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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS


KEITH LIDDY and VIRGINIA LIDDY, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, MOSES ABRAHAM, and ROSE ANNE DAVIS, Defendants-Appellees.

UNPUBLISHED September 20, 2005

No. 262176 Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 03-322738-CZ

Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Gage and Wilder, JJ. PER CURIAM. Plaintiffs appeal as of right the trial court's order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants. The trial court determined that no genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to plaintiff Keith Liddy's wrongful termination/breach of contract and age discrimination claims,1 and additionally rejected plaintiffs' contention that outstanding discovery issues precluded summary disposition. We affirm. Plaintiff was a long-time General Motors employee, having originally been hired in 1968 as an hourly worker. In 1984, plaintiff was promoted to a salaried employee position and, in 1989, became a seventh-level general supervisor. Plaintiff was terminated in August 2001 for violating General Motors' e-mail policy, which had been disseminated to employees in January 2001, and which indicated that violations could result in discipline up to and including discharge. Plaintiff's termination stemmed from an investigation into inappropriate e-mail usage that began in June 2001 when an employee of General Motors' World Wide Facilities Group sent an inappropriate e-mail to an employee in another group. During the investigation, several people were determined to have sent e-mails that violated the company's e-mail policy. Plaintiff admitted sending four sexually-oriented e-mails to a number of individuals through General Motors' e-mail system, contrary to the company's policy. At the time of plaintiff's termination, another employee, Linda Slupe, was also terminated. Like plaintiff, Slupe, who was older than plaintiff, sent four sexually-oriented e-mails to numerous recipients. Two other employees, both

1

Plaintiff Virginia Liddy brought only a derivative claim for loss of consortium. For that reason, the singular term "plaintiff" refers only to plaintiff Keith Liddy.

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of whom were also older than plaintiff, were not terminated for violating the policy. However, these individuals were determined to have sent only one inappropriate e-mail to a single recipient. Following the investigation, a contract employee, whose age was not disclosed on the record, was also informed that he could no longer work in General Motors' facilities because of his violations of the company's e-mail policy. In July 2003, plaintiff and his wife filed the instant suit alleging wrongful termination/breach of contract, age discrimination, and loss of consortium. The trial court granted summary disposition of each of these claims in favor of defendants pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). A decision on a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is reviewed de novo. Ormsby v Capital Welding, Inc, 471 Mich 45, 52; 684 NW2d 320 (2004). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a claim. Spiek v Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). When reviewing a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary disposition, we consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence submitted in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ritchie-Gamester v Berkley, 461 Mich 73, 76; 597 NW2d 517 (1999). The court should grant the motion only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). Plaintiff first argues that summary disposition of his claim for wrongful termination/breach of contract was improper. Specifically, plaintiff argues that he was never informed that he was an at-will employee, and that statements by his superiors and his thirtythree-year employment history led him to believe that he could be fired only for just cause. "Generally, and under Michigan law by presumption, employment relationships are terminable at the will of either party." Lytle v Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153, 163; 579 NW2d 906 (1998). However, the presumption of employment at will may be rebutted by: (1) proof of "a contractual provision for a definite term of employment or a provision forbidding discharge absent just cause", (2) an express agreement, either written or oral, regarding job security that is clear and unequivocal; or (3) a contractual provision, implied at law, where an employer's policies and procedures instill a "legitimate expectation" of job security in the employee. [Id. at 164 (citations omitted).] In resolving the issue whether an employee has demonstrated a legitimate expectation of job security, an inquiry must be made into what, if anything, the employer promised and whether the promise is reasonably capable of instilling a legitimate expectation of just-cause employment in the employee. Id. at 164-165, citing Rood v General Dynamics Corp, 444 Mich 107, 138-139; 507 NW2d 591 (1993). In this case, plaintiff signed a compensation statement with defendant in 2000. The statement indicates that it was part of plaintiff's "employment agreement," that plaintiff was a month-to-month employee, and that the new statement replaced any previous compensation statement and would continue in effect until either the employment agreement or plaintiff's -2-


employment was terminated. Plaintiff signed substantially similar statements in each year of his employ with General Motors from 1994 forward. The compensation statements contain a complete integration clause and indicate that no modifications or amendments, other than a cancellation and replacement by another written compensation statement, would be effective unless signed by both plaintiff and his employer. The General Motors employee handbook similarly indicates that regular employees were employed on a month-to-month basis and that, consistent with an at-will employment relationship, either the employee or the company could take the initiative to end the relationship. The written agreement and the handbook created an atwill employment relationship. Schultes v Naylor, 195 Mich App 640, 643; 491 NW2d 240 (1992); Singal v General Motors Corp, 179 Mich App 497, 504-505; 447 NW2d 152 (1989). Plaintiff failed to submit any evidence refuting his at-will employment status. He failed to present evidence that he had a written or oral agreement for just-cause employment, that he had a legitimate expectation of job security, or that he had a contract for a definite term of employment. Lytle, supra. Because plaintiff was an at-will employee and failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact to the contrary, summary disposition of his claim for wrongful termination/breach of contract was appropriate. Summary disposition of plaintiff's age discrimination claim was also appropriate. Proof of discrimination in violation of

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