." Id. at 283. The Court specifically overruled Summer and held that "a person must file a claim under the Civil Rights Act within three years of the date his or her cause of action accrues, as required by

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