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Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Opinion
JULIE NEAL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v TERRY WILKES, Defendant-Appellant. _______________________________ BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH MARKMAN, J. We defendant granted is leave to from act appeal

Chief Justice:

Justices:

Maura D. Corrigan

Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Clifford W. Taylor Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman

FILED JULY 20, 2004


No. 122498

to

consider pursuant

whether to the for

exempt land use

liability (RUA), MCL

recreational

324.73301(1),

injuries plaintiff sustained while riding an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) on defendant's property. granted defendant's motion for The trial court disposition,

summary

concluding that the RUA bars plaintiff's cause of action against defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding

that defendant is not exempt from liability for injuries that occurred to plaintiff while riding an ATV on the mowed

portion pertains

of to

defendant's injuries

backyard that occur

because on

the

RUA tracts

only of

"large

undeveloped land."

Because there is nothing in the RUA

that indicates that it pertains only to "large tracts of undeveloped land," we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's order of summary disposition in favor of defendant. I. FACTS
AND

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff injured her back while riding as a passenger on defendant's ATV, which was being driven by defendant's brother on defendant's property in the village of

Dimondale.1

When defendant's brother drove over an uneven

area of defendant's lawn, plaintiff was bounced on the ATV, causing her to suffer injuries to her lower back.

Defendant's property is an eleven-acre lot that is zoned residential. Although portions of the lot are wooded,

plaintiff was injured while riding on the mowed portion of defendant's backyard. The trial court granted defendant's

motion for summary disposition on the basis that the RUA bars plaintiff's cause of action against defendant.

An "ATV" is defined as a "3- or 4-wheeled vehicle designed for off-road use that has low-pressure tires, has a seat designed to be straddled by the rider, and is powered by a 50cc to 500cc gasoline engine or an engine of comparable size using other fuels." MCL 324.81101(a).

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However, on the basis of this Court's decision in Wymer v Holmes, 429 Mich 66, 79; 412 NW2d 213 (1987), that the RUA only applies to "large tracts of undeveloped land," the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded this Court the case for the

continued

proceedings.2

After

directed

parties to present oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other action permitted by MCR

7.302(G)(1),3 and having heard such argument, we granted defendant's application for leave to appeal.4 II. STANDARD
OF

REVIEW

At issue in this case is the proper interpretation of MCL 324.73301(1). The proper interpretation of a statutory

provision is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Morales v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 469 Mich 487, 490; 672 Likewise, a trial court's ruling on a

NW2d 849 (2003).

summary disposition motion is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Schmalfeldt v North Pointe Ins Co,

469 Mich 422, 426; 670 NW2d 651 (2003). III. ANALYSIS
The RUA, MCL 324.73301(1), provides:
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued September 17, 2002 (Docket No. 230494).
3 4 2

469 Mich 870 (2003). 469 Mich 936 (2003).

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Except as otherwise provided in this section, a cause of action shall not arise for injuries to a person who is on the land of another without paying to the owner, tenant, or lessee of the land a valuable consideration for the purpose of fishing, hunting, trapping, camping, hiking, sightseeing, motorcycling, snowmobiling, or any other outdoor recreational use or trail use, with or without permission, against the owner, tenant, or lessee of the land unless the injuries were caused by the gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct of the owner, tenant, or lessee. In Wymer, the plaintiff's decedent suffered injuries while swimming on the defendants' property. held that the defendants could be held This Court for the to for

liable was

plaintiff's apply to

injuries

because of

"the

[RUA]

intended suitable

large

tracts

undeveloped

land

outdoor recreational uses.

Urban, suburban, and subdivided Wymer,

lands were not intended to be covered by the RUA." supra at 79.

Defendant contends that our decision in Wymer should be overruled because it is inconsistent with the plain

language of the RUA.

We agree.

"[O]ur primary task in

construing a statute, is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature." Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, "The words of a

460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999).

statute provide `the most reliable evidence of its intent . . . .'" Id., quoting United States v Turkette, 452 US Although

576, 593; 101 S Ct 2524; 69 L Ed 2d 246 (1981).

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the Wymer Court noted that its task was to ascertain the legislative intent, it failed to recognize that the

language of the statute is the best source for determining legislative intent. Instead, Wymer found it "reasonable to

assume that the Michigan statute has the similar general purpose of similar acts in other jurisdictions . . . ."5 Wymer, supra at 77. That purpose being to "open[] up and

mak[e] available vast areas of vacant but private lands to the use of the general public" in order to "promot[e]

tourism."

Id. at 78, quoting Thomas v Consumers Power Co, If that used the

58 Mich App 486, 495-496; 228 NW2d 786 (1975). were the Legislature's purpose, it could have

words "vacant or undeveloped land of another," rather than the words "the lands of another."6

It is impossible for us to determine whether these other acts are indeed "similar" to Michigan's act in any particular respect because Wymer failed to cite any of these "similar acts." Immediately before Wymer, supra, stated that the purpose of the RUA is to make available to the public "vast areas of vacant but private lands," id. at 78, it asserted that the purpose of the RUA is "to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering thereon for such purposes." Id. at 77. Although we agree that the purpose of the RUA is to encourage owners of private land to make their land available to the public, we can find no basis to conclude (continued...) 5

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Before Wymer, in Winiecki v Wolf, 147 Mich App 742, 745; 383 NW2d while the 119 (1985), with in which the plaintiff in was

injured backyard, precluded stating:

playing Court of

"land

skis"

defendants' the RUA

Appeals action

concluded against

that

plaintiff's

the

defendants,

[The RUA], as the trial court has already observed, is clear and unambiguous. Plaintiff was a person on the lands of another, without paying a consideration, for the purpose of an outdoor recreational use. The statute offers nothing on its face excluding from its application the backyard of residential property. If the Legislature did not intend the statute to apply to parcels of land this size, it was within its power to insert words limiting the statute's application, e.g., to lands in their natural state. As we, however, are constrained to apply the statute as written, we cannot say that the trial court erred in relieving defendants of liability based on the recreational use statute. This understanding of the RUA is truer to the language of the RUA than is the Wymer Court's interpretation of the RUA. There is absolutely no indication in the language of

the RUA that the Legislature intended its application to be limited to vacant or undeveloped lands. As the Court of

Appeals in the instant case stated, "[a]lthough nothing in the statutory language indicates that the statute is not

(...continued)
that the purpose of the RUA is to encourage only owners of
vast areas of vacant private land in this regard.


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applicable to the backyards of residential property such as defendant's, the statute has been construed to apply `to large tracts of undeveloped not . . to .'" land suitable for outdoor and

recreational subdivided omitted).7

uses,' .

`[u]rban, Slip op

suburban, at 2

lands

(citations

Because this construction is, as the Court of

Appeals itself recognized, not supported by the statutory language, we are compelled to abandon this construction and overrule Wymer.8 The RUA makes no distinction between large tracts of land and small land, for tracts vacant of land, and undeveloped occupied uses and land and land not

developed suitable

land

land, land

outdoor

recreational

suitable for outdoor recreational uses, urban or suburban land and rural land, or subdivided land and unsubdivided

This language suggests that the Court of Appeals might well have reached a different conclusion in this case had it not been bound by Wymer. Although we recognize the importance of stare decisis, we conclude that it is appropriate to overrule Wymer because it is clearly inconsistent with the language of the RUA and, thus, was wrongly decided. Further, there are no relevant "reliance" interests involved and overruling Wymer would, therefore, not produce any "practical real-world dislocations." See Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 465-466; 613 NW2d 307 (2000).
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land.9

To introduce such distinctions into the act is to

engage in what is essentially legislative decision-making. The RUA simply states that an owner of land is not liable to a person who injures himself on the owner's land if that person has not paid for the use of the land and that person was using the land for a specified purpose,10 unless the injuries were caused by the owner's gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct. The statute contains no

limitation on the type of land involved, but rather applies to specified activities that occur "on the land of another . . . ." MCL 324.73301(1). That is, the act limits its

application to specified activities, but it does not limit its application to any particular type of land. Therefore,

an owner is not liable to a nonpaying outdoor recreational user of his land, unless the user's injuries are caused by

We disagree with the dissent's assertion that an "urban residential backyard" is not a natural resource. Post at 4 (emphasis in original). Rather, in our judgment, land is a natural resource whether it is urban or rural, residential or non-residential, someone's backyard or a state park. See Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1991)(defining "natural resources" as "the natural wealth of a country, consisting of land . . . ."). We use the terms "specified purpose" and "specified activity" throughout this opinion as a summary phrase for describing "fishing, hunting, trapping, camping, hiking, sightseeing, motorcycling, snowmobiling, or any other outdoor recreational use or trail use . . . ." See MCL 324.73301(1).
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the

owner's

gross

negligence

or

willful

and

wanton

misconduct.11

Plaintiff and the dissent argue that the fact that the Legislature amended the RUA after Wymer was decided, but did not amend the language at issue here, means that the Legislature must have agreed with the Wymer Court's interpretation of the RUA. However, as we recently explained in People v Hawkins, 468 Mich 488, 507-510; 668 NW2d 602 (2003), neither "legislative acquiescence" nor the "reenactment doctrine" may "be utilized to subordinate the plain language of a statute." "Legislative acquiescence" has been repeatedly rejected by this Court because "Michigan courts [must] determine the Legislature's intent Donajkowski v from its words, not from its silence." Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 261; 596 NW2d 574 (1999). Although, where statutory language is ambiguous, the reenactment doctrine may be a more useful tool of construction, "[i]n the absence of a clear indication that the Legislature intended to either adopt or repudiate this Court's prior construction, there is no reason to subordinate our primary principle of construction--to ascertain the Legislature's intent by first examining the statute's language--to the reenactment rule." Id. at 508509. The dissent concludes that the fact that the Legislature amended

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