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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS


LEE CHURCHILL, NANCY CHURCHILL, and LEE D. CHURCHILL REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST, Plaintiffs/Counter DefendantsAppellants, v BRYAN SWARTHOUT, Defendant/Counter PlaintiffAppellee.

UNPUBLISHED April 11, 2006

No. 257151, 260843 Genesee Circuit Court LC No. 02-074654-CK

LEE CHURCHILL, NANCY CHURCHILL, and LEE D. CHURCHILL REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST, Plaintiffs/Counter Defendants-
Appellees,
v BRYAN SWARTHOUT, Defendant/Counter Plaintiff-
Appellant.
No. 262093 Genesee Circuit Court LC No. 02-074654-CK

Before: Meter, P.J., Whitbeck, C.J. and Schuette, J. PER CURIAM. In this case involving contracts for the sale of property, this Court addresses three consolidated appeals. In Docket No. 257151, plaintiffs appeal the trial court's granting of defendant's motion for summary disposition on plaintiffs' third amended complaint. In Docket No. 260842, plaintiffs appeal the trial court's grant of defendant's motion for case evaluation sanctions. In Docket No. 262093, defendant appeals the trial court's denial of his request for entry of a money judgment, taxable costs, and prejudgment interest. We affirm.

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I. Facts This case stems from plaintiffs' attempted sale of two pieces of land to defendant. Lee and Nancy Churchill (the Churchills) and the Lee D. Churchill Revocable Trust (the Trust) owned a little over 29 acres of land in Genesee County. The land consists of three parcels; a vacant waterfront lot, a residence, and an equestrian center. The Churchills attempted to sell the land through a realtor for two years, but were unsuccessful. Eventually, the Churchills were contacted by JP King, an auction company, and in May 2002, they entered into a contract with JP King to auction the land. The auction was held on August 14, 2002. The Churchills indicated that they would be willing to sell the land as one parcel or to sell it in three individual parcels. The Churchills had a total reserve of $4.5 million and they were informed by a representative of JP King that if the reserve was not met, they would try to negotiate a price between the bidder and the Churchills. Defendant, a neighbor of the Churchills, was the high bidder on Parcel 1 (the residence) and on Parcel 3 (the equestrian center), but neither bid met the Churchills' reserve. However, the Churchills negotiated with defendant through a JP King representative and agreed to sell Parcel 1 for $2,250,000 and Parcel 3 for $1,600,000. The parties entered into purchase agreements titled, "Auction Real Estate Sales Contract," for both Parcels 1 and 3. The purchase agreement for Parcel 1 identified that land to be sold as "`SAILAWAY FARMS EQUESTRAIN (sic) ESTATE' PARCEL # 1, located in the County of Genesee, State of Michigan, and more particularly described on the Title Commitment as attached to this Auction Real Estate Contract." The purchase agreement for Parcel 3 contained the same language, except the parcel number was changed to 3. The contracts also stated that Parcel 1 was zoned residential and Parcel 3 was zoned agricultural, and listed applicable easements for each parcel. No further property descriptions were given and contrary to the stated language contained in each purchase agreement, the Title Commitment was not attached to either purchase agreement. Plaintiffs subsequently presented an affidavit from a representative of JP King that stated that defendant was given a copy of the Title Commitment. However, the Title Commitment that was given to defendant contained different property descriptions for Parcels 1 and 3, than the Parcels 1 and 3 the Churchills intended to convey under the purchase agreements. Both purchase agreements were signed by Lee Churchill, Nancy Churchill, and defendant. Defendant put a total of $385,000 down as an earnest money deposit. Closing was scheduled to take place on September 16, 2002. On September 9, 2002, defendant informed the Churchills that he would not be closing on the purchase of Parcels 1 or 3. On October 3, 2002, the Churchills, filed a complaint against defendant alleging counts of specific performance of the two purchase agreements, breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On September 29, 2003, the Churchills filed a first amended complaint, which contained the same allegations but had additional exhibits attached. On January 12, 2004, the court heard defendant's motion for summary disposition. The trial court granted the motion with regard to the Churchills' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress but denied summary disposition as to the remainder of the Churchills' complaint.

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On January 28, 2004, the Churchills filed a second amended complaint, adding the Trust as a plaintiff. On March 8, 2004, on defendant's motion, the court reconsidered the denial of summary disposition on the first amended complaint and the Churchills' claims. The trial court granted summary disposition on the Churchills' claims, finding that the statute of frauds voided the contracts because not all the owners of the property signed the purchase agreements. The court also found that the purchase agreements contained inadequate descriptions of the land that was to be sold and found summary disposition for defendant appropriate on that ground also. The court further held that the Churchills had violated a township land division ordinance and that there was no allegation of any mutual mistake or fraud to allow reformation of the contract. The court dismissed the first amended complaint in its entirety. Defendant then filed a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) to dismiss plaintiffs' second amended complaint, which included claims on behalf of the Trust. On April 12, 2004, the court granted defendant's motion, but because defendant filed the motion under (C)(8), the court allowed plaintiffs to file an amended complaint to attempt to state a claim for relief on behalf of the Trust. On May 26, 2004, plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint, which contained claims on behalf of the trust, but also on the Churchills' behalf. On June 28, 2004, the trial court granted defendant's motion for summary disposition again, citing the statute of frauds and an inadequate property description. The court found that the land division ordinance was no longer an issue and again found no evidence of mutual mistake to justify reformation of the contracts. The court also ordered plaintiffs to return defendant's deposit of $385,000. On July 29, 2004, defendant filed a motion for the entry of a judgment in defendant's favor, which would have included statutory interest from the date of the filing of the complaint to the date defendant was returned his deposit money. On the same date, defendant also filed a motion for case evaluation sanctions, alleging that all parties rejected the case evaluation and that the judgment was more favorable to defendant than the case evaluation award. On August 30, 2004, the court declined to enter a money judgment against plaintiffs and declined to award interest. The trial court also declined to order case evaluation sanctions, citing the interest of justice exception under MCR 2.403(O)(11). On November 1, 2004, the court granted defendant's motion for reconsideration in part and found that the interest of justice exception did not apply in this case and that defendant was entitled to case evaluation sanctions. On January 24, 2005, the court awarded defendant $100,000 in case evaluation sanctions. II. Purchase Agreements Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in finding that the descriptions of the property contained in the purchase agreements did not adequately identify the property to be sold. We disagree. A. Standard of Review This Court reviews the granting of summary disposition de novo. Kelly-Stehney Assoc Inc v MacDonald's Industrial Products, Inc (On Remand), 265 Mich App 105, 110; 693 NW2d 394 (2005). "Similarly, `[t]his Court reviews de novo questions of law such as whether the statute of frauds bars enforcement of a purported contract.'" Id., quoting Zander v Ogihara Corp, 213 Mich App 438, 441; 540 NW2d 702 (1995).

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B. Analysis The trial court did not err in concluding that the purchase agreements were void because they contained inadequate descriptions of the land to be sold. "The substance of a binding contract for the sale of land is a subject separate from its sufficiency under the statute of frauds and one that is governed by the general contract law concept that there must be a meeting of the minds regarding the `essential particulars' of the transaction." Zurcher v Herveat, 238 Mich App 267, 279; 605 NW2d 329 (1999) (emphasis in original). A contract for the sale of land "`must generally be in writing and must set forth the terms of the agreement with sufficient certainty and definiteness, specifying the identities of the parties and their mutual assent, the property which is the subject of the contract, the price of such property, and the consideration.'" Id. at 282, quoting 77 Am Jur 29, Vendor and Purchaser,

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