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Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 48909 ____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice Justices

Maura D. Cor rigan

O pinion
MICHAEL LEE, BRYAN DUNCIL, MARY
DUNCIL on behalf of herself and
JOSEPH DUNCIL, BRYAN DUNCIL, KENNETH
DUNCIL, and JON DUNCIL, as their
Next Friend, and the class of all
others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellees,
v THE MACOMB COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, and the COUNTY OF
MACOMB,
Defendant-Appellants.
____________________________________ DENNIS D. WALKER, on behalf of
himself and DAWNELL J. WALKER and
MELANIE WALKER, their Next Friend,
and DWAYNE STEAGALL, ERNEST GROCE,
JERRY GRAY, PAUL ECKLEY, DUANE GORE,
KENNETH JONES, MORRIS BARTOLOTTA, and
the class of all others similarly
situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v


Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Clifford W. Taylor Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

FILED JULY 17, 2001


No.

114700


No. 115259


THE WAYNE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS and THE COUNTY
OF WAYNE,
Defendants-Appellants.
_____________________________ BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
TAYLOR, J.
At issue in these two cases coming to us from Macomb and
Wayne counties is whether these plaintiffs have standing to
pursue actions to compel their respective county board of
commissioners to levy a tax to establish a veterans' relief
fund in accordance with the soldiers' relief fund act, MCL
35.21 et seq. It is uncontested that none of the plaintiffs
Because of this,


actually had sought relief under the act.

the counties asserted that these litigants had suffered no
injury and, accordingly, that plaintiffs (1) were without
standing to sue and (2) had failed to exhaust statutory
remedies. In Lee, the Macomb County case, the trial court


granted summary disposition for the county on those grounds.
In Walker, the Wayne County case, the trial court denied the
county's motion for summary disposition, concluding that


plaintiffs had standing and were not required to exhaust
statutory remedies because they alleged a complete failure to
comply with the act. The Court of Appeals consolidated the


appeals and largely reversed in Lee and affirmed in Walker.
235 Mich App 323; 597 NW2d 545 (1999). 2
It concluded that


plaintiffs had standing to sue to compel implementation of the
act and that mandamus was a proper remedy. Statutory Analysis
In these actions, plaintiffs seek to compel the
We reverse.


legislative branch of the county government, the board of
commissioners, to levy a tax to establish a veterans' relief
fund pursuant to the soldiers' relief fund act. provides in pertinent part:1
The county board of commissioners of each
county shall annually levy, a tax not exceeding
1/10 of a mill on each dollar, to be levied and
collected as provided by law, upon the taxable
property of each township and city, for their
respective counties, for the purpose of creating a
fund for the relief of honorably discharged
indigent members of the army, navy, air force,
marine corps, coast guard, and women's auxiliaries
of all wars or military expeditions in which the
United States of America has been, is, or may
hereafter be, a participant . . . and the indigent
spouses, minor children, and parents of each such
indigent or deceased member. . . . If any money in
the fund is not necessary for the purpose for which
it was raised, the money shall remain in the
treasury of the county as a soldiers' relief fund,
and shall be considered in raising future sums
therefor.
As can be seen, this section requires that the board of
commissioners create a soldiers' relief fund by a tax levy.
It also, however, requires the commissioners to consider the
amount existing in the fund when determining the amount, if
MCL 35.21


This act was initially enacted in 1899 and amended in
1984 to update antiquated language.
3


1

any, of the annual levy for the fund.2
Having thus established the funding mechanism, the act
then continues by providing a procedure in MCL 35.23 for
initiating and determining the amount of relief to be granted.
This section states:
The supervisor of each township and ward in
each of the counties of this state, and where there
is no ward supervisor the aldermen of the several
wards of every incorporated city in this state,
shall, on or before the last Monday in September in
each year, make and place in the hands of the
soldiers' relief commission of the county, a list
of all the persons entitled to relief under the
provisions of this act, and the soldiers' relief
commission, on the first Monday in October in each
year, shall proceed to determine the amount
necessary for aid and relief to be granted such
persons under this act, which shall be then and
there recorded in the books to be kept by the
secretary of said soldiers' relief commission. The
commission may determine not only the sum to be
paid, but the manner of paying the same, and may
discontinue the payment of such relief in their
discretion. Appeal may be taken therefrom to the
circuit court of such county, by certiorari by
filing application therefor with the clerk within
fifteen days following the making of such decision.
The court shall hear the case de novo and its
decision shall be final.
What is established, then, is a scheme whereby it is


In response to the dissent, we note that, once the fund
is created, the act provides the commissioners with discretion
regarding the amount of the annual tax levy in light of any
amount existing in the fund. Moreover, at oral argument,
plaintiffs' counsel conceded that the record did not establish
whether Macomb County had, at some time in the past, created
a fund by levying a tax in compliance with the act.
Presumably, the record is similarly unclear regarding whether
Wayne County, at some time in the past, created a fund by
levying a tax in compliance with the act.
4


2

anticipated that the township supervisor or ward aldermen will
annually prepare a list of persons eligible for relief and
provide this list to the soldiers' relief commission.3 That


commission then, in its discretion, determines the amount of
relief, if any, to grant to the indigent, honorably discharged
veteran or dependent applicant. Moreover, the statute


provides that aggrieved applicants can appeal the commission's
decision to the circuit court.
Facts and Proceedings
Here, without ever having sought relief under the act,
plaintiffs filed suit to compel Macomb and Wayne Counties to
levy the annual tax in order to create the fund of which the
act speaks. Further, they, and presumably others, will soon


seek damages for those years in which the counties allegedly


The statute requires the supervisor or alderman to
create such a list, but it does not specify the means for
identifying eligible persons. Clearly, the supervisor or
alderman can only place persons on this list if aware or made
aware that an eligible person is in need. The supervisor or
alderman can obviously act sua sponte and include on the list
any known eligible persons. However in order to fulfill the
duty to "make . . . a list of all the persons entitled to
relief under the provisions of this act," he is also obligated
to add to the list any eligible person who asks to be included
on it. (Emphasis added.) This reading of the statute, rather
than one reposing veto power with the supervisor or alderman
regarding who will be included on the list, expands the
opportunities for eligible veterans who, for whatever reason,
have not been included on the list. We opt for this expansive
reading because this is a remedial statute and we are
obligated to read it liberally in favor of the indigent
veterans it is intended to benefit. See Chandler v Dowell
Schlumberger Inc, 456 Mich 395, 398; 572 NW2d 210 (1998).
5

3

failed to comply with the act.
Macomb disposition, County, in the inter Lee case, moved of for summary
and


claiming,

alia,

lack

standing

failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

In support, it


provided the 1994 affidavit of its Department of Veterans
Affairs Director, which indicated that the department had,
through county budget appropriations, maintained a fund of
$1000 for veterans relief for several years and that no claims
for such relief had been filed for the past ten years. trial court granted Macomb County's motion for The


summary


disposition, concluding that plaintiffs lacked standing and
failed to exhaust administrative remedies because they had not
requested relief from the local government.
Wayne County, in the Walker case, sought summary


disposition on similar grounds.

It provided documentary


evidence indicating that, in 1994, the Wayne County Commission
approved an appropriation of $1,146,042 for Veterans' Affairs
expenditures and that the Wayne County Soldiers Relief Program
had been operational since February 1995. In this case,


however, the trial court denied Wayne County's motion for
summary disposition, concluding that plaintiffs had standing
because they were in the class intended to be benefitted by
the act and had been harmed by noncompliance with it and that
they were not required to exhaust administrative remedies to
challenge a wholesale failure to comply with the act.
6


These Appeals, Walker.4

two

cases

were

consolidated in Lee

in and

the

Court

of
in


which The

largely Court of

reversed Appeals

affirmed

majority

concluded

that


plaintiffs had standing because they are "members of the class
for whose benefit the Act was enacted" and because they are
"detrimentally affected in a manner different from the public
generally." 235 Mich App 332. The panel held that mandamus


was an appropriate remedy here because plaintiffs were seeking
compliance with the act, not the levy of a particular amount
or the grant of particular benefits. Id. at 333-334.


Finally, it concluded that plaintiffs' actions could not be
dismissed on the basis of failure to exhaust statutory


remedies because they were alleging a wholesale failure to
implement and comply with the act. Id. at 335.


In dissent, former Justice John Fitzgerald, sitting by
assignment, disagreed with the majority regarding standing:
[P]laintiffs have not alleged any specific
injury as a result of defendants' failure to
establish a mechanism for evaluation of a claim for
benefits or of defendants' underfunding of their
respective veterans' relief funds. [Id. at 337.]
Explaining further he said:
[P]laintiffs have not alleged a distinct and
palpable injury resulting from defendants' failure
to fully comply with the statute, and consequently
their claims cannot be differentiated from those of


The Court of Appeals ruled that government immunity
precluded plaintiffs' negligence and gross negligence claims
in both cases.
7


4

any other citizen. As a prudential matter, courts
must exercise their jurisdiction to address
tangible, personal, threatened interests, not
generalized grievances. I am not persuaded that
plaintiffs, as private citizens whose individual
rights under the statute have not been abridged,
have standing . . . . [Id. (citations omitted).]
Regarding mandamus, he stated that it was inappropriate,
assuming standing existed, because plaintiffs were "seeking to
compel defendants' exercise of discretion in a particular
manner" that is beyond the scope of mandamus Id. at 338-339.


This Court granted leave to appeal. 462 Mich 912 (2000).
Standard of Review
Whether a party has standing is a question of law. Court reviews questions of law de novo. This


Stitt v Holland


Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591, 595; 614 NW2d 88
(2000).
Standing
It is important, initially, to recognize that in


Michigan, as in the federal system, standing is of great
consequence so that neglect of it would imperil the


constitutional architecture whereby governmental powers are
divided between the three branches of government.
Standing, as a requirement to enter the courts, is a
venerable doctrine in the federal system that derives from US
Const, art III,

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