Preview:

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS


MISSION OF LOVE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v EVANGELIST HUTCHINSON MINISTRIES and GEORGE W. HUTCHINSON, Defendants-Appellees.

UNPUBLISHED April 12, 2007

No. 266219 Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 04-428155-CK

Before: Wilder, P.J., and Sawyer and Davis, JJ. PER CURIAM. In this action to quiet title, plaintiff appeals as of right, challenging the trial court's orders denying its motion for contempt, vacating an injunction, and granting defendants' motion for summary disposition. We affirm.1 I The facts relevant to this appeal are undisputed. This dispute concerns property located at 17030 and 17048 Joy Road in Detroit. Plaintiff acquired the property in 1986, subject to an existing mortgage. In July 2004, Darnell Pippen, allegedly acting for plaintiff, conveyed the property to defendant Evangelist Hutchinson Ministries by warranty deed. Plaintiff filed this suit, entitled complaint for temporary restraining order and to quiet title, in September 2004, alleging that the warranty deed was invalid because Pippen did not have authority to execute it (and that defendants were aware that he lacked authority). In September 2004, the trial court granted an ex-parte temporary restraining order. In October 2004, defendant Evangelist received an assignment of the mortgage on the property. On November 12, 2004, the trial court issued a "permanent injunction" prohibiting the parties from entering, using, modifying, altering, possessing or accessing the premises, or removing personal property from

Although plaintiff filed its claim of appeal before entry of the trial court's final order, we accept the claim of appeal as timely, given that the defect was cured by the filing of the final order within 21 days of the appeal.

1

-1-


the premises, until further court order. On November 23, 2004, defendants sent a letter to plaintiff notifying it of the mortgage assignment. In February 2005, defendants commenced proceedings for foreclosure of the mortgage by advertisement under MCL 600.3201 et seq., placing an advertisement in a local newspaper for five consecutive weeks publicizing the foreclosure sale. In March 2005, Evangelist purchased the property at the foreclosure sale, receiving a sheriff's deed. On September 29, 2005, one day before the redemption period expired, plaintiff filed a motion for contempt and clarification of order, arguing that the foreclosure sale violated the "permanent injunction." Plaintiff argued that: the purpose of the injunction was to maintain the status quo; defendants' conduct (foreclosing on the property) was designed to alter the status quo; and defendants' knowing and intentional violation of the injunction constituted contempt. Plaintiff requested the trial court to abate the redemption period or void the mortgage assignment and foreclosure sale.2 After the redemption period expired, the trial court held a hearing on plaintiff's motion. The trial court stated that the permanent injunction was entered to prohibit use or possession of the property, and contained no provision prohibiting foreclosure. Defendants asserted that because they had legal right to the property, the trial court should dissolve the injunction so that they could take possession. The trial court denied plaintiff's contempt motion and dissolved the injunction. The court's order further provided that all monies plaintiff received from the alleged July 2004 sale of the property were to be returned to Evangelist. Defendants then filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4), (5), or (10). They asserted that plaintiff's lawsuit contended that the deed signed by Pippen was invalid and that plaintiff was estopped from contending otherwise. Defendants further argued that plaintiff had no standing to maintain its suit because the trial court had dissolved the injunction and ordered the sale monies returned on the basis that there was no sale between the parties, and that defendants had legal title to the property, given that the redemption period had expired. Plaintiff responded that defendants' conduct allowed them to circumvent the equitable jurisdiction of the court and improperly benefit from unclean hands and fraud. It stated that if the warranty deed was valid, then Evangelist's titles merged and extinguished the mortgage, voiding the subsequent foreclosure. Thus, its standing was not vitiated by the foreclosure. Plaintiff further asserted that equity required that the trial court retain jurisdiction in order to give plaintiff complete relief and set aside the foreclosure proceedings, given the fraud. It also contended that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the redemption period had expired on September 30, 2005, because the redemption period did not begin to run until the deed was recorded on April 14, 2005.

Plaintiff further argued that if defendants were correct that the warranty deed signed by Pippen was valid, then Evangelist's titles merged upon receiving the mortgage assignment, thereby invalidating the mortgage claim.

2

-2-


The trial court granted defendants' motion. In its November 2005 order, the trial court held that Evangelist "has title to the real property pursuant to and legally described in a Sheriff's Deed . . . and that the redemption period has expired." II A 1 The first issue is whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for contempt. This Court reviews a trial court's decision regarding a contempt motion for an abuse of discretion. In re Dudzinski, 257 Mich App 96, 99; 667 NW2d 68 (2003). But the court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error. McFerren v B & B Investment Group, 253 Mich App 517, 522; 655 NW2d 779 (2002). "Clear error exists when the reviewing court is left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made." Massey v Mandell, 462 Mich 375, 379; 614 NW2d 70 (2000). 2 At issue, first, is whether defendants possessed the premises in violation of the injunction. Plaintiff argues that the purpose of the injunction was to maintain the status quo and that defendants' actions changed the status quo and, therefore, violated the injunction. We disagree. Although the injunctive order is titled "permanent injunction," we agree that it is substantively a preliminary injunction. Courts are not constrained by labels. See State Treasurer v Abbott, 468 Mich 143, 152 n 10; 660 NW2d 714 (2003); Manning v Amerman, 229 Mich App 608, 613; 582 NW2d 539 (1998). A preliminary injunction is entered pending a final hearing on the merits of the case, while a permanent injunction determines the rights of the parties in a final judgment. 10A Michigan Pleading & Practice (2nd ed),

Download MISSION OF LOVE V EVANGELIST HUTCHINSON MINISTRIES.pdf

Michigan Law