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Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 48909 ____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice Justices

Maura D. Cor rigan

Opinion
MACOMB COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v SHERRI MURPHY,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________________ BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
CORRIGAN, C.J.
We granted leave in this case to

Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Clifford W. Taylor Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

FILED MAY 30, 2001


No.

114444


consider

whether


defendant violated the incompatible offices act, MCL 15.181 et
seq.; MSA 15.1120(121) et seq., by simultaneously holding
positions as the delinquent personal property tax coordinator
in the Macomb County treasurer's office and as an elected
member of the Harrison Township Board of Trustees. On review


of the incompatible offices act as a whole, we conclude that
the phrase "public offices held by a public official," MCL


15.181(b);

MSA

15.1120(121)(b),

encompasses

positions

of


public employment.

However, we conclude that defendant's


positions are not inherently incompatible because only a
potential breach of duty of public office arises from the
ability of the township to contract with the county for the
collection of its delinquent personal property taxes. We


therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand to the circuit court for entry of an order granting
summary disposition for defendant.
I. Factual Background and Procedural Posture


Defendant is an elected trustee of Harrison Township.
She is also the delinquent personal property tax coordinator
in the Macomb County treasurer's office. Under MCL 211.56(3);
MSA 7.100(3), a township board of trustees and the board of
county commissioners, with the concurrence of the county
treasurer, may agree that the county treasurer will collect
the township's delinquent Board personal of property taxes. such The
an


Harrison

Township

Trustees

considered

arrangement in March 1994. the township continue to

A trustee eventually moved that
collect its delinquent taxes.


Defendant supported that motion.

The motion carried.


The possibility of having the county treasurer collect
the township taxes was, however, raised again five months
later. A trustee requested additional information about the


revenue generated if the township were to collect its own
2


delinquent taxes. requested

In light of this development, the board
Macomb County Prosecuting Attorney's


plaintiff

opinion whether defendant had a conflict of interest because
of her dual positions.
Plaintiff opined that defendant's offices were "not


necessarily incompatible, but . . . will be deemed to be
incompatible if the township trustee is presented with a
situation in which he or she is required to vote on a proposal
to have the county collect delinquent personal property


taxes."

In this case, plaintiff concluded that even though


the board had already voted to continue collecting the taxes,
defendant's offices were incompatible because the board was
still exploring the possibility of entering into an agreement
with the county. Defendant declined to follow plaintiff's


suggestion that she resign from one of her positions.
Plaintiff then sought a declaratory ruling that defendant
had violated the incompatible offices act by breaching a duty
of public office. The trial court granted summary disposition
for plaintiff under MCR 2.116(C)(10). The court concluded


that defendant's positions were incompatible offices because
the board of trustees had considered the question whether the
county treasurer should collect delinquent taxes and


defendant's vote affected her interest as tax coordinator.
The trial court directed that defendant vacate one of the
positions. The court denied 3
defendant's motion for


reconsideration, but stayed enforcement of its order pending
appeal.
The Court of Appeals granted defendant's delayed


application for leave to appeal and affirmed.1

The Court


concluded that a breach of duty arises when a public official
"`cannot protect, advance, or promote the interest of both
offices simultaneously.'" 233 Mich App 381, quoting OAG,


1997-1998, No 6931, p 5 (February 3, 1997). The Court further
reasoned that a breach occurs when an "issue arises in which
one constituency's interests may conflict with the interests
of a separate constituency represented by the official." at 382. Id.


It rejected defendant's arguments that the extent of


conflict between her positions was minimal and that a question
of fact existed regarding how a township-county agreement
would affect her position as tax coordinator. The Court also


concluded that the trial court properly found that defendant
voted on a proposal to have the county collect the township
taxes. The Court reasoned that defendant implicitly voted not
to enter into an agreement with the county when she voted in
favor of the township collecting its own taxes.2


1


233 Mich App 372; 592 NW2d 745 (1999).


Defendant additionally argued that the trial court
erred in denying her motion to disqualify plaintiff because of
a conflict of interest. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's ruling. Defendant does not challenge that
portion of the Court of Appeals decision.
4


2


This Court granted defendant's application for leave to
appeal. 462 Mich 854 (2000).
II. Discussion


The question presented is whether defendant violated the
incompatible offices act by simultaneously holding positions
as the delinquent personal property tax coordinator in the
Macomb County treasurer's office and as an elected member of
the Harrison Township Board of Trustees. We conclude that


defendant's positions are not inherently incompatible because
only a potential breach of duty of public office arises from
the ability of the township to contract with the county for
the collection of its delinquent personal property taxes.
A. The The Incompatible Offices Act
offices act3, at MCL 15.182; MSA


incompatible

15.1120(122), contains the general prohibition against holding
incompatible offices. It provides that "[e]xcept as provided


in [MCL 15.183; MSA 15.1120(123)], a public officer or public
employee shall not hold 2 or more incompatible offices at the
same time."4


The Legislature enacted the incompatible offices act in
1978, apparently in response to a 1978 opinion of the Attorney
General that the positions of public school superintendent and
state university board member were incompatible offices under
the common law. House Legislative Analysis, HB 6699, January
22, 1979.
Under MCL 15.181(d); MSA 15.1120(121)(d), a "public
employee" is
(continued...)
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4


3

The Legislature defined the phrase "incompatible offices"
for purposes of the act. provides:
"Incompatible offices" means public offices
held by a public official which, when the official
is performing the duties of any of the public
offices held by the official, results in any of the
following with respect to those offices held:
(i) The subordination of 1 public office to
another.
(ii) The supervision of 1 public office by
MCL 151.181(b); MSA 15.1120(121)(b)


(...continued)
an employee of this state, an employee of a city,
village, township, or county of this state, or an
employee of a department, board, agency,
institution, commission, authority, division,
council, college, university, school district,
intermediate school district, special district, or
other public entity of this state or of a city,
village, township, or county in this state, but
does not include a person whose employment results
from election or appointment.
A "public officer," in contrast, is
a person who is elected or appointed to any of the
following:
(i) An office established constitution of 1963.
by the state


4

(ii) A public office of a city, township, or county in this state.


village,


(iii) A department, board, agency,
institution, commission, authority, division,
council, college, university, school district,
intermediate school district, special district, or
other public entity of this state or a city,
village, township, or county in this state. [MCL
15.181(e); MSA 15.1120(121)(e).]
6


another.
(iii) A breach of duty of public office.
The Legislature also created exceptions to the general
prohibition on holding incompatible offices. 15.1120(123)5 now generally allows public MCL 15.183; MSA
officers and


5


MCL 15.183; MSA 15.1120(123) provides:


(1) Section 2 does not prohibit a public
officer's or public employee's appointment or
election to, or membership on, a governing board of
an institution of higher education. However, a
public officer or public employee shall not be a
member of governing boards of more than 1
institution of higher education simultaneously, and
a public officer or public employee shall not be an
employee and member of a governing board of an
institution of higher education simultaneously.
(2) Section 2 does not prohibit a member of a
school board of 1 school district from being a
superintendent of schools of another school
district.
(3) Section 2 does not prohibit a public
officer or public employee of a city, village,
township, school district, community college
district, or county from being appointed to and
serving as a member of the board of a tax increment
finance authority established pursuant to the tax
increment finance authority act, Act No. 450 of the
Public Acts of 1980, being sections 125.1801 to
125.1830 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, a downtown
development authority established pursuant to Act
No. 197 of the Public Acts of 1975, being sections
125.1651 to 125.1681 of the Michigan Compiled Laws,
or a local development finance authority
established pursuant to the local development
financing act, Act No. 281 of the Public Acts of
1986, being sections 125.2151 to 125.2174 of the
Michigan Compiled Laws.
(4) Section 2 does 7
not do any of the
(continued...)


5

(...continued)
following:
(a) Prohibit public officers or public
employees of a city, village, township, or county
having a population of less than 25,000 from
serving, with or without compensation, as emergency
medical services personnel as defined in section
20904 of the pubic health code, Act No. 368 of the
Public Acts of 1978, being section 333.20904 of the
Michigan Compiled Laws.
(b) Prohibit public officers or public
employees of a city, village, township, or county
having a population of less than 25,000 from
serving, with or without compensation, as a
firefighter in that city, village, township, or
county if that firefighter is not any of the
following:
(i) A full-time firefighter.
(ii) A fire chief.
(iii) A person who negotiates with the city,
village, township, or county on behalf of the
firefighters.
(c) Limit the authority of the governing body
of a city, village, township, or county having a
population of less than 25,000 to authorize a
public officer or public employee to perform, with
or without compensation, other additional services
for the unit of local government.
(5) This section does not relieve a person
from otherwise meeting statutory or constitutional
qualifications for eligibility to, or the continued
holding of, a public office.
(6) This section does not apply to allow or
sanction activity constituting conflict of interest
prohibited by the constitution or laws of this
state.
(7) This section does not allow or sanction
(continued...)
8


employees

to

serve

on

boards

of

institutions

of

higher


education and permits a school superintendent to serve as a
member of a school board of another district. The statute


also allows public officers and employees of local units of
government to serve as members of boards of tax increment
finance authorities, downtown development authorities, and
local development finance authorities. Finally, the statute


generally allows public officers and employees of units of
local government medical having small populations to serve as
and


emergency

services

personnel,

firefighters,

perform other services for that unit of government.
The act does not create a private cause of action. 15.184; MSA 15.1120(124). MCL


Rather, it grants the Attorney


General and county prosecuting attorneys the authority to
apply to the circuit court "for injunctive Id. or other


appropriate judicial relief or remedy."

A violation of


the act does not render an action of a public officer or
public employee absolutely void. MCL 15.185; MSA


15.1120(125).

Instead, the decision to void an action lies
Id.


within the discretion of the circuit court.

5

(...continued)
specific actions taken in the course of performance
of duties as a public official or as a member of a
governing body of an institution of higher
education that would result in a breach of duty as
a public officer or board member.
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B. Public Offices Held By A Public Official
We reject defendant's initial argument6 that her


positions are not "incompatible offices" because her position
as delinquent personal property tax coordinator is not a
"public office." The question is one of statutory


construction, which we review de novo.

The Herald Co v Bay
Our task is


City, 463 Mich 111, 117; 614 NW2d 873 (2000).

made difficult by the Legislature's inartful draftsmanship.
In particular, the Legislature used the undefined term "public
official" in defining the phrase "incompatible offices"


instead of the defined terms "public officer" and "public
employee." Construing the act as a whole, however, we


conclude that the phrase "public offices held by a public
official" encompasses public employment.
In considering a question of statutory construction, this
Court begins by examining the language of the statute. Sun


Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119
(1999). We read the statutory language in context to


determine whether ambiguity exists. Id. at 237; see Consumers
Power Co v Public Service Comm, 460 Mich 148, 163, n 10; 596
NW2d 126 (1999). If the language is unambiguous, judicial


This issue is not properly preserved because defendant
first raised it in her application for leave to appeal to this
Court. See Kratze v Independent Order of Oddfellows, 442 Mich
136, 142; 500 NW2d 115 (1993). We address it nonetheless in
the interest of completeness. See Blackwell v Citizens Ins
Co, 457 Mich 662, 672; 579 NW2d 889 (1998).
10


6

construction is precluded.

Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Marlette
We


Homes, Inc, 456 Mich 511, 515; 573 NW2d 611 (1998). enforce an unambiguous statute as written. supra at 236. seeks to

Sun Valley Foods,


Where ambiguity exists, however, this Court
the Legislature's considering intent through of a


effectuate

reasonable

construction,

the

purpose

the


statute and the object sought to be accomplished. Frankenmuth
Mut Ins, supra at 515.
The statute involved in this case defines the phrase
"incompatible offices" as "public offices held by a public
official which, when the official is performing the duties of
any of the public offices held by the official, results in"
the subordination of one public office to another, the


supervision of one public office by another, or a breach of
duty of public office. MCL 151.181(b); MSA 15.1120(121)(b).


We construe the undefined terms "public office" and
"public official" according to the common usage of the


language.

Consumers Power, supra at 163.

The dictionary


definitions of the words "public," "official," and "officer"
suggest that the terms "public official" and "public officer"
are synonymous.7 Words, however, are given meaning by context


This Court often consults dictionary definitions to
ascertain the generally accepted meaning of words. Consumers
Power, supra at 163, n 10. Random House Webster's College
Dictionary, p 1091, defines the word "public" as meaning "of,
pertaining to, or being in the service of a community or
(continued...)
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7


or setting.

Id. at 163, n 10.

In defining the phrase


"incompatible offices," the Legislature used the term "public
official," rather than the term it defined in the


statute--"public officer."

The Legislature's use of this


undefined term when it could have easily employed the defined
term suggests that the terms are not synonymous for purposes
of this statute. See 82 CJS, Statutes,

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